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IntroductIon
The Dayton Peace Agreement from 1995 brought peace to Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, ensured that it remained a single country and prevented a subsequent 
armed conflict in a divided society. Simultaneously, it established a state with 
a weak Council of Ministers at the central (state) level and split it into two Enti-
ties – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska 
(RS) and Brčko – since 2000 an autonomous district. FBiH is composed mainly 
of Bosniaks and Croats and is divided into 10 cantons, while RS is inhabited pri-
marily by Serbs and is highly centralised. This complicated structure of power 
sharing was intended to overcome division between three ethnopolitical com-
munities (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) to create a multiethnic state, which 
would become an EU and NATO member state in the future.
Indeed, on 15 February 2016 Bosnia and Herzegovina formally applied for mem-
bership of the EU. However, in the current situation this is rather an ambiguous 
achievement. Since at least 2006, the country has been mired in a protracted 
crisis caused by the lack of a common vision for the future; with Serbian politi-
cal elites creating a state within the state in RS and constantly undermining 
the power of the central governments; Croats are focused on fighting for their 
own entity and Bosniaks are pushing for a more centralised state. In order to 
stay in power, local politicians often resort to stirring up mutual resentments 
and fears and to using public resources to enhance their patronage network. 
The situation in the country deteriorated after 2008 due to the economic crisis, 
which led to an increase in the rate of unemployment (over 43% in 2015) and 
a fall in remittances from those working abroad, which are the main source of 
income for many. This combination of a protracted economic crisis and a lack 
of confidence towards corrupt political elites resulted in massive protests in 
February 2014. It brought no significant change in the internal situation or po-
litical scene of BiH since it was played down by local politicians in power and 
presented as a threat to the interests the of ethnopolitical group. However, this 
strong manifestation of public discontent led to a change of the EU’s policy to-
wards Bosnia. The EU started to focus on economic issues by introducing the 
Reform Agenda and to unblock the process of Bosnia’s EU integration, which 
resulted in a membership application being submitted.
The EU’s policy had brought no significant change in BiH since 2006 and 
a change was unquestionably needed. The application and focus on the adoption 
of EU norms may change the dynamics of the reform process as was the case 
with the visa liberalisation in 2010, which was one of the rare success stories 
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in BiH. Having a clear incentive, the local elite were able to fulfil all the crite-
ria of enabling visa-free travel, including the sophisticated introduction of the 
biometric passport in a very short period of time. However, the EU at this point 
is missing the stick and the carrots on which the success of enlargement policy 
is based since the prospect of full membership is unlikely in the coming years. 
Moreover, the Bosnian political elites want to gain a political point from the 
submitting the application, but they are less keen on introducing the reform, 
which undermines their position. The opaque way the EU is conducting the en-
largement policy in BiH prevents Bosnian society from accessing information 
regarding who is responsible for the success and the failures of the process. The 
EU is also not very strict in introducing its policy. From the conditions which 
were mentioned as requirements for submitting an application (the introduc-
tion of a functioning mechanism of coordination, the revision of the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement, implementation of the Reform Agenda, and 
the publication of the 2013 census result) none were fully implemented. The co-
ordination mechanism1 was secretly adopted in January 2016, but is questioned 
by the governing elites of Republika Srpska. This tendency is a signal for the 
governing elites in BiH that the EU is keener on quick success than real reform.
The Framework of the EU negotiation process, which provides clear bench-
marks and priorities in the reform process, is a useful tool and an opportunity 
for the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It may help in assessing 
the achievements of the country’s governing elites. But only a combination of 
bottom-up pressure and strict European conditionality can bring significant 
change and prevent local elites from using the accession process in their old 
ethno-political games. Bosnia badly needs a positive signal but at the same 
time the EU’s institutions have to fairly evaluate the achievements of Bosnian 
political elites otherwise the EU will lose credibility in the eyes of society. 
A group of NGOs from Bosnia have already questioned the massively overly 
optimistic 2014 Progress Report and the 2015 Report of the European Union, 
which ignored the basic setback in BiH in that period2. In their opinion these 
1 The coordination mechanism is intended to unify the stances of different administration 
bodies on EU related issues. The current construction of the coordination mechanism gives 
a lot of opportunities to block the process of an adoption of the EU’s norms and recommen-
dations by the various levels of the local administration (not only entities but also cantons) 
which can significantly slow down the process.
2 Komparativni pregled „Izvještaja Evropske komisije za BiH za 2015 godinu" i  „Alternativnog 
izvještaja o napretku BiH 2015“ Inicijative za monitoring evropskih integracija Bosne i Her-
cegovine, http://eu-monitoring.ba/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Komparativni-pregled-
Izvje%C5%A1taja_04112.pdf  
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two documents were intended to appease local political elites and to strength-
en their position in society.
* * *
The idea of experts from Central Europe cooperating more closely in order to 
exchange ideas, conduct common research, monitor the transformation pro-
cess and provide recommendations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
not a new one. In 2006 on the initiative of the Polish Institute of International 
Affairs (PISM) a seminar about the security challenges in Bosnia and Herze-
govina was held in the International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk 
University in Brno. A collection of the papers was published3 as a result of this 
project held on the occasion of signing the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment (SAA). It was devoted to examining the structural problems of BiH and 
the engagement of the international community in its stabilisation. Since then 
many things have change but many have stayed the same. The countries of the 
Visegrad Group – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – have 
been more actively engaged in the Western Balkans. This region, including 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is also playing a more prominent role in the frame-
work of V4 cooperation not only due to the security challenges in the immedi-
ate neighbourhood of Central Europe, but also due to the migration crisis. The 
stability of this region and its integration with the EU and NATO is of vital 
interest to the V4 countries. It was for this reason that the Centre for Eastern 
Studies (OSW), alongside partner institutions from the V4 countries, decided 
to continue this initiative to elaborate the process of the transformation of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina in a team of the scholars and political analysts from Cen-
tral Europe and BiH. The main focus of the research were the challenges for 
the stability of BiH; the examination of the policies and areas, which hinder 
the reform process, coherence and unity of the state in the changed internal 
and international circumstances; and the policies of various political actors 
towards BiH which influence the dynamics of the political process there. This 
research was the base for developing a political recommendation for the V4 
countries which, by conducting common activities, can contribute to the stabi-
lisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Despite international pressure (especially from the EU), the complicated con-
stitutional structure imposed by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in 1995 is 
3 Mateusz Gniazdowski (ed.), Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie 
środkowoeuropejskiej, Warszawa 2008.
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still in place. The consequences of this institutional arrangement were broadly 
elaborated on by Jan Muś in the opening chapter of the book. He underlines 
that the lack of democratic legitimacy of the constitution made it a subject of 
criticism from all three nations – Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks, which led to de-
creasing respect and support for this basic act of law. That eventually wreaked 
destruction on the image of the constitutionally established state institutions. 
It is also important that the system which was aimed at creating a multiethnic 
society reinforced ethnic division and led to a complete ethnicisation of po-
litical discourse and practice. As Wojciech Stanisławski notes in his paper, 
these three dominant identifications – the Bosniak, the Croatian and the Ser-
bian – separated and mutually exclusive – are not balanced by the collective 
“Bosnian” identity based on a sense of citizenship and a nation of “Bosnians”. 
According to this author the existence of a community addressing its political 
loyalty towards the modern Bosnian state is the sine qua non to reforming and 
modernising BiH. Thus the ‘ethnic ghettoisation’ of Bosnian political life has 
led to the emergence of a ‘cartel’ of ethnic political parties, which exploit na-
tional identities, sentiments and resentments to defend its position in control-
ling broad areas of the economy, media, security and administration.
Hana Semanić in her paper describes another powerful tool, which entrench-
es ethnic divisions and prevents the creation of a common identity – the educa-
tion system. BiH has no vertical or horizontal responsibility or coordination in 
the education sector on the state level. There is no common teaching curricu-
lum, but separate plans and programmes for FBiH and RS for the three constit-
uent peoples in so-called ‘national groups of subjects’. The school manuals are 
ideologically and nationalistically oriented to treat and promote the culture of 
only one ‘constituent people’, they contain many examples of hate speech di-
rected towards different ethnic groups and do not promote feelings of a united 
BiH heritage. Moreover, RS is developing a more intense level of cooperation 
in education with Serbia than with the rest of BiH. As regards the Croats of 
BiH and the Republic of Croatia, the cooperation is less institutionalised, but it 
does nevertheless exist. In these circumstances education is used to enhance 
stereotypes and to promote competing and divisive histories instead of to pro-
mote societal reconciliation and build social trust.
Péter Reményi devoted his paper to the development of the transportation and 
communication network, which weakens the unity of the state and enhances its 
partition. Starting from the thesis that the more connections and interactions 
the members of a society have, the more cohesive a country is, the author notes 
that the ethnocratic elites in Bosnia favour ethnic/entity interests in the field 
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of transportation development and push for transport lines to be constructed, 
which connect their territories. Both RS and FBiH try to plan, construct and 
develop structures which increase their own stability, efficiency and spatial 
development. This kind of spatial planning is in contrary to the interests of the 
state as a whole and additionally enhances its division. Therefore this aspect 
also should be taken into account by the EU or V4 in choosing projects which 
are to get robust funding for example in the framework of the Berlin process.
The chapter written by Rastislav Báchora and Simona Mészárosová deals 
with the influence of the poor political and economic situation on the inter-
nal security in BiH, which is challenged by corruption, organised crime and 
the different types of extremism, especially radical Islamism and terrorism. 
These also pose a significant danger to the wider region including Central and 
Eastern Europe. The advanced decentralisation and the complex structure of 
law enforcement agencies undermines the state’s ability to effectively fight 
corruption and organised crime. Due to ethnic divisions, corruption investi-
gations or allegations are often challenged as being politically motivated or as 
an attempt to weaken the position of one of BiH’s nations. Moreover, the high-
est political, legal and economic structures and businesses are infiltrated by 
criminal groups. The bad socio-economic situation and subsequent unemploy-
ment, especially among vulnerable youth, make BiH prone to further radicali-
sation and the growth of extremism. Taking into account the fact that Bosnia’s 
Muslim population is currently a pool for generating new extremists and is 
a transit country for Islamists from Western Europe to Syria and Iraq, if the 
stagnation in Bosnia is prolonged then it would be a source of growing internal 
and transnational security threats.
Haris Mešinović devoted his article to the mutual dependence structure of the 
state’s structure and economic development. He also examined the source of the 
resistance to the creation of a single economic space in BiH. First of all there is 
the fragmentised system, which requires expanded and double or even triple 
administration in a country of 4 million people and is extremely inefficient and 
costly and obviously hampers economic growth. On the other hand, it upholds 
the privileged position of interest groups affiliated with political parties. Under 
the cover of ‘the defence of national interests’ elites reject the implementation 
of reforms which would bring competitiveness to Bosnia’s economy and would 
thus significantly weaken its influence. Weak development of the private sector 
also makes the society as a whole dependent on politicians who make appoint-
ments in the administration and state-owned businesses and on which contracts 
to sign with private companies. Therefore the assumption that economic growth 
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and reform is in the interest of the Bosnia political and even business elites is un-
founded. Both Mešinović and Tomaš Dopita underlined that if Bosnia is to be re-
formed and its institutional arrangement changed, then the interests of all local 
political, social and business units should be taken into account and they should 
be involved in the process. Dopita compared the conditions and the course of the 
army and police reforms and showed why the former was a success and the latter 
a failure. Any attempt to impose even the most rational and effective solutions 
would fail if the important social and political actors are not convinced of the 
benefits of the changes and the negative consequences of failing to implement 
them. This is why the bottom-up approach and gaining the support of low-level 
actors are so important for the success of reform. Well-organised groups or com-
munities (farmer groups, health care patients, students etc.) should be involved 
in the process and may thus effectively advocate for change.
Jarosław Wiśniewski in his paper also notes that strengthening the non-gov-
ernmental sector will be crucial to the success of reforms in Bosnia, in particu-
lar in the context of the new German British initiative, which has already led 
to the process of Bosnia’s European integration being unblocked. This has not 
yet borne fruit in any real change in the circumstances on the ground, though. 
Wiśniewski also underlines the lack of ‘naming and shaming’ of those who are 
responsible for the failures and backlogs of the reform process. In current cir-
cumstances the local political elite in not accountable to its citizens, thus soci-
ety has no practical tools to assess its performance. The EU’s constant practice 
of conducting secret negotiations outside the state’s institutions additionally 
weakens the transparency of the process and the position of the society versus 
its political elites. Domestic dynamics are based on the protection of the system 
of patronages and business relations are based on political power. When we 
take into account the fact that this is somewhat threatened by this new initia-
tive, we understand the need for a wider coalition to support it.
This means not only engaging the internal actors, but also what I address in 
my article regarding the support from neighbouring countries. Neither Serbia 
nor Croatia have been fully engaged in supporting the reform process in Bosnia 
and they are rather focused on protecting the interest of their ‘own people’; this 
usually runs counter to the objectives of a pan-EU policy on Bosnia. Brussels 
has enough tools to bring Belgrade and Zagreb on board a common EU strategy 
towards BiH. In pursuing a new approach, the EU should also take into account 
the activity of other players such as Turkey, China and Russia. Especially for 
the latter influence in Bosnia is the ‘newly rediscovered’ tool of pressure on 
Western partners, and Moscow will not give it up easily.
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The analysis of the challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina is accompanied by 
a comprehensive elaboration of the relations BiH has with V4 countries, written 
by Mateusz Gniazdowski and Tomáš Strážay in both the bilateral and mul-
tilateral dimension. The authors emphasis that the Visegrad Group has proven 
to be a committed advocate of the region in the EU and a supporter of the inte-
gration ambitions of the countries of the Western Balkans. They also provide 
multiple examples of how the V4 countries can engage in stimulating reform in 
BiH. Transfer of know-how, particularly in sectoral areas, and strengthening 
the commitment of the international community – especially the EU – to the 
reform process in BiH are the most important of these. But V4 can also influence 
BiH’s political elite and explain the consequences of their inaction.
As Gniazdowski and Strážay note, BiH as an important element of political 
stability in the entire Balkan region, which is one of the main priorities for 
the foreign policy of all the Visegrad Group countries. It is also the subject of 
rivalry for influence between the EU and countries outside the EU – mainly 
Russia. Moreover, the uncontrolled migration via the Western Balkans trail 
to Western Europe and the security challenges (mainly the fight against ter-
rorism) underlines the problem of ‘geopolitical gaps’ on the map of Europe in 
the region; these pose a threat for the security not only of V4 countries but also 
of the whole EU. This challenge should be addressed in the framework of EU 
enlargement policy, which the V4 group is devoted supporter of. However, it is 
also an opportunity for V4 to confirm its role in the wider neighbourhood.
This report derives from workshops and discussions in the framework of 
a joint research project developed by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in 
cooperation with partners from the Visegrad Group countries – the Research 
Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, the Institute of International 
Relations Prague and GEO Research from Hungary.
This whole initiative was made possible by support from the International Viseg-
rad Fund. We would like also to express our sincere gratitude to the institutions 
and individuals with whom we discussed the current situation in BiH and who 
helped us conduct the research, particularly to the Embassy of the Republic of 
Poland in Sarajevo and the Delegation of the European Union in Sarajevo.
Responsibility for the opinions and views expressed in these published articles 
rests solely with their authors.
MaRTa SzPala

PART I  
THe InTeRnal CHallenGeS 

PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
17
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
16
JAN MUś
One HanD ClaPPInG – THe STaTe-BuIlDInG 
PROCeSS anD THe COnSTITuTIOn Of BOSnIa 
anD HeRzeGOVIna
The Dayton constitution purports to create a ‘state’ composed of two unrelated parts, armed 
against each other, each allied with neighboring states, and with no functional central gov-
ernment. This is a constitution worthy of a zen master, the concept of single ’state‘ so divided 
being comparable in its subtlety to the sound of one hand clapping. 
Robert Hayden, “Blueprints for a house divided”
The constitutional system of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) mostly concerns 
relations between the three ethnopolitical groups inhabiting the country. 
Each of the provisions regarding, for example, the institutional set up, divi-
sion of competences, legislative process, etc. is perceived as necessary for the 
preservation of the fragile inter-ethnic balance. Taken together, though, the 
provision provided a framework which has led to a complete ethnicisation of 
political discourse and practice and a deepening inter-ethnic abyss. The text 
presented below will briefly elaborate the Bosnian constitutional system with 
regard to its functionality and inter-ethnic relations.
1. Origins of the Constitution 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in November 1995. This marked 
the end of the war in Bosnia and provided the country with a new constitu-
tional framework, included in the peace agreement as the Annex IV. It is gen-
erally perceived that the DPA has disabled the state’s functionality and may 
be regarded as one of the main factors hampering the political and economic 
development of the country and the reconciliation of society. 
The agreement has secured the political rights of all three nations – Croats, 
Serbs and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) by enabling them to be represented in 
all central institutions and to unilaterally stop the legislative process. It has 
not however satisfied their aims and long term ambitions and in this sense it 
has preserved the political conflict between the three national factions. The 
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Serbian aspirations of the establishment of a so-called Greater Serbia, finally 
covering Serbia proper, Montenegro, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and also the land in-
habited by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, could not be 
satisfied because of the military defeat of the Serbs in Croatia in summer 1995, 
the international embargo and the subsequent loss of their dominant position 
on the Bosnian frontline. Bosnian Croats were also unable to secure independ-
ence from the authorities in Sarajevo and the unification of Western Herze-
govina and Central and Northern Bosnia with Croatia. Furthermore, Bosniak 
leaders had to give up the idea of a unitary state, in which their political option 
would ultimately enjoy the support of a relative majority. As a result of this po-
litical dissonance, the constitution of BiH has provided the political, economic 
and social framework of the state, but has been very thoroughly criticised both 
internationally and domestically, although for extremely different reasons. 
The act has been too centrist for Serbs, to too decentralising for Bosniaks, and 
discriminatory against the Croatian minority, which has been left without its 
own entity. 
The picture would not be complete without taking into account the interna-
tional environment concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constitution was 
prepared by international peace negotiators and guaranteed by major interna-
tional players. In formal terms, the Dayton accords were reached by ‘the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia’.1 Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH), the two entities composing BiH, formally speaking ‘have 
agreed’ to almost all annexes containing more detailed provisions of the peace 
agreement, while the constitution itself has been ‘approved’. The constitution 
has never been the subject of popular vote or referendum. Furthermore, the 
international community (High Representative, the OSCE, NATO, the EU, Rus-
sia, the USA, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Turkey) has been deeply 
involved in overseeing the implementation of the DPA. As such, it remains 
a unique act in the European legal system – it not only lacks political and popu-
lar legitimacy, it also provides the international community with overseeing 
powers. Secondly, the democratic legitimacy of the act, constituting the funda-
ment of the legal, political, economic and social system, has been and will be, 
dependent on the political needs of the particular players; this is the subject of 
a fundamental dispute. Using the constitution as an object of permanent criti-
cism not only led to decreasing respect and support for this basic act of law, but 
1 The General Framework Agreement, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379
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has eventually wreaked a destructive effect on the image of the constitutional-
ly established state institutions. The gradual and constant degeneration of the 
political class in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with nepotism and corruption 
constitute additional factors that, when taken together with the constitutional 
system presented below, has led to the Bosnian dysfunctionality.
2. non-territorial division – Constituent Peoples
The Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats are defined as the constituent peoples of BiH. 
This means that in reality there is a pluralistic character of society and there-
fore also of politics. After the war the question arose as to whether the territo-
rial division overlaps with the constituent character of the Bosnian peoples, 
i.e. whether each of them is constituent only on ‘its own’, respective territory. 
The Constitutional Court of BiH ruled on this subject in 2000, in the so called 
Constituent Peoples’ Decision. The ruling imposed an obligation for the respect 
of all three constituent nations in all parts of BiH. The implementation of this 
decision however required additional agreement, which was achieved only in 
March 2002. The agreement defined the vital interest of the constituent peo-
ples as well as the institutions responsible for its protection – the House of Peo-
ples in FBiH and the Council of Peoples in RS. 
The idea of a constituent character of the three peoples of BiH aims at equal 
treatment and a balanced political position. It established a constitutional 
norm developed later on in all the three branches of the government, the deci-
sion making process and in political life in general. However, a system of this 
kind has two negative consequences. Firstly, it excludes the building of a single 
“Bosnian” political identity, which could be based on the idea of citizenship, 
not ethnicity or nationality. Secondly it excludes non-constituent people from 
the state government. The latter issue was addressed in 2009 by the Sejdić-
Finci ruling of the European Court of Human Rights. It states that limiting the 
possibilities of participation in public life by virtue of being a member of an 
ethnic minority is discriminatory and as such against the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. 
3. Territorial division
Bosnia and Herzegovina is federation divided between two entities: Republika 
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This division consti-
tutes a classical territorial form of federalism. The internal border between 
these two entities roughly represents the frontline from autumn 1995. It has 
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been generally acclaimed that the existing inter-entity borders are dysfunc-
tional and contradict economic reasoning. The DPA has provided politically 
empowered territorial units, which nevertheless disregard the principals of 
economic development. Peripheries traditionally linked with certain markets. 
One example of this is Eastern Herzegovina (RS) links with Mostar (FBiH) and 
Dalmatian Coast (HR). Another is Eastern Bosnia’s (RS) links with Sarajevo and 
Tuzla (FBiH). The inter-entity borders not only split the multi-ethnic commu-
nities, they also split roads, factories, mines, sale points and customers. 
Map 1. Territorial Division of BiH between the RS and the FBiH. The number 
refer to the cantons in the FBiH
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The Bosnian federation has another dimension, though – the national one. 
While the Serbs constitute a majority in RS, FBiH is dominated by Bosniaks. 
Bosnian Croats control two of the ten cantons in the FBiH (II, VIII) and con-
stitute a significant minority in two other cantons (VI, VII), where they can 
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also possibly win power. The nations are not, though, linked to the territories, 
nor do the territories formally have any particular national character. As re-
gards non-territorial federalism, the Constitutional Court decided in 2000 in 
the above-mentioned ruling that: elements of a democratic state and society as 
well as underlying assumptions – pluralism, just procedures, peaceful relations that 
arise out of the Constitution – must serve as a guideline for further elaboration of the 
issue of the structure of BiH as a multi-national state. (…) Territorial division must 
not serve as an instrument of ethnic segregation (…) Despite the territorial division of 
BiH by establishment of two Entities, this territorial division cannot serve as a con-
stitutional legitimacy for ethnic domination, national homogenisation or the right to 
maintain results of ethnic cleansing.(…) Designation of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as 
constituent peoples in the Preamble of the Constitution of BiH must be understood as 
an all-inclusive principle of the Constitution of BiH to which the Entities must fully 
adhere, pursuant to Article III.3 (b) of the Constitution of BiH.2 In short – Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats were politically empowered regardless of the internal divi-
sion of the territory. This ruling, followed by its implementation indicates that 
national or ethnopolitical division does not formally reflect the territorial one, 
although in practice certain regions are dominated by the respective groups.
The constitutional system of Bosnia provides its citizens with both forms of 
federalism – territorial and non-territorial and may be described as a bidimen-
sional federation. This model was adopted due to the strong division between 
particular ethnopolitical factions. Territorial division provided their leaders 
with power and the non-territorial dimension opened the path for the rees-
tablishment of multi-ethnic societies. And while the first conditions have been 
met, the second is still to be realised and is unlikely to happen. 
4. Constitutional consociationalism – institutions, processes, 
competences and territorial division
Bosnia and Herzegovina was inhabited by three groups with a different eth-
nic consciousness and political identity. Therefore the constitutional model 
applied in this case required a special feature – consociationalism. Since the 
political domination of one of the groups is likely to lead to the exclusion of the 
others from the state government, the consociational democracy implies that 
in pluralist societies the widest possible participation of all groups is needed 
for the sake of the stability of the system. It needs to be emphasised that in 
2 Constituent Peoples’ Decision of the BiH Constitutional Court, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/
legal/const/default.asp?content_id=5853m
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a divided society, just as in the case of BiH, the political differences between re-
spective group concern major questions, for example those of cultural identity, 
political organisation and social life and are therefore of grave significance. 
In practice the consociational model contains the following characteristics: 
the proportional political representation in the legislature, executive, judici-
ary and administration, the right to veto,3 enjoyed by representatives of the 
respective groups, autonomy from the central authorities4 and the require-
ment of a grand coalition in the legislature enabling the common governing by 
all segments of society. These solutions weaken the state authorities, but their 
main goal has been to stabilise the political system and thus to preserve their 
respective statehoods. 
4.1. Representation of ethnic groups or ethnicisation of institutions
The post-war practice and pre-war experience established a norm, which 
guarantees at least the formal participation in state governance by repre-
sentatives of all the three groups. Subsequently, all of the important state in-
stitutions have been covered by ethnic parity. For example, the upper cham-
ber of the Bosnian Parliament – the House of Peoples – comprises 15 delegates. 
Two-thirds (five Croats and five Bosniaks) are selected from the FBiH by the 
respective regional parliament and one-third (five Serbs) from RS. They 
therefore represent the interests of the regional legislatures, and strictly 
speaking ruling regional coalitions and, at the same time, the three sepa-
rate ethnic caucuses (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). The lower chamber – the 
House of Representatives – consists of 42 Members. Two-thirds (28) of them 
are elected in popular vote directly from FBiH and one-third (14) from RS. 
There is no formal requirement regarding the ethnic or national affiliation 
of the elected members so theoretically representatives of any ethnic groups, 
including minorities can be elected. In practice however the members from 
RS are almost exclusively Serbs, while in FBiH the victors are Bosniaks and 
Croats. Taking into account the dominance of Serbs in RS and Bosniaks and 
Croats in FBiH, both chambers of parliament are politically divided along 
ethnic and territorial lines. 
Proportional representation has been guaranteed, both in terms of territo-
ry and ethnicity. Rules concerning election to the House of Representatives 
3 In BiH has been guaranteed by the mechanism of the protection of the vital interest.
4 In BiH it has materialised by a strong decentralisation towards the middle-level of govern-
ance – entities and cantons.
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suggest even some sort of representation of the population as the whole. 
Nevertheless, the ethno-political key is the dominant one and, so far, the 
parliamentary elections favoured those political factions which look for 
support among one of the constituent peoples and preferably in one of the 
entities. This is a perversion of the consociational or federal systems, where 
the upper chamber usually represents the particular interest of regions or 
society’s segments, while the lower chamber tends to reflect the overall in-
terest of the population, such as: security, economic development, social 
welfare, international trade and foreign policy. In BiH the legislature al-
most exclusively reflects the ethnopolitical divisions and ignores common 
identity and issues.
Ethnic parity does not, though, only affect parliament, which reflects social 
divisions in other way, even if they are not marked by ethnicity. A similar logic 
has been applied to the head of state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This collective 
body – the Presidency – consists of three members: one Bosniak and one Croat, 
each directly elected from the territory of FBiH, and one Serb directly elected 
from the territory of RS. The members of the presidency are elected (precisely 
as is the case with members of parliament) with regard to their nationality, 
as representatives of a particular constituent people inhabiting a particular 
entity. Minority members submitted a complaint regarding the election rules 
concerning the presidency to the European Courts of Human Rights (Sejdić – 
Finci case). 
The executive also reflects ethno-territorial divisions. One third of the Coun-
cil of Ministers should be appointed from RS and, consequently, should repre-
sent the interests of Serbian majority inhabiting it. The remaining two thirds 
should represent the interests of Bosniaks and Croats who dominate the FBiH. 
The composition of the council of ministers and senior officials in the min-
istries has been strictly regulated to ensure the participation of each of the 
three constituent nations’ representatives. The Constituent Peoples’ Decision 
has provided more detailed guidelines concerning the ethnic composition of 
public offices. The court decided that in the entities: the prime minister and 
their deputies may not come from the same constituent people. Moreover, out 
of the following positions in the entities not more than two should be staffed 
by representatives of any one constituent people or of ethnic minorities: the 
prime minister, two speakers of the upper and lower chambers of the relevant 
parliaments, presidents of the supreme and constitutional courts, public pros-
ecutors. In the entities, the President should have two Vice-Presidents coming 
from different constituent peoples. 
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A similar line of logic has been followed also in relation to executive institu-
tions on the entity level of government. In the transitional period, i.e. the pe-
riod of the return of refugees to their pre-war homes: The RS Government should 
be composed of 8 Serb, 5 Bosniak and 3 Croat ministers. One Other may be nominated 
by the Prime Minister from the quota of the largest constituent people. There shall 
be additionally a Prime Minister who shall have two Deputy Prime Ministers from 
different constituent peoples selected from among the Ministers. The Federation Gov-
ernment (Prime Minister and 16 ministers) shall be composed of 8 Bosniak, 5 Croat 
and 3 Serb ministers. One Other may be nominated by the Prime Minister from the 
quota of the largest constituent people. There shall be additionally a Prime Minister 
who shall have two Deputy Prime Ministers from different constituent peoples se-
lected from among the Ministers.5 
This overwhelming ethnicisation of public institutions has resulted in the 
preservation of the ethno-political divisions, since none of the state institu-
tions, particularly the parliaments can claim to represent the whole popula-
tion. In terms of institutional affiliation, ethnic identity with one of the three 
groups became the leading factor. Then again, guarantees of inclusion, even 
if concerning virtually all institutions, do not necessarily lead to state ineffi-
ciency or failure. However, when such provisions are paralleled in the decision 
making process and strengthened by ethno-territorial divisions and substan-
tial decentralisation, the ethnic identity and therefore ethnic divisions receive 
superior political value. 
4.2. The division of competences 
Territorial division does not necessary lead to decentralisation and definitely 
does not determine the model under which competences are divided between 
the centre, the regions and the communities. The Bosnian model encourages 
regionalisation by leaving weak state authorities and powerless municipali-
ties. The enumerations below show the formal (constitutional) state compe-
tences as well as the contested ones, which, as centralist claims, arise from 
other provisions of the constitution, but which remain contested by political 
elites aiming at a further decentralisation. 
5 Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples’ Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.oscebih.org/Download.aspx?id=160&lang=EN
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formal state competences (article III) 
Foreign policy
Foreign trade policy
Customs policy
Monetary policy
Finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation
International and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol
Establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities
Regulation of inter-entity transportation
Air traffic control
formal state competences (Outside of article III)
Election law 
Constitutional judiciary 
Defence 
Establishment of a Central Bank by Parliament 
Limited budgetary competences 
International obligations of the State  
Protection of human rights 
Implied and contested competences:
Establishment of the new state institutions – border guard 
The system of and the agency for indirect taxation 
This list in not complete as the division of competences and the empowerment 
of various levels of institutions does not have a permanent character. It is rath-
er a subject of a spill-over effect, presuming that the common institutions have 
a growing number of competences. Nevertheless, this system has been criti-
cised on from both sides and is accused of having a centralist and a decentral-
ising character, but this dispute (centralisation or decentralisation) is rather 
another topic used as a smokescreen protecting political elites from responsi-
bility for the catastrophic economic and social condition of the state. Neither 
centralisation nor decentralisation does not determine the development of the 
country as local politicians claim. In the case of BiH, most of the responsibility 
for the economy, agriculture, social security, the insurance system, banking, 
housing, infrastructure, etc. falls on the entities and cantons. However, this 
does not mean that solutions of this kind to problems which arise are impos-
sible. It is possible on both these levels of governance.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
26
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
02
/2
01
6
4.3. Procedural guarantees of inclusion
There are three types of veto which can be introduced by a particular caucus 
to stop the decision making process. First of all there is the vital interest pro-
tection veto. The three (of five) delegates to the House of Peoples, representing 
one of the constituent nations, may veto a legislative process by referring to the 
protection of the vital national interest of their people. 
The vital interests have been defined as follows:
 – to exercise the rights of constituent peoples to be adequately represented in legislative, 
executive and judicial bodies,
 – to identity one constituent people,
 – constitutional amendments,
 – the organisation of public authorities,
 – the equal rights of constituent peoples in the decision-making process,
 – education, religion, language, the promotion of culture, tradition and cultural heritage,
 – territorial organisation,
 – the public information system,
 – and other issues treated as being of vital national interest if so claimed by 2/3 of one of 
the caucuses of the constituent peoples in the House of Peoples or Council of Peoples.
The protection of vital interest may practically cover all possible areas of leg-
islation. Also the legislation procedure relies on the support of representatives 
of the all three constituent peoples, and two thirds of either Bosniak, Croat or 
Serb representatives in the House of Peoples may block a legislative proposal. 
In the House in Representatives the right to veto might be used by the members 
on the basis of territorial affiliation. This in fact means also a nationally-based 
veto. In this case the decision-making process may be blocked by a two-thirds 
sub-majority of all deputies elected from one of the entities. This indirect way 
of vetoing a decision-making process is known as entity voting or the entity 
veto. Entity voting is based on the territorial division of the country, while the 
other veto opportunities are attributed rather to the particular constituent 
peoples than the territory. The entity veto ends the relevant legislative proce-
dure, while the vital interest veto has a more constructive character leaving 
the disputed bill for reconsideration and possible amendment. The entity veto 
– as opposed to ‘the vital interest veto’ – does not require a standard, yet com-
plicated, procedure of the preparation of court motions and is based on vote 
counting in parliament. Interestingly, the entity veto has been used in over 
50% of procedures, which led to the rejection of a proposal, while the vital in-
terest veto only 4 times (during the period 1997-2007). 
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The members of the Presidency may stop legislation procedure by referring to 
the protection of one of the entities’ interests. This decision must be supported 
by a majority of either Bosniak or Croat delegates to the House of Peoples of 
FBiH, or of Serbian delegates to the National Assembly of Republika Srpska 
(both of these are the parliamentary bodies of the federal units). Thus, while 
protecting the interests of the whole entity, a member of the Presidency of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina derives the power of veto from representatives of one of 
the constituent nations.
Common wisdom claims that true political power can be measured by one’s 
ability to block the decision making process. In BiH these are ethnopolitical 
factions, whose political power has not only become formalised but has also 
gained an exclusive character. 
Conclusions
Territorial division, decentralisation, and institutional empowerment are of-
ten mentioned in political models and applied in practice to varying intensities 
and scales. The principles of proportional representation, grand coalition, and 
federalism has been provided to stabilise the country, which has been peopled 
by a divided society. These tools seem to grant autonomy to different groups 
within society, while at the same time preserving a common state. These tools 
have been generously applied in the Bosnian political system, framed by the 
constitution. The three nations inhabiting Bosnia and Herzegovina, repre-
senting three very different visions of the future of the country, have their rep-
resentatives in practically all public institutions. Unlike the political system 
of Germany and the US, composition of the Bosnian government, presidency, 
parliament and other institutions reflect its federal division. Thus the question 
of nationality has dominated Bosnian political life and development. 
Nevertheless, it is the application of ethnic parity in the legislative path and 
decision making process in the presidency which provide ethnicity with true 
political power and therefore it is this which remains destructive for building 
a common Bosnian identity and constitutes a serious obstacle for socio-eco-
nomic development. Any political party will find it much easier to gain power, 
represent the people and use legislative tools if it relies on the support of one of 
the constituent peoples. In the post-war situation this means mobilising voters 
by emphasising the threat arising from the other nationalities and this pro-
motes a similar action among the other nationalities. 
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WOJCIECH STANISłAWSKI
THRee naTIOnS In BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna  
(TO Say nOTHInG Of THe fOuRTH)  
THe queST fOR a POST-DayTOn COlleCTIVe 
BOSnIan IDenTITy
For the last couple of years diplomats, political analysts, international advisers 
and journalists interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) or who feel respon-
sible for it have constantly been posing questions such as: “What went wrong?”, 
“What are the key factors of the crisis?” “Why is the post-war settlement so 
painful?” or “What is the main obstacle to the political process?”. The fact that 
we are celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 
that laid the groundwork for post-war Bosnia and started the peace process 
does not help much. 
The opinion that those endeavours have so far been in vain, and the conclusion 
that the “Bosnian problem” is – under the present political conditions and with 
the existing political toolset – insoluble, is not a new one; in the mid-2000s local 
authors such as Božo Zepić6 and Nerzuk Ćurak7 have claimed this. It took some 
time, however, before internationally renowned experts were able to admit in 
Foreign Affairs pages – as did Patrick C. McMahon and Jon Western – that “Bosnia 
stands on the brink of collapse”.8 It is not openly admitted by diplomats or mem-
bers of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) staff; however, the weariness 
and resignation that come hand in hand with ‘exit syndrome’ seem to be present 
among international community much more than they were in the nineties. 
If anyone is ready at all to admit that ‘something went wrong in Bosnia’ – be it the 
failed population census, the still-divided Mostar, one FBiH’s9 cabinet falling af-
6 B. Zepić, Pat pozicija u Bosni i Hercegovini, Mostar 2005.
7 N. Ćurak, Obnova bosanskih utopija. Politologija, politička filozofija i socijologija dejtonske 
države i društva, Zagreb-Sarajevo, 2006.
8 P. C. McMahon, J. Western, The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia from Falling Apart, 
Foreign Affairs, October 2009.
9 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the two entities in BiH. 
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ter the other, the lack of any prospects of constitutional reform, etc. – there is one 
“usual suspect” to be blamed in the first place: the nationalisms, or – as George 
S. Will put it in his review of recent publications on Bosnia – the centrifugal forces 
of the rival ethnic nationalisms of Bosnia’s Muslims, Croats and Serbs.10 
I wish to argue that this interpretation oversimplifies the state of affairs. Quite 
obviously centrifugal forces exist, but they are not ingrained in the simple 
ethno-national sentiments. And what makes these forces so dangerous for 
Bosnia is the lack (or at least the weakness) of a counterbalancing centripetal 
force, that – under normal circumstances – would be dominant. 
One of the basic problems of present-day BiH is precisely this deficiency of the 
collective Bosnian identity based on a sense of citizenship. The lack of this 
identity makes the creation of any political bodies unfeasible – be they popu-
lar movements or political parties enjoying wide support among the political 
elites, with clearly defined aims and the determination to follow a set agenda. 
The problem is that political bodies of this kind, willing and mobilised, are the 
sine qua non to reform and modernise BiH, to move it from the current state 
of entanglement. This is the ‘fourth nation’ – so much expected and still non-
existent in present Bosnia: the nation of Bosnians, addressing their political 
loyalty towards the modern Bosnian state. 
The three nations of Bosnia (or, as I shall elaborate below, the dominant politi-
cal projects, which are to a very limited extent identical to the expression of 
a “true” ethnic will, interests, and even sentiments) leave almost no room for 
the development and maturing of the ‘fourth nation’—the civic one. It does ex-
ist, of course: as a political offer, as a set of ideas, and even in the field. However, 
the present situation offers barely any opportunity for the expression, action 
and maturing of such Bosnian national sentiment. 
Is there room for advice, more nuanced and less bold than the blunt nation-
building idealism that has – since the interventions in Bosnia and Iraq – been 
rightly criticised and sometimes even ridiculed? The present project, aimed 
at the assessment of the current state of stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
obliges us to look for some viable solutions and a possible V4 contribution. I be-
lieve there still exist ways and means to strengthen the Bosnian identity, es-
pecially at a moment when the present political order would become, for any 
10 G. S. Will, Been There, Didn’t Do That, http://townhall.com/columnists/georgewill/2009/09/20/
been_there,_didnt_do_that?page=full 
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reason, destabilised – and, secondly, to help forge a new, broader collective Bos-
nian identity by offering a new understanding of the historical past. 
1. The three historical and political nations of Bosnia
The development of the various national identities within Bosnia’s borders in 
modern history is certainly too broad a subject to be discussed or even epito-
mised within a single paper. But whether we refer to internationally renowned 
experts such as Xavier Bougarel11 or (as yet) lesser known specialists,12 the 
broad and overall conclusion remains the same: two of the country’s constitu-
ent nations, namely Serbs and Croats, were developing their historical and cul-
tural identities relying on, respectively, Belgrade and Zagreb as the source of 
historical curricula, values and political agendas. 
The evolution of the third, Muslim/Bosniak national identity, was encounter-
ing many obstacles; there were numerous factors inhibiting its development 
and several alternative projects regarding the basis of the Bosniak collective 
identity. We may observe with some astonishment the vague similarities be-
tween the perspectives of the Bosnian project under communist rule and in 
the post-Dayton era: both Bosnia’s were expected to became a model multi-na-
tional (or, to put it differently, ‘supra-national’) states. In both cases the hopes 
for the fast development of the supra-national or civic identity proved futile. 
Deliberately projected systems of ‘national quotas’, checks and balances, in-
stead of making the political system viable, led to the stalemate. One could per-
ceive it as a historical irony or a historical regularity, but the old adage The more 
things change, the more they stay the same seems to have rather a lot in common 
with the pre-1990 and post-1995 Bosnia. 
The architects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, facing the historical circum-
stances (plus the realities of the cruel war) did their best to tailor the de facto 
constitution of BiH in such a way as to make it functional for a multi-ethnic 
society, comprising the three main ethnic groups and 17 minorities. Although 
11 X. Bougarel, Od ‘Muslimana’ do ‘Bošnjaka’: pitanje nacionalnog imena bosanskih muslima-
na, [In:] H. Kamberović (ed.) Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka. Zbornik radova, 
Sarajevo 2008.
12 See I. Lucić, In the service of the nation: intellectuals’ articulation of the Muslim national iden-
tity, Nationalities Papers, vol. 40/2012; M. Seroka, Czynnik religijny w kształtowaniu 
współczesnej boszniackiej tożsamości narodowej, [In:] R.Michalak (ed.) Polityka jako wyraz 
lub następstwo religijności, Zielona Góra 2015; C. Sancaktar, Historical construction and De-
velopment of the Bosniak Nation. Alternatives, Turkish Journal of Foreign Relations, vol. 11/2012.
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‘ethnic hatred’ has been (quite inaccurately) blamed for all the horrors of the 
civil war, ethnicity itself has been (quite paradoxically) institutionalised in 
all aspects of political life in BiH. The basis of the whole political system has 
been recognition of the three constituent nations (Bosniak, Croat and Serbian) 
and the effort to make them share power and cooperate on various (municipal, 
cantonal, entity and state) levels. 
After twenty years, the result is all too well known: stalemate. The appeal to 
‘ethnic interests’ – or, better still, to the necessity of defending the “endangered 
vital interest of the constituent nation” – became a political passkey. By exploit-
ing it, ruling politicians are able to close every door to political manoeuvring. 
Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, when the ‘double 
hatted’ Office of the High Representative (OHR) was trying to show some ini-
tiative, this stalemate has been possible to observe within every aspect of the 
political process: be it constitutional reform or the EU integration. 
2. The nations or the projects?
But are the trivial ethnic rivalries to be blamed for this stalemate? Two re-
searchers in an op-ed in Der Spiegel which was broadly commented on referred 
to it as the “ethnical ghettoisation” of many aspects of Bosnian life.13 Many ex-
perts are doing their best to give a more nuanced answer. The Bosnian-Her-
zegovinian public sphere has recently become the scene of a battle of three 
dominant identifications – the Bosniak, the Croatian and the Serbian – that 
are perceived as separate and mutually exclusive – suggests Polish researcher 
Maciej Falski.14 There are many communities based on the quest of a collective 
identity in Bosnia, each of whom tends to become a state per se, granting the 
status of “citizen” only to their own members – explains the stalemate Bosnian 
sociologist Tarik Haverić.15 
In my opinion, however, the most adequate description of the ethno-political 
situation in Bosnia has been offered by the team of experts of the renowned In-
ternational Crisis Group. In a report from July 2014, entitled “Bosnia’s Future” 
13 R. Flottau, M. Kraske, Dayton 10 Years On: Apartheid in Bosnia, http://www.spiegel.de/in-
ternational/spiegel/dayton-10-years-on-apartheid-in-bosnia-a-383962.html
14 M.Falski, Pamięć społeczna a ideologia. Z problematyki autodefinicji kultury bośniackiej, 
Południowosłowiańskie Zeszyty Naukowe. Język, kultura, literatura,  łódź 2007, pp. 51–64.
15 T.Haverić, Etnos i demokratija. Slučaj Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo 2006, p. 318.
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(and, so far, the last, concluding one, that deals with Bosnia) they have defined 
the situation as follows: 
The noise and confusion are misleading. The reality is simpler: Bosnia has three, 
and only three, political communities that are not precisely identical to the 
three constituent peoples named in the constitution. Each is loyal to the set 
of political institutions that represent it, centred on a capital city. [emphasis 
mine]. Bosnian patriots, the largest community, are loyal to the BiH state and Sara-
jevo. They disagree on much but want that state to thrive as they see in it the repre-
sentation and protection of their interests. The second community is loyal to RS and 
Banja Luka; it wants the best for that entity and dreams of its independence. The 
third and smallest community lacks a clear institutional focus but has a capital of 
sorts in Mostar and an aspiration to some kind of self-rule for Croat-populated areas.
Political communities overlap with constituent peoples but are not identical to them. 
(…) Whatever his or her ancestry, a Bosnian may claim membership in any of the 
three peoples or any minority and may change identity at any time. Belonging to 
a political community is strictly voluntary. Yet, the sense of loyalty is exclusive: no 
one is left out; there are no minorities or dual identities. 
Whatever the details of their family trees, everyone in Bosnia looks to either 
Sarajevo, Banja Luka or Mostar as their focus of political activity and figu-
rative capital. [emphasis mine]. Nor are they based on heredity, culture or specific 
territory. Most but not all Bosniaks are Bosnian patriots, but so are many Croats and 
Serbs. Most Serbs are loyal primarily to RS, joined by smaller numbers of Bosniaks 
and Croats who feel at home there. Most Croats but also some Serbs and Bosniaks 
gravitate to Mostar. Ethnic minorities thrive in all three communities. Each commu-
nity’s adherents range from the apathetic to the fanatical.
Each political community corresponds to one of the political projects – a strong Bos-
nia, a strong RS or a Croat unit – and their competition constitutes Bosnia’s political 
struggle. Each has its own political parties, civil society organisations, media and 
patron-client networks. Individuals, factions and parties within a community fight 
over issues, the spoils and the like but agree on the overall political agenda and coop-
erate easily when it is threatened.16 
16 Bosnia’s Future, Europe Report 232, Brussels 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/eu-
rope/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/232-bosnia-s-future.aspx, pp. 6-8.
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I believe this is the most apt description of post-Dayton Bosnia’s ethno-political 
situation: the three meta-political projects that appeal to the national identities, 
sentiments and resentments, use (and abuse) the Dayton system – but are by no 
means pure or naïve expressions of the ‘(ethno)national will’. On the contrary, 
those projects and emotions are exploited by a ‘cartel’ of the six main political 
parties (broadly known as the ‘Sextet’) that for the last couple of years has been 
able to control broad areas of the economy, media, security and administration. 
3. The stalemate and the protests
Is there a way to break this cartelisation of Bosnia’s political life and the rule of 
the ‘Sextet’? It seems extremely complicated, especially given the determina-
tion with which the members of the ruling political elite in Bosnia are ready to 
defend its rule on the grounds of ‘defending the Dayton/constitutional order’.
The only viable solution would be to look for and support a new, civil, Bosnian 
common identity – one that would openly reject or at least disregard the strong 
ethnic identifications that make up the core of the present political system. 
Are there any prospects for such a common identity, a citizen’s nation – the 
fourth nation I was referring to in the title of my paper – to come out and grow? 
The truth is that numerous political initiatives that were appealing to this kind 
of understanding of the common interest were either marginalised – or have 
enjoyed only limited support or have been denounced as a cover up of the ma-
joritarian, Bosniak political project.17 Even the preliminary results of the de-
layed and incomplete present census (the fate of which is a meaningful exam-
ple of the political stalemate itself) show that the constituent nations dominate 
in statistics and public discourse. 
I think that as the ‘Sextet rule’ compromises itself, we should look for new avenues 
where an anti-systemic attitude could be voiced. The Dayton paradigm should be 
shifted and a new, Bosnian, citizen-rather-than-ethnic, identity expressed. 
In fact situations of this kind already took place during the Bosnian spring of 
2014 which, alas, withered away all too quickly. Several studies of the grass-
roots protest and the Bosnian civil unrest of 2014 clearly show that probably 
the most important aspect of those protests had been the appeals to a Bosnian 
17 Ibidem, p. 9.
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identity, the rejection of the whole system of political rule and the strong mis-
trust expressed towards all the existing political parties.18 
Should the ‘Sextet system’ prove to be non-viable, the chances are that protests 
of this kind may emerge more often and on a much broader scale. The experi-
ence of the emergence of the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s is a clear 
example of how a deterioration of general living conditions and mistrust to-
wards the ruling class could result in mass protests and – consequently help 
forge new collective identities and new mainstream political projects. 
What makes such developments even more probable are the radically new chal-
lenges that Western Balkan countries (as much as the whole Europe) might face 
with the present influx of the refugees/economic migrants from the Middle East 
and Northern Africa. As we are in the midst of a rapidly developing refugee cri-
sis, it is impossible to judge any of its outcomes: what we have encountered, how-
ever, since the summer of 2015 shows that the impact could be truly tectonic. 
So far, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been out of the way of the main migration 
routes – due to both geographical (inaccessibility, land-locked position) and eco-
nomic reasons. Any influx of refugees/migrants would certainly present a chal-
lenge to the fragile economy and ineffective infrastructure of the state. On the 
other hand though, it could quite unexpectedly became a unifying factor for the 
nations of Bosnia, engendering sentiments of solidarity, and a common threat. 
Such sentiments had already been voiced this summer in the other ‘troubled’ 
Balkan area – namely, the Preševo Valley – where longstanding Serbian-Albani-
an tensions sank into the background during August, 2015, when thousands of 
refugees/migrants from Macedonia were passing through the area.19
4. The quest for a shared memory 
Is there a chance for the development of the common, collective memory of the 
past within the communities or between the nations divided by (civil) war? It 
is certainly one of the biggest challenges for any reconciliation process. 
18 The most exhaustive study of this aspect of the Bosnian spring is, in my opinion, the work-
ing paper Sow hunger, reap anger, written by Chiara Milan, PhD candidate at the European 
University Institute and presented during the seminar run at the Collegium Civitas in War-
saw by Mateusz Falkowski, PhD.
19 Those are the observations of prof. Radosław Zenderowski, the renowned researcher of the 
conflict in the Preševo Valley, who was on the spot in August and shared his opinion with 
the author in several conversations and e-mail exchanges. 
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The leading Polish specialist in the field of ‘remembrance studies’, Robert Tra-
ba, during the last few years did a lot to describe the Polish and German no-
tions of the past.20 What he argues is that the ‘collective historical memories’ 
of the two neighbouring nations, that were so dramatically in conflict in the 
20th century (with the culmination during the Nazi German invasion and oc-
cupation of Poland, followed by looting of its resources and extermination of 
its population) remain parallel and separate.21 This situation exists in spite of 
the fact that the war in Central Europe ended 70 years ago, that many dramatic 
and politically valid acts of reconciliation took place and that Berlin and War-
saw remain close allies within the EU and NATO. 
I find the formula of ‘parallel and separate collective memories’ truly accu-
rate, not only for Poland and Germany, but also – actually, much more so – for 
other post-conflict communities and nations, forced by circumstances (or by 
decisions made at the international level) to remain neighbours or to share 
the same country and space. Actually, it is possible to note dozens of examples 
showing how divided and conflicted Bosniak, Croat and Serb collective memo-
ries currently are: both at the academic and popular level they are at its worst 
– contradictory, at best, i.e. parallel and separate. 
Efforts to construct an education curriculum of a basic shared history started 
two years after the Dayton peace conference; that is, on the relatively early 
stage of post-war build-up – and has still borne almost no fruit. Many authors, 
from Tommaso Diegoli22 to Valery Perry,23 to Pilvi Torsti,24 who made perhaps 
20 I am referring there basically to his review article Polska i niemiecka kultura pamięci, http://
www.polska-niemcy-interakcje.pl/articles/show/44. However, one should also read his ma-
jor publications: R. Traba (ed.), Przeszłość w teraźniejszości. Polskie spory o historię na 
początku XXI wieku, Poznań 2009; H.H. Hahn, R. Traba, M. Górny, K. Kończal (ed.), Polsko-
-niemieckie miejsca pamięci. Refleksje metodologiczne, Warszawa 2013. 
21 The German dominants of the collective memory of the second world war and 20th century 
are: the Holocaust, the battle of Stalingrad as a token of German military virtues, the bom-
bardment of Dresden as the symbol of the innocent German victims and the expulsions. The 
major points of the parallel Polish collective remembrance discourse is the heroic defence of 
the country against the German invasion, the Warsaw Uprising (1944) as the symbol of the 
quest for independence and, thirdly, Auschwitz and Katyn as symbols of Polish nations vic-
timised by the two totalitarianisms – the Nazi and the Soviet one – states Traba; R. Traba, 
op. cit., p. 6. 
22 T. Diegoli, Collective Memory and Social Reconstruction in Post-Conflict BiH, Denver 2007.
23 V.Perry, Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Educational System in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina”, ECMI Working Papers, No. 18.
24 P. Torsti, Segregated Education and Texts: A Challenge to Peace in BiH, International Journal 
of World Peace, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 2009).
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most in-depth description of historical education in Bosnia, harbour no il-
lusions: it has been one of the most spectacular failures of the reconciliation 
process. Within each of the three Bosnias’ ‘political projects’ its own histori-
cal narration is undergoing construction and development, and they are usu-
ally strongly polemically oriented towards ‘other’ narratives. Such narratives, 
even if they are objectively false, overstated or misinterpreted remain (owing 
to the educational system) deeply entrenched within each community and are 
perceived as ‘true’, ‘the one and only non-falsified’, etc. The endeavours under-
taken to impose a unified historical curriculum for the whole BiH failed and 
it is hard to imagine such an initiative being raised again within the existing 
‘Sextet system’. 
Given this ‘pat-position’ it might perhaps be reasonable to start the debate on 
Bosnia’s history/histories and the representations of the past on some other 
plane, neither the educational one (where the stalemate is evident) nor the aca-
demic (which is also heavily politicised). 
I do believe that much remains to be done regarding the whole sphere of the 
historical museums and exhibitions. Such institutions as ‘Historical Museums’ 
exist in both entities and several cities – heavily politicised but also (even more 
severely) underinvested and thus underdeveloped. To help them modernise 
would at present be both economically and politically too expensive: even if 
V4 was able to secure funds for this, it would mean support for competing and 
potentially conflicted projects. 
I would like, however, to point out the set of new digital technologies that 
have resulted in a new, rapidly developing phenomenon: so called ‘virtual mu-
seums’.25 Scores of them have been created in cyberspace during the last few 
years – either as an extension of a ‘real‘ museum’s offer or as a new, autonomic 
initiative. Owing to the advantages of the new technologies, the cost of estab-
lishing, running and conserving these ‘virtual museums’ is usually a fraction 
of the real museum budget. 
Given the willingness of the V4 countries to contribute to reconciliation, their 
present experience in ‘talking anew’ about their recent war and communist 
past and, last but not least, the Polish experience in the development of new 
25 Of the numerous literature, cf: W. Schweibenz. The Development of Virtual Museums. ICOM-
NEWS. no. 3. 2004; E. Giaccardi, Collective Storytelling and Social Creativity in the Virtual 
Museum: A Case Study. Design Issues 22 (2006).
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concepts for modern historical museums (the Museum of the Warsaw Upris-
ing and Museum of the History of the Polish Jews are already open, gaining 
spectacular successes; the Museum of Polish History and the Museum of the 
Second World War are to open their permanent exhibitions within the next 
two years) – perhaps it makes sense to share such experience with willing Bos-
nian partners or even help establish a virtual ‘Museum of Bosnia’s History/
Histories’?
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HANA SEMANIĆ 
fRaGMenTaTIOn anD SeGReGaTIOn  
In THe eDuCaTIOn SySTeM  
In BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna
The education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has a long history. 
The institutional beginnings of higher education are identical to the univer-
sity traditions of Western Europe. The first institutions of higher education 
can be traced back to 1531 when Gazi Husrev-beg26 established a school of Sufi 
philosophy. During the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a Sharia Law School be-
gan its five-year program. In the 1940s, the University of Sarajevo became 
the city’s first secular institute of higher education.27 However, the present 
educational system is greatly influenced by politics that has created instruc-
tive institutions that cannot respond to the needs of people living in BiH, nor 
can they cope with the new challenges posed by the Bologna process and the 
Lisbon agenda. This results in deep ethnic divisions, which will be further 
addressed in the paper. 
One result of the state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina created by the 1995 
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)28 was a series of negative effects on the education 
system. The DPA divided a relatively small country into two asymmetrical enti-
ties which enjoy full autonomy: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) 
and Republika Srpska (RS). The DPA also proclaimed three main ethnic groups 
or constituent peoples29 and 17 recognised national minorities.30 The constituent 
peoples are Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats (Bosnian Catholics) and Serbs 
(Bosnian Orthodox) based on the principle of self-declaration. Besides the con-
26 Gazi Husrev-beg was a Bosniak Ottoman sanjak-beg (governor) who greatly contributed to 
the improvement of the structural development of Sarajevo’s urban area.
27 Education, University of Sarajevo, http://www.sarajevo.ba/en/stream.php?kat=145 
28 The General Framework Agreement, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380
29 Constituent Peoples’ Decision of the BiH Constitutional Court, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/
legal/const/default.asp?content_id=5853
30 National Minorities in BiH, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
Mission in BiH, http://www.oscebih.org/Default.aspx?id=53&lang=EN
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stituent peoples, there is the group of ‘others’31 which includes anyone who does 
not identify with one of the three ethnic groups, including all minorities, peo-
ple of mixed ethnicity, those who do not wish to identify with one group over 
the others and those who simply identify themselves as ‘citizens of BiH’. Demo-
graphically speaking, Serbs make up a numerical majority in the RS (approxi-
mately 88%) and most Bosniaks and Croats today live in FBiH. The FBiH entity is 
further divided into ten cantons where usually either Bosniaks or Croats form 
a majority. Furthermore, in line with Annex 2, Article 5 of the DPA32 in 2000 the 
Brčko District was formed as an autonomous entity and a neutral, self-govern-
ing administrative unit that is currently a territory shared by the two entities. 
Both legal and political entities have their own independent legislative, execu-
tive and judicial functions with their own capitals, governments, presidents 
and parliaments. With this in mind, one can justly state that the DPA created 
a paradoxical political framework of integration through separation, which has 
also fragmented and segregated the education system in the country for the past 
twenty years. According to Pašalić-Kreso, From the very beginning, the Constitu-
tion created a decentralized, asymmetric and defective education management system 
that has undermined unity in educational policies, common educational goals, com-
mon values, positive and patriotic feelings for one’s country and homeland, etc.33 FBiH 
is fragmented into 10 mini-states or cantons, each of which has almost unlimited 
power over the education sector. The Brčko District has its own education poli-
cies, too. Simply put, according to the constitution, BiH does not have a ministry 
of education at the state level. This leaves the country without any vertical or 
horizontal responsibility or coordination in the education sector. 
The entity of RS is developing a more intense level of cooperation in the area 
of education with neighbouring Serbia than with the rest of BiH. In 2010, the 
Ministry of Education and Culture of RS and the Ministry of Education of 
Serbia signed a Memorandum of Understanding of Mutual Cooperation. The 
goal of this agreement has been intensifying the level of cooperation between 
the two partners when it comes to enhancing the exchange of knowledge, 
staff, students and joint participation in EU academic projects.34 Article 128 
31 Preamble of the Constitution of FBiH, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/const/
32 The General Framework Agreement: Annex 2, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_
id=370 
33 A. Pašalić-Kreso, The War and Post-War Impact on the Educational System of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, International Review of Education, Vol. 54, No. 3/4, 2008, p. 360. 
34 Saradnja u obrazovanju sa Republikom Srpskom, http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/sarad-
nja-u-obrazovanju-sa-republikom-srpskom_229550.html 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
41
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
16
of the Law on Higher Education in RS states that diplomas obtained at rec-
ognised institutions of higher education in Serbia are fully accepted in RS.35 
Moreover, the Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Education Docu-
ments and the Regulation of Statutory Issues of Students signed in 2005 rec-
ognises primary, secondary and higher education diplomas from Serbia in 
RS and vice versa.36 There is also a high number of students from RS study-
ing in Serbia as they have the right to free primary and secondary education 
under the same conditions as citizens of Serbia. This is particularly used in 
the border area along the Drina River, where many students from RS attend 
schools in Serbia. Also concerning higher education, Serbs from RS enrol into 
colleges or universities in Serbia under the same conditions as the citizens of 
Serbia, while those from other countries in the region join based on quotas 
negotiated by the Ministry of Education of Serbia and the universities. Since 
students from RS have the same status as citizens of Serbia, they are also 
entitled to be financed from the budget of Serbia if they meet the necessary 
criteria. The majority of students from RS choose to attend schools or univer-
sity in RS or Serbia over those in FBiH.
In the case of Croats from BiH and the Republic of Croatia, the cooperation is 
less institutionalised. There is an agreement between the Council of Ministers 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian government on cultural, educa-
tional and sports cooperation.37 However, Bosnian Croats or others who hold 
Croatian citizenship as a result of their ethnic Croat identity have the same 
right to education as Croats born in Croatia and pay equal enrolment and tui-
tion fees. Many young Croats from BiH go to Croatia to study, but, at the same 
time, recent years have seen an increasing number of students from Croatia 
who go to BiH to study, especially to the University of Mostar. This is partly due 
to the proximity of those in southern Croatia and southern Dalmatia, but many 
believe this is generally because most of them do not enrol onto the desired 
program in Croatia or do not pass the so-called državna matura – ‘maturity di-
ploma’ or the high-school leaver’s exam. 
35 Обавјештење о признавању страних високошколских диплома стечених у Републици 
Србији [Obavještenje o priznavanju stranih visokoškolskih diploma stečenih u Republici Sr-
biji], Vlada RS, http://www.vladars.net/sr-SP-Cyrl/Vlada/Ministarstva/mpk/Documents/
obavjestenje%20o%20priznavanju%20diploma%20iz%20srbije.pdf 
36 Sporazum o uzajamnom priznavanju dokumenata u obrazovanju i regulisanju statusnih 
pitanja učenika i studenata, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske no 79/05, http://www.ubn.
rs.ba/download/dokumenti/Sporazum-Srbija-Republika-Srpska-Priznavanje.pdf 
37 Official Gazette, No.16/03.
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1. High decentralisation of the education system 
The institutionalised image of the education system in BiH is a reflection of the 
complicated set-up of the country and thus education is also highly decentral-
ised. There are 14 ministries in charge of education in BiH: 
•	 two entity ministries38 (the Federal Ministry of Education and Science and 
the Ministry of Education and Culture of Republika Srpska)
•	 ten cantonal ministries39 (Ministries of Education of the Una-Sana Canton, 
Posavina Canton, Tuzla Canton, Zenica-Doboj Canton, Bosnian-Podrinje 
Canton Goražde, Central Bosnia Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, 
West Herzegovina Canton, Sarajevo Canton and Canton 10)
•	 a separate administration for education in the Brčko District 
•	 a ministry at the state level (the Ministry of Civil Affairs) which also has 
a division for education.40 
The BiH Constitution accommodates this state of affairs because, according 
to Article 3 (Annex 4 of the DPA),41 all powers that are ‘not expressly assigned’ 
to the state institutions are given to the entities, while Section 3, Article 4(b) 
of the FBiH Constitution42 gives the cantons responsibility for making educa-
tion policy, including decisions concerning the regulation and provision of 
education. The ministries of education at the entity level have entirely dis-
parate policies for pre-school, elementary, secondary and higher education. 
In addition, the cantonal ministries of education have the same individual 
policies and/or additional ones depending on the canton. For instance, the 
Sarajevo Canton has its own sector for pre-school, elementary and secondary 
38 Federalno ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke, http://fmon.gov.ba/; Ministarstvo prosvjete 
i kulture Republike Srpske, http://www.vladars.net/sr-SP-Cyrl/Vlada/Ministarstva/mpk/
PPP/Pages/Splash.aspx 
39 Kantonalna ministarstva, Federalno ministarstvo obrazovanja i nauke, http://www.fmon.
gov.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=184&Itemid=140 
40 Department of Education, Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.
mcp.gov.ba/org_jedinice/sektor_obrazovanje/default.aspx?langTag=en-US&template_
id=108&pageIndex=1 
41 The General Framework Agreement: Annex 4, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/?content_id=372 
42 Ustav Federacije BiH, Agencija za državnu službu, http://drzavni-ispit.foto55.com/dokumen-
ti/ustav_fbih.html 
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education; a sector for higher education and science; a sector for the comput-
erisation of education and science.43
At the entity level, education is highly decentralised in FBiH and highly cen-
tralised in RS, while remaining generally decentralised in the state as a whole. 
The Ministry of Civil Affairs is responsible for establishing the basic principles 
of the coordination of activities among the ministries, harmonising the plans 
of the entity bodies and defining strategies at the international level.44 Howev-
er, compared to the entity ministries, the role of the Ministry of Civil Affairs is 
quite insignificant. Bearing this in mind, one can presume that it was the DPA 
that created this immensely institutionally complex structure that has made 
the task of educational reform almost impossible. 
Within the education sector, political influence is greatly visible in the ap-
pointment of school boards, directors and teachers. Political motives also have 
a negative impact on the financial management of the education system, re-
sulting in outdated and inefficient school networks and schools which lack the 
adequate funds for equipment, libraries and teacher training. Oversight mech-
anisms, such as education inspectors, also fall victim to political pressures and 
the lack of independence. The OSCE mission to BiH has been monitoring the 
work of school directors, school boards and education inspectors for several 
years now. These efforts have resulted in a number of reports which all reach 
similar conclusions – democratic mechanisms lack transparency, accountabil-
ity, effectiveness and efficiency and therefore are not strong enough to counter 
political manipulation. This often results in political parties turning into the 
unopposed decision-makers in the education system.45
Perhaps the biggest challenge today is how to encourage citizens to actively 
participate in the decision-making process when it comes to carrying out dif-
ferent educational policies. One of the success stories of the OSCE mission is 
the establishment of two state-level associations of school directors in BiH, 
which is geared towards the improvement of cooperation and coordination 
among school directors across the country.
43 Nadležnosti, Ministarstvo za obrazovanje, nauku i mlade Kantona Sarajevo, http://mon.
ks.gov.ba/ministarstvo/nadleznosti 
44 Competencies of the Ministry, Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://
www.mcp.gov.ba/default.aspx?pageIndex=1&langTag=en-US 
45 Education, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.oscebih.org/Default.
aspx?id=3&lang=EN 
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2. Higher education and curriculum reform
As it was previously indicated, RS and cantons in FBiH, as well as Brčko Dis-
trict have their own laws and regulations on higher education. However, these 
laws need to be harmonised with state law. At the state level, higher education 
is regulated by the Framework Law on Higher Education in Bosnia and Herze-
govina which was adopted in 2007. The law sets the basic standards and prin-
ciples for the area of higher education. All other issues in the area of higher 
education that are not regulated by the law are governed by entity law in RS 
and cantonal laws in FBiH.46
In accordance with the laws and regulations, higher education institutions are 
funded by the corresponding RS or FBiH authorities. Higher education activi-
ties are thus governed by either RS or FBiH legislation, with the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs at the state level assuming the task of coordinating the higher ed-
ucation activities of the two entities. One of the main prerequisites for reform 
was the adoption of the Higher Education Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fol-
lowing its adoption, many challenges such as the establishment of a higher ed-
ucation institution and a financing council will need to be addressed. Reforms 
within universities themselves represent a challenge — for example, the in-
troduction and implementation of the ECTS and diploma supplements, as well 
as other Bologna Process initiatives.
In 2012 there were 48 higher education institutions in BiH, including 25 uni-
versities (more private than public ones), 19 colleges (visoka škola) and four re-
ligious universities.47 It is incredibly difficult to find exact data on the num-
ber of higher education institutions for 2015.48 This is mostly due to a growing 
number of private higher education institutions in the country, more than are 
46 Higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Execu-
tive Agency (EACEA), Unit P10 – Tempus and Bilateral Cooperation with Industrialised Coun-
tries, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/overview/bosnia_and_
herzegovina_country_fiche_final.pdf 
47 N. Branković, Enrollment policy and higher education funding system in B&H, Center for 
Research and Studies – GEA, August 2012. Accessed June 11, 2015, p. 15.
48 Even the Agency for the Development of Higher Education and Quality Assurance that has 
been established by the Framework Law on Higher Education in BiH as an independent pub-
lic organisation removed this information from its official website given that there has been 
some misunderstandings and misinterpretation; List of HEIs in BiH, Agency for Development 
of Higher Education and Quality Assurance, http://www.hea.gov.ba/kvalitet/evidencija_
vsu/Lista.aspx
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needed, in fact.49 However, the Law on Higher Education treats private and 
public higher education institutions equally. There is almost no cooperation 
between and among different education ‘systems’ and where there is it tends 
to be primarily encouraged by the previously-mentioned institutions and laws. 
However, this cooperation is not sufficient to respond effectively to the chal-
lenges posed by the Bologna Process and Lisbon Agenda.
The primary and secondary school curricular reform began in 2002 and calls 
for educational standards to reflect human rights values and contemporary 
educational approaches. Primary education in BiH is mandatory and free for 
all children from ages 6 through 15 and lasts for nine years in three three-
year cycles (ages 6–9, 9–12 and 12–15). This system was firstly adopted in 2004, 
as a replacement for the old eight-year primary education system, offered to 
children from ages 6 through 14 in two four-year cycles (ages 6–10 and 10–14), 
which is still valid for children who began their education before 2004 and 
also in some regions after that date. Secondary education is also free. It be-
gins at the age of 15 (or 14 as part of the previous system) and lasts for three or 
four years, depending on whether it is a general secondary school (gimnazija, 
medicinska škola, ekonomska škola, tehnička škola, muzička škola) or a vocation-
al secondary school. Students who have graduated from general secondary 
schools and who have passed the high-school leaver’s exam or Matura exam 
can enrol into any university or college after passing a qualification exami-
nation set by the institution, while students who graduated from vocational 
schools obtain a diploma.50
The main challenges of the education system in BiH, some of which will be 
further elaborated in the paper, are: 
•	 assimilation and segregation grounded in separate curricula for the three 
‘constituent peoples’
49 Throughout the Western Balkans, in BiH especially, there has been a boom of new private 
universities. Some of them are certainly on their way to establishing themselves as serious 
institutions of higher education, but many raise doubts (the establishment, curricula, teach-
ing staff, requirements, study time, corruption scandals). According to Florian Bieber, there 
are approximately as many private universities in the Western Balkan region as in the en-
tire EU; F. Bieber, New Universities in the Balkans: European visions, UFOs and Megatrends, 
http://florianbieber.org/2011/06/26/new-universities-in-the-balkans-european-visions-
ufos-and-megatrends/
50 World Data on Education, UNESCO http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Pub-
lications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina.pdf 
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•	 the practice of students commuting to mono-ethnic schools
•	 teaching about religions and history
•	 literature and language teaching
•	 the ‘two schools under one roof ’ system 
•	 the problem of subjects listed within the ‘national group of subjects’ (his-
tory, geography, nature and society, mother tongue and literature, and re-
ligious instruction).51
3. literature and language teaching 
The literature and language policy in BiH is what prevents the education sys-
tem from developing into a more unified one. The country recognises three of-
ficial languages which correspond to the category of constituent peoples: Bos-
nian (mainly used by Bosniaks), Croatian (mainly used by Bosnian Croats) and 
Serbian (mainly used by Bosnian Serbs).52 It is important to indicate that the 
Serbian used in BiH (the official language of RS) is a dialectical version of Ser-
bian which is not identical to what is spoken in Serbia, and the Croatian used 
in BiH differs slightly from the standard version used in Croatia.53 Neverthe-
less, this linguistic division is exploited by those who want to keep the current 
segregated educational system by simply stressing the importance for chil-
dren of different ethnicities to be taught in ‘their language’. The administrative 
boundaries in the former Yugoslavia never translated into the ethnic ones, so 
the language(s) used in BiH, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia today is that peo-
ple speak in a similar way, while accents are local and not national.54 The official 
language in Yugoslavia was called Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian in Croa-
tia. In BiH, before the disintegration of Yugoslavia and after the 1992-1995 war, 
the language is a mix of the Croatian language (Latin alphabet and Ijekavian 
51 Curricular Reform, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.oscebih.org/De-
fault.aspx?id=31&lang=EN 
52 S. Boračić, A. Kamber, Language Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting, TRI Issue 721, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/language-politics-bosnia 
53 Ibidem, p. 1. 
54 T. Judt, D. Lacorne, Language, nation, and state: identity politics in a multilingual age, New 
York 2004, p. 216. 
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forms), while generally adopting Serbian terms55 and using Turcisms. However, 
practically speaking, the differences between the three languages are ‘statis-
tically few and insignificant’56 but, metaphorically speaking, the non-existent 
differences have taken root in society. In other words, the language goes be-
yond the mere ‘communicative reach’57 and it serves the purpose of retaining 
cultural values, political goals, autonomy, asserting loyalties, etc.58 The linguis-
tic choices in BiH are political ones, as there is fear among parents that their 
children could be instructed and trained in ‘another language’ which does not 
match their ethnic belonging. One can also notice that although there are no 
‘territorial divisions’ between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in FBiH, it is still 
visible that there is a linguistic disunion. This is particular for the southern 
part of the country, Herzegovina, which has always been a battleground for the 
power-struggle between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats.
The name Bosnian language has been a controversial issue for some Croats and 
Serbs, who refer to it as the Bosniak language based on the people who speak it 
and not based on the country. This has been recently confirmed by Ivan Klajn 
on behalf of the Committee for the Standardization of the Serbian Language of 
the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts.59 Croatian linguists are divided on 
the issue. Some support the term Bosnian language, while others claim that 
Bosnian language and Bosniak language refer to two different things. Bosniak 
linguists, however, insist that the only legitimate term is Bosnian language 
(bosanski jezik) and that that is the name that both Croats and Serbs should use, 
too. The controversy arises because the name ‘Bosnian’ may seem to imply that 
it is the language of all Bosnians and Herzegovinians, while Bosnian Croats 
and Bosnian Serbs reject that designation for their idioms. Nonetheless, the 
language is called Bosnian in the DPA which was signed by the international 
presence and recognition.60 The International Organization for Standardi-
zation (ISO), the Library of Congress, the United States Board on Geographic 
Names (BGN), and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names (PCGN) 
55 Ibidem, p. 217. 
56 Ibidem, p. 228. 
57 W. Kymlicka, F. Grin, Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries [In:] F. Daf-
tary, F. Grin (ed.), Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries, 
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Budapest 2003, pp. 1-29.
58 Ibidem, p. 11. 
59 Postoji li bosanski jezik? Evo šta kaže Ivan Klajn, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/587341/
Postoji-li-bosanski-jezik-Evo-sta-kaze-Ivan-Klajn 
60 R. D. Greenberg, Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and Its Disintegra-
tion, New York 2004, p. 136.
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also recognise the Bosnian language, as well as bodies such as the United Na-
tions, UNESCO, translation and interpreting accreditation agencies, and most 
English-speaking language encyclopaedias.
RS does not acknowledge any language other than Serbian. This entity refuses to 
call the language Bosnian, but instead calls it the ‘language of Bosniaks’ or ‘Bos-
niak language’ ( jezik bošnjačkog naroda or bošnjački jezik). Therefore, the begin-
ning of this school year was uncertain for hundreds of Bosniak children in RS, 
especially in the Bosniak-dominant schools in Kotorski, Vrbanjci and Konjević 
Polje. Their requests to the RS authorities have failed, even though they have 
been the same for the past three years: the introduction of the ‘national group 
of subjects’ and a request to call the language Bosnian as opposed to Bosniak, as 
is currently the case. Finally, pupils’ parents from Vrbanjci and Konjević Polje 
decided that their children will attend instructive classes following the curricu-
lum of the Zenica-Doboj Canton of FBiH, while pupils in Kotorski will start the 
2015/16 school year according to the curriculum of RS, but will boycott classes 
which would teach the ‘language of Bosniaks’. The RS authorities are insisting 
on this language formulation as the RS Constitution states that the official lan-
guages of Republika Srpska are: the language of the Serb people, the language 
of the Bosniak people and the language of the Croat people,61 and by ‘the rules of 
formation’ the language of the Bosniak people is called Bosniak.
According to the inter-entity agreement from 2002, pupils of Bosniak ethnic-
ity, which formed a majority of more than 50% in these schools, were entitled 
to the introduction of the Bosnian language and the ‘national group of sub-
jects’. This is another instance of a growing systemic discrimination in BiH 
enhanced by the mechanisms in place. The greatest consequences are suffered 
by the children, although according to the constitution of RS everyone has the 
same rights. It is possible to witness the segregation that is built into the sys-
tem, while basic human rights are systematically violated at all levels. 
Based on data from the Ministry of Education and Culture of RS, there are 95,000 
elementary school pupils in this entity today, out of which 6,925 are Bosniak and 
only 408 are Croats. Most Croat children are assimilated into the teaching cur-
riculum of RS. This is mostly the case in smaller cities such as Prijedor, Doboj, 
etc. However, Banja Luka is home to one of the General Gymnasiums of the Cath-
olic School Centre, which is mainly, but not exclusively, attended by Croat pupils 
61 Basic Provisions, Article 7, Constitution of Republika Srpska, http://www.vijecenarodars.
net/materijali/constitution.pdf 
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and students and taught in the Croatian language. Such schools exist throughout 
BiH – in Bihać, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica. 
4. ‘Two schools under one roof’ system
As highlighted earlier in this paper, education in BiH is a powerful tool when it 
comes to reinforcing ethnic divisions and there is a strong link between educa-
tion, language and nationalism. This is highly visible when it comes to the system 
of ‘two schools under one roof’, which was intended to be a temporary solution 
for post-war BiH. This system was supposed to affirm the return of displaced 
persons to their pre-war addresses and provide security and rights to education 
for returnee children who had previously attended classes in inadequate facili-
ties that were not designed to serve educational purposes. However, this concept 
was abused in order to divide school children along ethnic lines. Even twenty 
years after the war, this system is still effective and is not being tackled enough 
by the major political elites and parties. It is important to stress that the policy 
of ‘two schools under one roof’ was not made because children, their parents or 
teachers demanded it, but because politics mandated for it. Such schools exist in 
FBiH and are absent from RS as there is a high degree of ethnic-homogeneity and 
education is centralised. ‘Two schools under one roof’ were created for Bosniak 
and Croat children who attend classes in separate shifts and are taught in ‘dif-
ferent languages’ and have different teaching curricula, books, two school bells, 
two entrances, two head teachers and two sets of staff. As regards a possible so-
lution to this issue, there is a wide gap between possible scenarios: some favour 
full integration, while others call for complete segregation.
The first school operating as ‘two schools under one roof ’ was established 
in 2000. The Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education adopt-
ed in 2003 foresaw the administrative unification of ‘two schools under one 
roof ’, but three cantons – the Zenica-Doboj Canton, the Central Bosnia Can-
ton and the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton – have not yet started implement-
ing the law. In the period from 2000 to 2003, the number of divided schools 
increased to fifty-two, and these are mainly located in the three previous-
ly-mentioned cantons. As both political and educational stakeholders were 
instructed to carry out an administrative unification of ‘two schools under 
one roof ’, the number of such schools has decreased but they are far from 
having been abolished.62 Even though current data vary, it is believed that 
62 G. Božić, Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: An Essay on Some Aspects of Education 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2006. p. 328. 
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presently there are approximately thirty-four63 divided but functioning ‘two 
schools under one roof ’. Even in schools that have already successfully imple-
mented the administrative unification, it seems that the transformation does 
not necessarily imply the students are integrated, as they are united only by 
the same facility while the curricula and textbooks are still different. The 
educational reform was successfully carried out in the Brčko District, where 
the Education Act was passed in 2000 and led to an integrated school system.
There is also a ruling by the Supreme Court of FBiH from August 2014 which 
says that the phenomenon of ‘two schools under one roof ’ represents the eth-
nic segregation of pupils and that this practice should be eradicated. This prin-
cipally applies to the Stolac and Čapljina primary schools.64 Nonetheless, the 
experience teaches us that in BiH court decisions per se are not employed in 
a timely manner. Even the ruling by the Strasbourg European Court of Human 
Rights in the Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case from 2009 is still 
to be implemented in the constitution. What is very worrying is the fact that 
ministers in the cantons where ‘two schools under one roof ’ exist do not see 
this issue as segregation, but a constitution article which guarantees equality 
for the three ‘constituent peoples’. 
5. The ‘national group of subjects’ issue 
Another peculiarity of elementary and secondary education in BiH is the so-
called ‘national group of subjects’ that includes history, geography, nature and 
society, the mother tongue and literature and religious instruction. There are 
no teaching curricula at the level of BiH, but separated plans and programs for 
FBiH and RS. Moreover, in FBiH there are two curricula, one that is applied in 
the cantons with a Bosniak majority and another one in the cantons with a Cro-
atian majority population. This diversity, as has been previously explained, is 
enabled by the fact that in FBiH education is at the level of cantonal ministries 
of education, so the cantons can individually profile their educational policies. 
Additionally, the Brčko District has had its own educational strategy since its 
establishment in 2000. In the middle of 2001, there was a common proposal to 
63 A. Ivanković-Tamamović, Nastavak diskriminacije pravosudnim sredstvima: logičke akro-
bacije i apsurdi drugostepene sudske odluke u predmetu Dvije škole pod jednim krovom, 
Analitika – Centar za društvena istraživanja 2013, p. 2.
64 Presudom Vrhovnog suda Federacije BiH prekinuta evidentna praksa razdvajanja djece na 
etničkom principu, Vaša prava BiH – Legal Aid Network, http://www.vasaprava.org/?p=2092; 
http://www.vasaprava.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2014/11/Vrhovni-sud-Federaci-
je-BiH-odluka-po-reviziji-dvije-%C5%A1kole-pod-jednim-krovom_01.pdf 
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harmonise teaching plans and programs for primary and secondary schools, 
which started to be implemented from school year 2001/2002. Generally speak-
ing, multiethnic education has been established in the Brčko District, but his-
tory and other subjects of the ‘national group of subjects’ are taught separately 
in primary schools. In gymnasiums, history teaching is performed jointly, re-
gardless of the national affiliation of students, according to the harmonised 
plan and program. In secondary vocational schools, history classes are per-
formed separately as a ‘national group of subjects’. In primary schools in the 
Brčko District there was a reduction of the contents of the national curriculum 
for approximately 30% in order to alleviate the teaching contents. The teaching 
is performed in accordance with the common core at BiH level. For this subject 
students use textbooks written in the language and scripts of the people whose 
history is being studied.65
The Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted a study which ex-
amines the extent to which three different school books and teaching curricula 
in BiH are in line with the laws and other relevant documents of the education 
system reform. What is important for this paper is their assessment of some 
individual subjects from the ‘national group of subjects’: 
•	 Mother tongue: The title of the subject alone calls for linguistic segrega-
tion. Mother tongue books are ideologically and nationalistically oriented 
to treat and promote culture of only one constituent people, at the same 
time forgetting that cultural diversity is one of the main characteristics of 
BiH. These books also tend to ‘lay claim’ to authors or literary pieces as be-
longing to a certain ethnic group, which is a manipulation of biographical 
information. In other words, some books and/or writers, for instance, are 
proclaimed to be Serbian, by some sources, while others claim them to be 
Croatian and others still say they are Bosniak.
•	 History: History books contain few instances that can serve as a positive 
model of history teaching. Generally, we come across negative examples 
which do not promote feelings of a united BiH heritage. At the same time, 
history books do not encourage critical thinking in students, while his-
torical and political processes are burdened with political interpretations 
65 Seventh and eighth periodic report on application of international convention on elimina-
tion of all forms of racial discrimination in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of human 
rights and refugees, http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/PDF/LjudskaPrava/PeriodicniIzvjesta-
jCERDeng.pdf 
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which reinforce the stereotypes. There are also many examples of hate 
speech directed towards different ethnic groups. 
•	 Religious instruction: This subject is organised and implemented under 
the jurisdiction of religious institutions, not educational ones. Religious in-
struction books carry instances of a certain religion being glorified, while 
religious diversity is depicted as a problem. 
Gordana Božić terms the driving force behind the ‘national group of subjects’ 
an ‘adequate education’ which targets one of the ‘constituent peoples’. In the 
context of BiH, the concept of an ‘adequate education’ does not ‘give minority 
groups the right to an education in their mother tongue and according to their 
cultural and religious beliefs, respecting and promoting school, community, 
and national pluralism’, but it is created in order to meet the needs of ‘constitu-
ent peoples’ and make it an ‘ethnically correct education’ driving all stakehold-
ers involved into the national identity trap.66
long-term solutions 
The political divisions and inefficiencies in the country make education reform 
almost impossible. Politicians generally focus on their self-serving campaigns 
based on nationalistic ideology and have no long-term strategy for future gen-
erations. For more than twenty years the system has been educating children 
who have barely anything in common: they are instructed in three supposedly 
different languages within three different education systems and who rarely 
have mutual contact. Then we come to another issue that is seldom put forward. 
What happens with the category of the ‘others’, the 17 recognised minorities in 
BiH which do not belong to the group of ‘constituent peoples’? Which school 
should they go to? The obvious conclusion from what has been previously writ-
ten is that major changes in the education system are urgently needed, because 
otherwise all ethnic groups will continue to live in isolation and tensions could 
produce more conflicts in the future. Analysis of the current education system 
provides an insight into the high ethnic apprehension in the country and pre-
dicts gloomy prospects for the citizens of BiH.
In order to create a more welcoming and participatory school environment and 
to bring the education system in line with BiH’s international commitments, 
66 G. Božić, op. cit., pp. 330-331.
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the political framework in the country needs thorough revision. It should be-
gin with institutional and legislative changes, but also needs to improve coop-
eration between the relevant bodies in the country, as well as among teachers 
and students regardless of their ethnicity or religion. The phenomenon of ‘two 
schools under one roof ’ is the most visible example of segregation in schools in 
BiH and it was often the subject of heavy criticism, condemnation and pressure 
due to various obstructions at the local level. In spite of all the efforts, these 
schools still exist. 
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HARIS MEšINOVIĆ
DayTOn’S STRuCTuRe  
Of BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna  
anD THe SInGle eCOnOMIC SPaCe 
Twenty years on from the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) remains at peace, but the conflict’s legacy still persists 
in the deep divisions that hamper its society’s development and impinge on the 
life of its citizens. Major progress and some notable successes have been seen 
in: security, human rights, the restitution of property, reconstruction efforts, 
even the prosecution of war crimes. But BiH’s economy has consistently under-
performed, all but blocking its society’s path to prosperity and increasing the 
strain on the institutions and the population. 
This paper aims to analyse the context for economic policy-making in BiH in 
order to discover the causes for their systematic failure to produce economic 
growth and developmental trajectories on the level of comparator countries, 
both in Southeastern Europe and beyond. Specifically, I will examine how the 
old war-time divisions enshrined in the political system have shaped the coun-
try’s present-day institutions and how they evolved to contribute to the per-
sistent malaise of its economy. I will take a look at the evolution of factors, and 
actors, that have been driving and steering (economic) policy-making from the 
immediate post-war days to the present. Lastly, I will strive to weigh up both 
the particularities and the commonalities of the political-economic underpin-
nings of the current state of BiH’s economy and economic management in the 
hope of highlighting some paths and approaches that may improve their effi-
ciency and robustness.
To explain the relevance and pervasiveness of the topic, this paper starts with 
the historical context, looking not only at the national, but also to the interna-
tional context in the 1990s: the transition patterns, the Washington Consen-
sus, the inability of the domestic elites to generate convincing alternatives. The 
diagnostic part will focus on the current state of affairs, with a range of exam-
ples and an attempt to analyse their individual and cumulative effects. Next 
I proceed to look at the interests (political and other) of the country’s ethnic 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
56
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
02
/2
01
6
group, universally seen and even constitutionally defined as key forces in the 
political system, as well as the impact of external factors, such as Office of the 
High Representative (OHR), the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and the 
EU on the behaviour of country’s elites. Then I review the past and current ap-
proaches to improving the situation and reforming the system. 
1. Promise and reality of post-war recovery and prosperity
The authors of the DPA needed to stop the war and create conditions for the 
country to begin to heal and move forward. A considerable package of financial 
and technical assistance (USD 5.1 billion over 4-5 years) was envisaged to help 
the country’s recovery and jumpstart its economy. Mechanisms to address 
security, justice, political and human rights concerns were provided, but the 
country’s two constitutive entities – Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation 
of BiH (FBiH) and ten cantons (in the larger of the two, FBiH) – received broad 
autonomy, including control over economic matters.67 
Understanding some of the shortcomings of the DPA in the economic sphere 
may be helped if the broader European and global context in the mid-1990s is 
taken into account. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of social-
ism, the market model and capitalism were generally embraced by former East 
European nations, and the prospect of economic prosperity was the main mo-
tivation for embarking on the difficult and painful transition process. When 
the war in Bosnia ended, transition processes were well underway in all other 
former socialist countries and the prestige of the Western economic model was 
at its height. This reform momentum spread globally to numerous develop-
ing countries that were seeking solutions for their socio-economic woes and it 
even found its formal policy expression in the Washington Consensus,68 which 
67 The Constitution was adopted as Annex IV to the Dayton Peace Agreement. It treated the is-
sues of security, political institutions, human rights and international obligations in detail, 
but as regards economic issues, it only specified that foreign trade, customs, and monetary 
policy, as well as the finances of the institutions and the international obligations of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were the stated responsibilities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All other mat-
ters not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na shall be those of the Entities, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372 
68 The Washington Consensus is a set of 10 relatively specific economic policy prescriptions 
that is considered to constitute the ‘standard’ reform package promoted for developing coun-
tries  by Washington, D.C.– based institutions such as the  International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the US Treasury Department. It was coined in 1989 by Eng-
lish economist John Williamson. The prescriptions encompassed policies in such areas as 
macroeconomic stabilisation, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment, 
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sought to determine a universal path of successful development for crisis-af-
fected countries. Since then, however, it has come to symbolise the rigidity of 
the Western approach in the context of the diverse conditions and dynamics of 
development. 
Consequently, in 1995 Bosnian leaders neither would nor could question the as-
sistance their country was offered, nor its modalities and underlying concepts. 
Their will and capacity had been exhausted and weakened by nearly four years 
of conflict and deprivations, and policy-making circles in Bosnia could not pro-
pose any realistic alternative to the ‘transition to market economy’ model, let 
alone reach agreement about it. However, the country’s ethnic elites, having 
used wartime to gain power and control of resources – from state-run compa-
nies and property to taxes and appointments – did not miss the opportunity 
to solidify their hold and tap into new sources of revenue generated by recon-
struction and economic recovery. 
There are multiple channels in which a political economy of this kind operates, 
from large and small-scale corruption to nepotism, incompetence, neglect, and 
a lack of accountability, but these phenomena are widespread and may be en-
countered even in advanced societies. The peculiarity of the Bosnia’s condi-
tions from the standpoint of economic development is, however, best reflected 
in the persistent struggle for creation of a ‘single economic space’ (SES) in the 
whole country. The understanding of the concept in Bosnia draws considerably 
on the experience of the EU, but also on the country’s recent history as a part of 
Yugoslavia. It is probably unsurprising that a clear and formal definition could 
not be traced, since any specific prescriptions were likely to encounter opposi-
tion from the defenders of the sweeping powers of the entities in the crucial 
economic domain, but for the purposes of this article, a single economic space 
signifies the uniformity of the regulation of the economy aimed at enabling the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, resting on the principles 
of free trade in BiH. 
The earliest mention of a single economic space in the Bosnian policy context 
can be found in statements of the High Representative for BiH Carlos Westen-
dorp in 1998.69 Among the priority issues at the time, single customs and mod-
and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. http://www.iie.com/pub-
lications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf 
69 Presentation by HR Carlos Westendorp at the Donor Conference in Brussels, 7 May 1998, 
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=3318 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
58
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
02
/2
01
6
ern payment systems have since been achieved, progress has been made on the 
harmonisation of taxation, but the privatisation and restructuring of public 
services have never quite been completed and still remain open issues, even if 
they are not at the top of the agenda. Since then, although specific priorities 
and approaches may have varied, reflecting changing circumstances, occasion-
al reform achievements, and even the evolving understanding of the concept 
of single economic space, it remained an important composite measure of pro-
gress towards a functional market economy and an elusive goal in the Bosnian 
context. The Compact for Growth and Jobs in BiH,70 the most recent initiative 
targeting a set of specific reforms in this domain, was conceived in late 2014 as 
an international initiative, and it took nearly a year to get all domestic parties to 
sign up. The implementation only began in the autumn of 2015, but it is certain 
that any meaningful progress will require sustained international pressure. 
2. More competition then coordination in economic management 
Even a brief overview of the main features of BiH’s economic system and insti-
tution will suffice to highlight many obstacles to a real SES. The broad powers 
granted to the entities (and the cantons in FBiH) by the Dayton Constitution 
are reflected in the multiple legislatures, often with overlapping and poorly 
divided jurisdictions, and different bodies of legislation regulating economic 
activities in a fragmented way, with few requirements for uniformity and even 
less understanding of why it matters. In addition to the BiH Parliamentary As-
sembly, there are 13 other parliaments regulating economic activities in their 
respective jurisdictions. State-level laws, whether imposed by the High Rep-
resentative or painstakingly negotiated by domestic political parties, are typi-
cally ‘umbrella laws’, often leaving a lot to be defined by entity-level laws, often 
disputed and occasionally counteracted by entity legislation (most frequently 
by RS) treating the same subject matter. The pressure created by the require-
ments of EU integration has been the main factor leading to intensive harmo-
nisation activities, but even when such efforts succeed, such as in the case of 
the entities’ inspection laws, they are extremely effort-intensive and not en-
tirely safe from subsequent divergences. 
From the standpoint of the economy, the structure of the judiciary also reflects 
the independence and often profound differences in approach employed by 
the entities.In FBiH regular courts handle business-related matters, including 
70 The Compact for Growth and Jobs in BiH, ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/compact_en.pdf 
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registering businesses, while in RS there are separate commercial courts. Busi-
ness registration laws were introduced on the entity-level, developed with in-
ternational assistance and harmonised to a high level, but businesses still need 
to register in both entities to operate throughout the country, and there are 
still three connected but distinct databases of operating businesses (including 
the one in the Brčko District) which significantly increases the administrative 
burden on businesses and complicates judicial enforcement. 
At this point, it will be useful to explain the position of the state-level gov-
ernment relative to the entities and lower levels, as well as its repercussions. 
Although at the top of the governmental pyramid, the state government is not 
hierarchically superior to the entities; instead, its powers are sharply delimit-
ed and rather narrow, predominantly related to international affairs. Its main 
role is one of coordination between the entities on a broad range of issues. While 
‘coordination’ is the sole mechanism at disposal for advancing most inter-
governmental decision-making processes in BiH, there is plenty of evidence 
that it often fails to work. Coordination mechanisms for agriculture, educa-
tion, health care, and even the police have failed to yield the desired results.   
BiH could not even establish the necessary mechanisms to receive EU IPARD 
funds.71 But this state of affairs can only partially account for the sweeping lack 
of accountability between levels of government: the RS government routinely 
disputes and opposes state-level initiatives, cantonal governments and parlia-
ments can pass laws and budgets without the requirement to coordinate with 
government of FBiH, while most governments and parliaments regularly fail 
to meet even their own adopted work programs. Accountability to citizens is 
barely notional, since the election law ensures that the party leaderships de-
termine the order candidates appear on ballot papers, effectively ensuring the 
loyalty of their members of parliament.
Competition for resources, including tax revenues and investment, is not un-
common in countries with a multiple-tier structure; in BiH, though, its forms 
often tend to aggravate the business environment in various ways. Under in-
ternational pressure, the state level budget, which is responsible for servicing 
the foreign debt, has priority on indirect tax receipts, i.e. the major source of 
revenue for the state now with the decline in importance of customs duties. 
But the actual budget for the state institutions has been frozen for four years 
71 V. Perry, Elephant in the Room: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Unmentionable Constitutional 
Disability, http://www.transconflict.com/2014/07/elephant-room-bosnia-herzegovinas-un-
mentionable-constitutional-disability-097/ 
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at approximately 950 million BAM (around EUR 486 million), which consider-
ably hampers the development of state capacity not only to meet EU accession 
obligations, but also to implement other trade-related reforms. 
The entities, for their part, get to distribute the remaining indirect tax rev-
enues, in addition to collecting most other fiscal revenues, but are in turn also 
constitutionally tasked with the broad range of economic and social mandates. 
The centralised structure of Republika Srpska permits relatively simple deci-
sion-making when it comes to the allocation of budget resources, but certain 
geographical areas feel they are being consistently neglected. As for the FBiH, 
its revenues remain higher, but its complex structure and the inevitability of 
coalitions in government severely undermine the efficiency of revenue allo-
cation. The cantons enjoy broad powers in domains such as the police, health 
care and education, but are often hard-pressed to secure sufficient revenues 
for the exercise of these powers. While their taxation power has been effec-
tively limited for a number of years, the need to augment both cantonal and 
municipal revenues may still lead to tax hikes or the introduction of non-tax 
fees and charges. Fortunately, in recent years this competition has also result-
ed in efforts to simplify the administrative requirements for business and in-
vestment.
3. not so common economic space 
The sector of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises is by far the most 
negatively impacted by the non-existence of a SES: while successive reforms 
brought down administrative costs, the requirement to register in both entities 
to be able to operate in the entire country is still disproportionally detrimental 
to small businesses. While the entity company laws have been mostly harmo-
nised, the regulatory burden in general is often multiplied on entity, cantonal 
and municipal levels, which increases both direct and indirect costs and de-
ters investment, particularly by discouraging business expansion to other ju-
risdictions. It is important to understand that the attitude of the ruling elites 
towards the private sector is not ideological: the private sector is welcome to 
operate, but as long as the ‘powers that be’ get their ‘share’– up front whenever 
possible. On its part, the business sector is disenchanted and fragmented, and 
seeks solutions either by way of evasion or collusion. 
The banking sector has been widely perceived as one of the major reform suc-
cesses in BiH: having received considerable technical assistance and policy at-
tention, it was successfully privatised and attracted a very considerable share 
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of total FDI. Still, the banking system is also entity-based, with different but 
harmonised banking laws, and two banking supervision agencies that are in-
dependent but operate in coordination, with the competent and careful back-
ing of the BiH Central Bank, whose role in banking supervision has gradually 
evolved. While this setup seems, and even is, workable, it should be contrasted 
with the ongoing drive to unify banking supervision across the EU. While oth-
er segments of the financial sector are less important and less developed, there 
are still two stock exchanges, two securities commissions and two securities 
registers, as well as two entity insurance agencies (albeit with a national um-
brella coordination body on the state level). 
Presented as a way to jumpstart investment and the economy and conceived 
broadly along the lines of the Czech model, privatisation was also implemented 
on the basis of entity-level legislation and managed by the entity and even can-
tonal governments. While the analysis of the privatisation process falls outside 
the scope of the article, it is worth noting that the FBiH decision-makers felt it 
necessary to give their territorial sub-units (cantons) a role in it. While grant-
ing a share in the proceeds to local communities in exchange for the assets in 
their territory made sense, the resulting lack of transparency and efficiency 
has contributed to the perceived failure of privatisation to deliver a boost to 
growth and employment. A small number of mostly homegrown investment 
funds, which emerged from entity-based privatisation but failed to develop 
significantly, also operate pursuant to their respective entity legislation and 
on their own entity market. The difference in approach to the network-based 
industries is another prominent aspect of the lack of policy harmonisation: as 
early as 2007, RS privatised its telecommunications operator and used the bulk 
of the proceeds to finance its Investment-Development Bank. In the FBiH, the 
Sarajevo-based BH Telecom and the HT Eronet from Mostar to this day remain 
majority-owned by this entity government and control of the significant rev-
enues they generate continue to be a prominent bone of contention between 
coalition partners in every FBiH‘s government.
Other segments of the country’s infrastructure follow the same model: three 
power generation utility companies surviving from wartime are still in op-
eration, two in FBiH (on Croat- and Bosniak-majority territory) and one in 
RS, each with their own generation and transmission facilities. The situation 
with railways and roads is somewhat simpler: there are only Federal and RS 
Railways, operating in their respective territories. While it used to be neces-
sary to change engines when crossing the inter-entity boundary line, it is no 
longer the case, but in the meantime both public railway enterprises continue 
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to suffer from poor management and underinvestment. After long delays, the 
road sector is now in a better position from the investment standpoint, but it is 
still managed by entity-level directorates and projects are implemented by the 
individual entities’ road construction enterprises. 
Let us not forget that all the above public-sector enterprises are subject to entity 
regulation and follow their own business plans, and that there are no require-
ments to adhere to any state-level strategies or documents. Certainly, coordina-
tion bodies and harmonisation mechanisms exist in all the sectors mentioned 
above, and most of the time they even work. But the waste of resources inherent 
in duplication (sometimes triplication) of predominantly administrative work 
is huge, while on the other hand the capacity to adopt – and implement – impor-
tant but basic decisions is obstructed to a debilitating extent.
The EU in its 2014 annual report saw no progress towards creating a single eco-
nomic space within the country72 and specifically listed weaknesses in achiev-
ing consensus on economic policy, the need to reboot privatisation, reduce 
subsidies to state-owned enterprises, eliminate administrative barriers for 
business and investment, and achieve more on the liberalisation of network 
industries. At the same time, the relevance of this topic is increasingly rec-
ognised by local leaders: BiH Presidency Member Dragan Čović, speaking to 
the media in August 2015, specifically invoked the primacy of the creation of 
‘a single economic space’ in BiH as the goal of upcoming government actions.73
4. Origins of resistance to the SeS
This section aims to dispel the myth of an ‘enduring conflict’, ‘fear’, ‘hatred’ and 
‘national (effectively ethnic group) interests’ from the reality of economic in-
centives prevailing in what is essentially a drawn-out, lingering and in a sense 
subverted early stage of the transition process. It is this author’s firm belief 
that the motives of political economy were pivotal even for the outbreak of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia in late 1980s, with the contending elites using 
the ethnic card as a way to win power and control over the resources of their 
respective communities, even at the risk of sweeping devastation, staggering 
72 2014 BiH Progress Report, DG-Enlargement, Annex to COM(2014)700 final of 8th October 2014, 
p. 30.
73 Dragan Čović o reorganizaciji BiH: Cilj jedinstveni ekonomski proctor, https://www.linked-
in.com/pulse/dragan-%C4%8Dovi%C4%87-o-reorganizaciji-bih-cilj-jedinstveni-business-
news 
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economic losses and impoverishment of the population. Over time, their moti-
vation changed to protecting the power and control they had won against the 
rise of a different and formidable model personified by the EU. The domestic 
powers-that-be have so far been mostly successful in thwarting the changes 
that would advance the country on the path to strengthening rule of law and 
rule-based governance. Despite their weakness and lack of vision, their power 
is reinforced by a tacit understanding that they protect what remains of the 
economy by slowing down EU integration. The indirect mode of protection is 
essentially inaction, and the current leaders are its implied protagonists. As 
there are few widely-held firm objectives, success is measured by how well the 
status quo is preserved, but the ultimate defeat of the current ruling elites will 
follow from their inability to offer an alternate road to prosperity. 
The interests of the three main ethnic groups in BiH, as expressed in the stated 
positions of political leaders who come from seven or eight significant parties, 
can be reduced to the drive for increasing autonomy on the part of Serbs and 
Croats, and the striving for ‘a normal, functional country’ of Bosnia and Herze-
govina for all citizens. With one entity for themselves, the Serbs already enjoy 
considerable autonomy, but most of their persistent opposition to strengthening 
the central institutions in the past decade might be seen as the struggle to pre-
serve the status quo. Croats invoke the risk of being outnumbered and outvoted 
in the FBiH by the numerically predominant Bosniaks as the reason to claim 
a separate entity of their own, but in the meantime are reasonably successful in 
winning the government seats they crave and in obtaining other concessions. 
For their own part, Bosniaks advocate for a stronger state and justify it with the 
need to fulfil numerous and complex requirements on the road to EU integra-
tion. They frequently feel pressed into unpalatable concessions and continue to 
present themselves as the victims of Serb and Croat intransigence. 
However, this assessment of the balance of interest in BiH cannot fully ac-
count for the apparently ‘irrational resistance’ and determined obstruction-
ism even of initiatives and reforms that would increase the wellbeing of the 
entire population, such as business environment reforms and enhancements 
to the country’s infrastructure, and it only becomes clearer when the inter-
ests, goals and capacity of the ruling elites are factored in. The status quo is the 
preferred position for both Croat and Serb political and economic leaders: they 
manage to keep and solidify control of their communities and related assets 
and resources without the need for transparency and performance, mainly by 
stoking old fears and mistrust. Twenty years after the war, the division of as-
sets and the demarcation of ‘interest zones’ have been mainly completed, so 
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there is little danger coming from encroachment by other domestic elites and 
the competition is chiefly for control of appointments and public budgets. On 
the other hand, the outright pursuit of separatist agendas to their ultimate 
outcome of secession is also not in the interest of domestic elites, as it is risky 
and expensive. The strategy of neither winning (in which case the seceding 
territory would join one or the other of the neighbouring countries and the 
elite would lose its importance and its power) nor losing does not bring any 
improvement over the status quo. 
The preference for the status quo to be maintained applies to the Bosniak ruling 
elite as well, primarily as they lack the capacity to put forward superior al-
ternatives and convince their domestic counterparts accordingly. In the same 
way, while the notion of dominance of the most numerous people in a more cen-
tralised country is not unattractive, it is perceived as too risky and too costly. 
To a considerable extent, such strategic calculations are shaped by the perva-
sive engagement of the international community, and the EU in particular; firm 
international support for the DPA makes any radical actions prohibitively risky 
and expensive. On the other hand, faster progress towards eventual EU mem-
bership exceeds the abilities of the elites, fragmented and conservative as they 
are, leaving the status quo as the preferred ‘low equilibrium’ state. In addition 
to preserving peace and stability, the international community’s influence fre-
quently prevented or mitigated major policy failures, but a by-product of such 
extensive support has been to encourage irresponsibility on the part of domes-
tic policy makers, who have apparently come to believe that external help will 
always be available to save them from their own mistakes and incompetence. 
The EU’s increasing preference for maintaining stability in recent years, even at 
the expense of preventing reform and the fulfilment of obligations, appears to 
validate this perception. A logical extension of this type of outlook, which also 
serves to encourage irresponsibility among Bosnian leaders and the population, 
is a belief that Bosnia’s geographical position, its painful recent history and the 
EU’s striving to follow a regional approach to the Western Balkans will combine 
to bring BiH into the EU eventually, while in the meantime the country will be 
able to benefit from the bloc’s assistance and support.
While the EU at the present time faces perhaps the greatest strain since its ori-
gins, the best hope for BiH is that enlargement momentum will continue. For 
BiH at its current stage of social, economic, and political development there is 
no other way to change the paradigm from recurring backslides into isolation, 
fragmentation and impoverishment except to join a club in which its people 
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will be both allowed and prompted to join the 21st century global economy. That 
path will be longer and harder than almost anybody in BiH really understands, 
but at least it will be well laid-out and clear.
Conclusions 
The most important departure point when considering the SES and the re-
form agenda in general is to understand that all parties involved recognise the 
absence of alternatives to EU accession; there is no competing long-term per-
spective but the European one, no consistent ideological approach except the 
market approach, and no feasible model that can bring prosperity to broader 
segments of the population. In this context, the current resistance should be 
recognised as delaying tactics used by those social and political forces whose 
privileged positions will be undermined by reforms. Nevertheless, such delays 
impose considerable losses on the society as a whole. In consequence the EU 
should find a way to reward performance (or perhaps to punish the lack of it). 
There are understandable fears that rewarding one entity for some progress 
would reinforce the division of the country (economic space), but the exist-
ing multi-polarity of jurisdictions and power centres should be exploited by 
stimulating competition. The EU insisted on, and obtained, signatures on the 
Compact for Growth and Jobs in BiH, and inadequate performance should be 
squarely ascribed to the governments and individual leaders responsible. Per-
haps this is not easy for appointed EU officials, but it might be easier for bilat-
eral (or even non-state) partners. 
The bottom-up approach has already been tried, and it is yielding results, al-
though it cannot be sufficient in its present forms. NGOs generally remain 
fragmented and typically suffer from the legacy of a ‘donor mentality’. Various 
donor/IFI programs sought to work either with the local levels of authority, i.e. 
municipalities on relevant reforms, or with low-level actors, such as local busi-
nesses/farmers communities/associations, generally on capacity building and 
on some institutional/procedural reform. There are successes, and there is some 
interest for replication on the part of municipalities not originally included in 
such projects, but the ability of those changes to filter up has so far been limited. 
It would be interesting to see what experience in strengthening subnational gov-
ernments in the EU accession context the V4 countries can offer.
Some constituencies around the country are coalescing around sectoral issues: 
agriculture and rural development have for a long time been an issue suitable 
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for being raised to the state level (in the form of a state law and state minis-
try), and there are nationwide farmer groups that recognise the need for the 
problems hindering their ability to export to be addressed in a uniform man-
ner. Unfortunately, although the failures have been widely recognised in other 
domains, such as the inter-entity mobility of health care patients, reforms 
required to enhance international mobility in higher education, or across the 
range of issues affecting the functioning of the single economic space, none of 
these, including the business community, is well-organised or strong enough 
to effectively advocate change.
While EU accession still enjoys 78% support in BiH,74 the fears of the social con-
sequences definitely dampen down the attraction of the EU and are readily ex-
ploited by the same forces which benefit from the status quo. Even if no ‘magic 
bullets’ exist, more direct and better disseminated experiences of countries 
that passed along the same path might diminish the fears and empower the 
forces of progress. In view of their recent experiences, the social sector – more 
precisely, mitigation of the consequences of EU accession – may be an area 
where V4 countries may provide support based on their recent experience.
There are other causes that affect the economic performance of Western Bal-
kans countries and, despite formal differences, their problems are still to 
a considerable extent shared. This is reflected in the level of GDP, investment, 
and quality of governance, to mention only a few common traits. But in this 
article I tried to show how this Bosnian phenomenon of irrational resistance 
to change and the stubborn insistence on ethnic interests and conflict histo-
ry in fact represents only superficially peculiar manifestations of underlying 
political-economic goals and incentives that are much more general and com-
prehensible. And I hope I have managed to prove that this problem is more of 
a ‘mirage’, a rearguard action of early winners in transition, fragmented and 
inflexible old-style interest groups that cling to privileges appropriated dur-
ing the conflict with the same methods and under the same excuses. What 
ultimately matters is that, when the covers of ‘ethnic interest’, ‘security’ and 
‘fear’ are stripped away, it will become easier to follow the example of other 
societies that managed to pull together around genuine progress and eco-
nomic prosperity.
74 78% of BiH Citizens Support entry into the EU, http://www.sarajevotimes.com/78-of-bh-cit-
izens-support-the-entry-to-the-eu/
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PéTER REMéNYI
COnneCTInG BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna
Bosnia and Herzegovina is today the paradigm of a state splintered along civi-
lisational/ethnic fault lines and also of the failure of the Western nation build-
ing. The ethnicised conflicts in the state, which were born during the breakup 
of Yugoslavia, could not have been solved either by local actors or by the in-
ternational community. In order to stop the large-scale armed hostilities and 
violence against civilians the conflict was frozen without a long-term solution 
being reached. A major tool for this was the peace treaty drawn up in Dayton 
in the United States; this also contains the constitution of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (BiH). According to the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) the country was 
decentralised based on ethno-spatial principles, and the newly formed territo-
rial units and political elites were granted widespread self-determination and 
autonomy. This made peace possible, but at the same time it has also proven 
unsuitable as an area where a sufficient, successful and modern European 
state can be established on the rubble of war. 
The major problem of the current system is the ethnicisation (and its institu-
tionalisation by the DPA) of the majority of spheres of everyday life, especially 
since this usually prevails over loyalty to the state. The DPA provides both terri-
torial and political autonomy to the groups organised along an ethnic logic, and 
thus in practice institutionalises the ethnic-based separation – within what is 
theoretically one state. The elites who lead the constitutional nations (Croats, 
Serbs, Bosniaks) wish to retain power and are thus not interested in bringing 
down the current system. This can be an option only to the Bosniak elites, who, 
due to the ongoing ethnicisation of political life and the demographic processes 
working in their favour, can expect to remain in power in the medium-term 
following centralisation. 
The infrastructure in BiH is chronically underdeveloped. The ethnic tensions 
and disintegration tendencies which is influencing the efficiency of the state 
and how it functions are the main challenge for developing Bosnia's transpor-
tation system. Besides that: the economy is not dynamic, there are high un-
employment rates, low export figures etc. These all contribute to the fact that 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
68
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
02
/2
01
6
the existing transportation infrastructure is generally not overused (though 
at certain times and places it may be crowded). Moreover, Bosnia and Herze-
govina is not a real transit region – except for Central European tourists who 
travel to Central and Southern Dalmatia – so external interests have only 
a slight impact on the development of infrastructural and traffic systems. So 
neither internal nor external economic interests push for the development of 
the infrastructure. Thus, in general, the infrastructure in BiH is rather a po-
litical question not an economic one.
On the other hand mobility is the principal phenomenon of the modern and 
post-modern age and global competitiveness; without it the world as we know 
it today could hardly exist. To increase mobility the creation of unified com-
munication networks is inevitable. Furthermore geographers (among others) 
from the early 20th century (e.g. D. Whittlesey, R. Hartshorne)75 have consid-
ered it obvious that without a balanced transportation infrastructure and ser-
vices no state can maintain internal stability and development. Not even one 
without ethnic tensions and powerful centrifugal forces. Generally the more 
connections and interactions the members of a society have and the slicker 
they are (this is not limited to transportation), the more cohesive a country is. 
Furthermore Bosnia and Herzegovina is far from being a cohesive state and 
is subject to several serious centrifugal forces.76 According to classical func-
tional political geography uninterrupted, balanced, fast and effective commu-
nication – the main channel of which is the transportation infrastructure – is 
a decisive centripetal force increasing integrity and keeping the state together. 
One of the arguments put forward in the paper is that an integrated infra-
structure policy and above all a regional development policy introduced along 
consensual principles would increase the stability and standard of living and 
survival prospects of the state. Besides increasing the global competitiveness 
of the state, this would have symbolic importance as well, (another consensual 
case), would help the effective use of resources (the removal of duplicated de-
velopment) and may contribute to the intensification of day to day cooperation 
among people and increase local SMEs’ economic opportunities and their ac-
cess to FDI. All this has to be supplemented by the intensified connections to 
75 D. Whittlesey, The Earth and the State. A Study of Political Geography, New York 1939, p. 618; 
R.Hartshorne, The functional approach in political geography, Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, vol. 40. no. 2, pp. 95–130.
76 P. Reményi, The statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the Hartshorne model, 
Historia Actual Online no. 27/2012, pp. 129–140. 
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the European and most prominently to the Central European networks, which 
are inevitable for the success of regional initiatives. 
1.  Bosnia and Herzegovina and the inherited infrastructure 
If physical geography is important everywhere in determining transportation 
infrastructure, it is even more important in the Balkans, including in Bosnia, 
due to its significant vertical fragmentation. Only the lowlands and valleys en-
able cost-effective transport routes so both the transport corridors and conse-
quently the major demographic-economic axes are geographically determined. 
As far back as Roman and medieval times the very same routes have been used 
since there are only a few alternatives provided by geography.77
As we stated above, there are not many transit demands regarding BiH, which 
does not create an irresistible need to cut through the mountains as with the 
Alps in Switzerland. The sole exception is the above-mentioned tourists from 
Central Europe who travel through BiH en route to Adriatic and Croatia due 
to the geographically odd shape of the latter, where the distance between Osi-
jek and Dubrovnik via Bosnia is only the half the route which runs entirely 
through Croatian territory.78 
The most important East-West axis in BiH is the Posavina plain (along the river 
Sava), while the river valleys (Vrbas, Bosna, Neretva, Drina) provide North-
South links. Under the influence of the physical geography, the settlement sys-
tem has also been formed so that the major urban centres evolved in the sites 
most suitable for transportation. As a consequence the major transportation 
axes of present day Bosnia and Herzegovina, which follow in general the riv-
ers Sava (E-W) and Bosna-Neretva (N-S) also connects the major urban cen-
tres of the country. At the junctions of major routes important ‘junction-cities’ 
emerged79 (Banja Luka, Doboj, Zenica, Sarajevo, Bugojno) while the few routes 
traversing the mountain ranges saw the birth of gateway cities (Mostar, Ku-
pres, Travnik).80
77 T. Mendöl, A Balkán földrajza, Budapest 1948, p. 107; G. škrivanić, Roman Roads and Settle-
ments in the Balkans. F.W. Carter (ed.), An Historical Geography of the Balkans, London 1977, 
pp. 115–145.
78 P. Reményi, Horvátország térszerkezetének alapvonásai a XXI. század elején.[In:] Balkán 
Füzetek, No. 4, pp. 57–78.
79 G. Prévélakis, Les Balkans: cultures et géopolitique, Paris 1996, p. 191.
80 T. Mendöl, op. cit.
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Map 2. The main rivers in BiH
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The question of transportation infrastructure is inseparable from regional 
development, the spatial division of economic activity and in general from 
spatial politics. Every single decision regarding infrastructural development 
bears seriously impact on the opportunities of settlements, their development 
possibilities and the life of their citizens. This may be true in general for every 
state in the world, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnic policies are also added 
which – as we will put forward later – in many cases overrule the principles of 
spatial rationality, economics or long term sustainability. Hence political par-
ties organised along ethnic lines are in many cases interested in decisions fa-
vouring their own voters (also organised along ethnic lines) in contrary to the 
interests of the state.
Today’s transportation network is in general the result of Yugoslav develop-
ments, which were primarily aimed at satisfying the whole country’s needs 
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and demands (the economy, territorial cohesion, national security, etc.) and 
not only Bosnia’s.81 As a result of this, a significant part of both the railway and 
the road networks can be understood only in Yugoslav terms. Since the fall of 
Yugoslavia this means they must be viewed in international terms. Therefore, 
in some cases the fastest and most effective links may run partly or fully out-
side the current state borders and at the same time routes within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which bear only peripheral importance for Bosnia are important 
for neighbouring states.
For example, the East-West (Zagreb-Belgrade) highway in Croatia a few kilo-
metres north of the Croatian-Bosnian border can be used by inhabitants of 
northern BiH as a link to European networks or the motorway on the right 
bank of the river Drina (in Serbia). The most effective, geographically deter-
mined transportation routes between the cities of the western part of Bosnia 
occasionally dip across to the Croatian side of the border. At the same time the 
Una-railway which crosses the Croatian-Bosnian border several times, links 
major towns in Croatia, thus its usage for Bosnian domestic aims is limited. 
The E71 road connecting Zagreb to Split runs through Bihac and the E65 road 
crosses the Neum corridor. 
The transportation infrastructure was severely damaged during the war (as 
a target of attacks or accidentally) but this has largely been reconstructed. The 
spatial division created by the DPA continues to hamper the use of some trans-
portation links and directions, above all the railways. Besides obsolete infra-
structure, the existence of separate state railway companies in the entities of 
the country hinder the efficient operation of a railway system. The refusal of 
these companies to compromise means that the trains crossing the Inter-Enti-
ty Boundary Line (IEBL) change engine at every single crossing, which makes 
the use of railways practically impossible in certain directions. 
This leads to a situation in which development and planning tends to see routes 
laid out within individual entities’ ‘own’ territory – and this is not the case only 
for the railway, but also for road infrastructure. One other reason for this ten-
dency has its roots in the rule of the ethnic principle. 
81 D. Marić, Corridor Vc as a factor of integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Europe-
an Union, Journal of the Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijić”, vol 62. no. 1, pp. 89–101.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
72
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
02
/2
01
6
2. ethnocracy and the infrastructural development of the entities 
As with many other areas of life, both the management and development of 
transportation are also ethnicised in BiH. It is important to understand the 
ethnicisation of Bosnia and so the term ‘ethnocracy’ enables to understand and 
explain how and why infrastructure is developed and planned. 
Yiftachel and Ghanem term societies where ethnic affiliation overrules citi-
zenship when it comes to accessing public goods ‘ethnocratic regimes’.82 In 
their argument, the main point of ethnocracies is the ethnicisation of almost 
all levels of public life (politics, society, the economy, transportation etc.) 
where the main dividing lines follow the ethnic fault lines, instead of wealth, 
class or anything else, while remaining theoretically and institutionally de-
fined as democracies. They also emphasise, that ethnocratic regimes usually 
use development and planning tools – including transportation infrastructure 
development and its planning – and also land tenure to increase ethnic control 
over a territory;83 this is a crucial element of ethnocracies. 
Although Yiftachel and Ghanem did not include BiH in their research we can 
undoubtedly state that it also belongs to this category. Although Bosnia as 
a whole can hardly be considered a ‘regular’ ethnocratic regime, since its po-
litical and social structures are de jure based upon the balance of the three ma-
jor ethnic groups, the two entities nevertheless separately follow that scheme. 
This view is supported by the overall structure of the country (ethnic-based 
parties, ethnic-based institutions, ethnic-based school curricula, universities 
etc.), the ethno-demographic changes occurred in the last decades (homogeni-
sation), the blocking off of minority returns by the local majority, etc.84 
The division of ethnic groups along the former frontline, now functioning as 
the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), was a first step towards the creation of 
the ethnocratic regimes of a subnational level. However the framework for this 
ethnically based segregation of institutional, political and economic systems, 
82 O. Yiftachel, A. Ghanem, Understanding ‘ethnocratic’ regimes: the politics of seizing con-
tested territories. Political Geography, no. 23, pp. 647-676.
83 Ibidem, p. 650.
84 A. L Juhász, A boszniai gócpont: a folytonosság és átmenet keresztútján, Külügyi Szemle, 
(Spring 2008), pp. 47–71; H. Haider, The Politicisation of Humanitarian Assistance: Refugee 
and IDP Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, https://
sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/700 
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as well as the legalised ethnic control over territory, is a direct consequence of 
the peace treaty, as we stated above.85 It is also important to emphasise that in 
this case ethnocracy is not a state-level program, but rather works on a subna-
tional level and thus strengthen separatism. We may also consider the policy 
of the Republika Srpska (RS) as a ‘counter-ethnocracy’ and an answer to the 
growing (demographic) power of the Bosniak population and which results in 
opposing state-building preferences.
If we combine the ethnicisation of everyday life with the ethnocratic regimes 
and recent demographic trends (which foresee an absolute Bosniak majority in 
the medium-term) then we can understand the leaders of the Republika Srp-
ska insisting on every single word of the DPA, and their intentions to hinder 
the centralisation of the state and the returns of minorities, since this would 
(re)create a spatially multicultural society. This is also true for transportation 
infrastructure and its development, where, from the point of view of RS, it is 
not Bosnia but the RS whose integrity, stability and harmonic spatial develop-
ment should be protected, along with its uninterrupted domestic and external 
relations in strategic directions. 
On the other hand, due to the growing majority of Bosniaks, their lack of a kin 
state forces them to adjust their theoretical orientation to the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) is usually in favour of centralisation and ac-
cepts and applies the Bosnian point of view instead of the Bosniak one (know-
ing that in the long run the difference between them will be obsolete). But as 
we may see, in the case of infrastructure development the FBiH also has its 
entity-focused priorities.
If one were to examine the major spatial features of BiH and its entities as if 
they were separate states, one finds that the main axis of RS runs East-West 
along the Sava in the Posavina plain, while the secondary axis runs North-
South in the mountainous region along the Drina. The first of these is also 
a major axis of a cohesive Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The main axis of FBiH, on the other hand runs North-South along the Bosna-
Neretva rivers, linking the major towns of Mostar, Sarajevo and Zenica, while the 
secondary is Northwest-Southeast along the poljes of Herzegovina and Western 
Bosnia. The first axis here again is a major axis of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.
85 P. C. McMahon, J. Western, The Death of Dayton. How to stop Bosnia from falling apart, For-
eign Affairs,  September/October 2009, pp. 69-83.   
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If we look at these axes, the shape of the entities, their spatial characteristics 
and external relations we find that their orientations and the efforts to develop 
them are in several cases either antagonistic or competing. The interests of RS 
point towards Serbia and Montenegro, due to cultural ties, the economy and 
financial needs, while FBiH is oriented towards Croatia and beyond (Central 
and Western Europe) because of the very same reasons. And since the plan-
ning, maintaining and inspection of the roads and traffic is the business of the 
entities (which are led by ethnocratic elites) particular ethnic/entity interests 
rule the field of transportation. 
Transportation development and also regional development in general are all 
entity business too, and are strongly connected to the control of the land. It is 
thus of the utmost importance in a state where the ethnic-based struggle for 
territory is linked to this. Furthermore, the entities would like to have crucial 
transport lines running through “their” territory due to strategic reasons.
Map 3. Basic geopolitical axes of BiH and their entities
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2.1. Spatial planning as a tool for ethno-territorial control – RS
RS’s ‘real’ willingness to separate and form an independent state has been 
elaborated many times. We are not in a position to judge the possibility of this 
happening, but from the spatial development point of view (including trans-
portation development) one thing seems to be true: RS is either working on or 
at least planning to have the crucial basic infrastructure (not only of transpor-
tation) of a more viable territorial unit, and what suits RS in BiH, also suits an 
independent RS.
At the present time, the urban and infrastructural network of RS is unsuit-
able for the organisation of balanced spatial development and the provision of 
adequate services for the population – in other words, for becoming the spatial 
basis of the existence of a (semi-) sovereign state. On the other hand, the ef-
forts in this are there to be seen, which above all serve to strengthen the ur-
ban network of RS and to connect the major centres by new or renewed trans-
port links. Both regionalisation and the related urban development plans are 
meant (especially in the first version of the spatial development program and 
less clearly also in the second one)86 to strengthen the backbone of RS, i.e. the 
urban network, and the infrastructure responsible for the physical organisa-
tion of the settlements into a functioning network.
First of all, the spatial development plans made for separate entities lack any 
spatial rationality for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole so these documents 
may be seen as further proof of sovereignty efforts rather than strengthening 
state control over the territory and its integrity. 
The issue of the communication network (especially transportation) is close-
ly related to the transition/transformation of the urban network. The dis-
tinguished places of power over territories are the cities, but they can only 
function efficiently if they are connected to a network by a well-functioning 
infrastructure system. As the shape of RS is extremely unfavourable in a polit-
ical-geographical sense and the pre-war infrastructure systems not ‘designed’ 
for an entity of this shape were interrupted in many places by the IEBL. In the 
case of sovereignty, one of the most important tasks would be the building of 
86 Prostorni plan Republike Srpske 1996–2015 – Etapni plan 1996–2001; Prostorni Plan Repub-
like Srpske do 2015. godine, p. 405; Izmjene i dopune prostornog plana Republike Srpske do 
2025. godine, p. 342.
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adequate communication channels. There are responses to this challenge in 
the spatial development plans of RS.
Presently the entity has several parts that are not accessible by efficiently us-
able transport routes (such bottlenecks are e.g. the Posavina corridor and the 
South Drina corridor, and also the Doboj and Mrkonjić Grad districts). The spa-
tial development plans contain large-scale investment aimed at eliminating 
these bottlenecks (in some cases construction has begun) and for the creation 
of a connection to Serbia not endangered by another entity. We can define ar-
eas – let us call them hotspots – where the narrowing of the communication 
corridors bears the theoretical risk of future conflicts. Not surprisingly, sev-
eral transport development zones (Posavina motorway, Eastern Herzegovin-
ian railway, Serbia-Sarajevo railway) coincide with these hotspots, which are 
identical with the zones of large scale ethnic cleansing and divided municipali-
ties.87 Accordingly these are the most sensitive points of the spatial integrity of 
RS, and possession of those core areas allows the entity to operate, and the loss 
of them runs the risk of territorial fragmentation.
2.2. Spatial Planning – FBiH
As we have previously noted, if the current demographic trends and ethnicised 
domestic politics prevail, Bosniaks will emerge as an unavoidable factor in the 
state (to put it simply: they will reach an absolute majority), so for the Bosniak 
elite the growing centralisation of Bosnia and the demolition of the entities are 
desirable. Therefore, the regional development documents of the FBiH tends 
to apply a more integrated approach in terms of territory covered or at least 
to plan developments for the FBiH part as if BiH were an integrated state. On 
the other hand, in the recent transportation development documents of FBiH 
there are several hard-to-explain plans of motorways running parallel either 
to existing or planned motorways running on the RS side.88 One example is the 
embranchment from corridor Vc at Žepče (still in FBiH territory) via Tuzla to 
Orašje (Map. 4). Also in Southern Herzegovina the road connecting Trebinje 
with Mostar is duplicated. Both cases are clear examples of the entities’ own 
particular interests (in this case FBiH’s) overruling the interests of the other 
entity as well as Bosnian interests. 
87 N. Pap, P.Reményi, A.Végh, Új állam a Balkánon: a Republika Srpska, Földrajzi Közlemények, 
vol. 134. no. 3, pp. 313–329.
88 Prostorni Plan Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine za period 2008.-2028. godine, 2012, p. 294. 
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3. examples of ethno-territorial-based planning
3.1. The E-W (Posavina) axis of RS
The Posavina motorway, currently under construction, is the main artery 
of the most densely populated area of RS. It is important both for Bosnia’s 
spatial development and for international relations. It does, however, pose 
some questions. First of all, there is a motorway on the other side of the river 
Sava – indeed in another country – parallel to the Posavina motorway cur-
rently being built, serving the same directions and needs. The Posavina mo-
torway would duplicate the same Zagreb-Belgrade relations only 30-40 km 
to the south. This is the reason why it is not even listed in the E-network of 
European roads (Map. 4).
Its domestic importance is hampered by the fact that its course runs entire-
ly in RS territory, even if this means that some detours have to be made, and 
it bypasses larger urban areas within FBiH, such as Tuzla. Furthermore, 
the Vc corridor may be more important than the Posavina motorway, yet 
the construction works are much intensive at the latter. Even the webpage 
of the Republic of Srpska Motorways public company (Autoputevi Repub-
like Srpske) states that this motorway is an important factor in the integra-
tion of RS.
Map 4. The Posavina corridor89 and The Tuzla exit90
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89 Based on Izmjene i dopune prostornog plana Republike Srpske do 2025. godine, 2013, Banja 
Luka, p. 342. 
90 Based on Prostorni Plan Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine za period 2008-2028. godine, 2012. 
Sarajevo-Mostar, p. 294. 
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3.2. The FBiH exit to Croatia via Tuzla
The Vc corridor running from Doboj to the border in RS territory and from 
Doboj to FBiH territory is intended to be the major Northern connection to-
wards Croatia. The corridor is included in the EU’s Trans-European Transport 
Network (TEN-T). It links major cities in BiH (50% of the total population lives 
in the 30 km zone of the corridor, while 60% of its GDP is produced in the same 
area)91 and it is traditionally the major communication corridor of BiH.
As we stated above, FBiH planning usually favours Bosnian solutions disre-
garding the entities, but in this case a parallel motorway is also planned. It 
would split off from Vc at Žepče (still in FBiH territory) and while connect-
ing Tuzla with the corridor, it would continue its course towards the North via 
Brčko and cut across the border at Orašje (Map. 4). Building a motorway only 
a few kilometres to the East, parallel to the Vc seems to be economically irre-
sponsible in a state with a budget as low as BiH’s.
3.3. The Eastern Herzegovina highway
In Eastern Herzegovina one can also observe competing versions of road de-
velopment. The dissolution of Yugoslavia left a strip of land without real cities, 
when Dubrovnik became the southern most urban centre of the newly inde-
pendent Croatia and its hinterland was divided by the IEBL. Trebinje became 
part of the RS while the land between Trebinje and Dubrovnik went to FBiH 
with no real urban centre. For RS and FBiH a motorway providing the possibil-
ity of development is of the utmost importance and so the motorway linking 
the Vc corridor with Trebinje and onwards to Montenegro appears in the de-
velopment plans in both entities but following different courses. In the plans 
of the FBiH the highway from Trebinje crosses the IEBL at the closest point to 
the territory of FBiH where it connects Ravno (a town with a Croat majority) 
to the network and reaches Mostar from the south. The same highway in the 
plans of RS remains in the territory of the Serb entity where it turns north 
and connects Ljubinje (a town with a Serbian majority) instead of Ravno to the 
Trebinje-Mostar highway (Map. 5). The latter plan may be more realistic since 
it would follow the route of an already existing main road at the edge of Pop-
ovo Polje under relatively favourable circumstances as regards land relief. In 
contrast to this, the motorway in the FBiH’s plans would be a brand new road 
91 Marić, op. cit.
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through mountainous terrain, solely in FBiH territory, connecting barely ac-
cessible villages and towns to the motorway system. 
Map 5. Eastern Herzegovina RS version vs FBiH version92 
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We have to add that RS has already begun to develop the road, namely it has 
improved the Trebinje-Herceg Novi (Montenegro) link, which forms a new and 
fast connection between the southern parts of RS and the Montenegrin coast. 
The Posavina motorway and other minor links between Bosnia’s Podrinje and 
Serbia also play an ‘international’ role for RS. 
3.4. Railway plans of RS
Perhaps the most grandiose and the same time the most unlikely transporta-
tion development plans concern railway development. Massive railway develop-
ments can be found in the regional development plans of RS where physical ge-
ography does not favour railways. The large and multiple differences in altitude 
92 Izmjene i dopune prostornog plana Republike Srpske do 2025. godine, 2013, Banja Luka, 
p. 342, Prostorni Plan Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine za period 2008.-2028. godine, 2012. Sa-
rajevo-Mostar, p. 294.
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would require the construction of too many structures (tunnels, bridges etc.) 
which would make the construction of the line too expensive along the left banks 
of the Drina and further down to Trebinje. It would join Serbian lines at Zvornik 
and Višegrad and is planned to run in its entirety through the territory of RS to 
Trebinje from where it is planned to fork to the Vc railway and to Montenegro. 
The proposed railway would practically be a duplication of the Belgrade-Bar 
railway, which used to be one of the most expensive railways in the world. It 
would also be parallel to the railway of the Vc corridor, with the exception that 
the latter connects urban and economically active (in Bosnian terms) areas 
while the planned line would travel through sparsely populated rural areas 
with little economic activity. 
Map 6. The Drina railway93
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93 Based on Izmjene i dopune prostornog plana Republike Srpske do 2025, p. 342.
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3.5. Banja Luka-Split motorway
The Banja Luka-Split motorway is a similar project. A feasibility study is un-
derway and future financers and constructors have been identified. It would 
run between and parallel to the primary BiH transportation project, Vc motor-
way, and the existing A1 motorway in Croatia. It will connect Split – Croatia’s 
second largest urban area – with Central Europe via the Croat majority Herze-
govina and RS’s capital and largest city, Banja Luka. This would serve the in-
terests of RS as it realises an important N-S corridor within the entity, as well 
as the interests of Herzegovina as it connects Split with its Croat-inhabited 
Herzegovinian hinterland. It will also, of course, serve the interests of tran-
sit tourists heading to the Dalmatian coast. It is only the Bosniak community 
which it bears no significance for since it bypasses their territory and channels 
the transit flows to RS and the Croat cantons of FBiH. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that both RS’s and FBiH’s directors of 
public motorway companies stated that this Chinese-financed project is im-
portant. It may also be problematic that a motorway serving particular needs 
may overtake a project (Vc) designed for the entire state and also supported 
by the EU. 
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the V4 states
The connections between BiH and Central Europe (V4) are very weak. There 
are no direct flights from any V4 airports to anywhere in Bosnia, nor are there 
any direct train links between them. The railway connection between Hun-
gary and Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatia was terminated by Croatian Rail-
ways due to financial reasons. The only means of transport are either by car or 
via Serbia or Croatia or via huge western or eastern airports (Istanbul, Munich 
etc.). The diversification of transport connections is in the interests of BiH, but 
creating a North-South communication axis via Central and Southeastern Eu-
rope between the Baltic and Mediterranean seas is also the interests of V4.
When talking about road links, it is the Pan-European Corridor V which is 
the most important link between BiH and the V4. Corridor V forks into three 
branches at Budapest, Hungary heading to Slovenia, Northern-Italy, and the 
Western Mediterranean (branch A); through Zagreb to Rijeka (branch B); and 
through Osijek and Sarajevo to the Southern-Dalmatian port Ploče (branch C). 
Among these lines, from both the Hungarian and European perception, the 
most important is the first one linking several central and semi-central areas 
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of Europe with Central and Eastern Europe, while the ones labelled ‘B’ and ‘C’ 
‘only’ connect the not yet decisive Adriatic ports via a smaller (in European 
terms) capital area (Zagreb and Sarajevo) with the Danube Basin and beyond. 
Moreover, corridor V is not the priority axis for either Croatia or Hungary. 
Both these states have been interested in strengthening their western con-
nections from where significant FDI and modernisation can be expected. For 
Croatia – due to the importance of the tourism sector, the Adriatic motorway 
(which is not part of TEN-T) also has significant importance. Both for Hungary 
and Croatia it is more important to connect its peripheries (South Transdanu-
bia and Eastern Slavonia, regions which the Vc passes through) to their capi-
tals than to construct an uninterrupted motorway all the way down to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This resulted in the non-completion of the Vc on both sides of 
the Hungarian-Croatian border and at the Croatian-Bosnian border. Recent 
promises from both the Hungarian and Croatian governments state that work 
will begin soon.
Corridor Vc only bears significant importance for Bosnia-Herzegovina; it is lit-
erally the only TEN-T corridor reaching the country. It has domestic, transit 
and export utility as well. The construction of the corridor will undoubtedly 
help to integrate the country into international routes. The corridor would 
pass near core areas, the demographic and economic centres of the state and 
would link it with more developed regions. What is more, it would improve 
intrastate accessibility (which could help improve overall stability) and create 
the possibility of better cooperation with more developed Central and Western 
European regions, as a potential source of innovation, modernisation and FDI. 
Therefore, in the case of BiH the importance of the corridor is beyond question 
(as in Hungary or Croatia), but the possibility of construction is limited due 
to other vast and resource-consuming infrastructure construction projects in 
BiH (such as the Banja Luka-Split motorway). 
Conclusions and proposals 
The network of transportation infrastructure is being created according to the 
demands of physical geography and the economic/political demands of the for-
mer Yugoslavia. Following independence and the bloody and destructive war, 
the reconstruction of infrastructure has been completed. However, the spatial 
reconstruction of the former multicultural society has not yet happened. The 
political units of BiH maintain ethnocratic–like regimes where the main fac-
tor of inclusion and access to public goods is ethnicity. The ethnic elites run 
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institutions, public companies etc. which in many cases favours ‘their’ ethnic 
communities and their spatio-political units either directly or indirectly.
Since transportation is a fundamental element of a region’s economic perfor-
mance, development opportunities, well-being and overall standard of living, 
as well as general stability, it is no surprise that the institutions responsible for 
maintaining, planning, and developing such structures and networks (not only 
the transportation network, but regional development and spatial planning as 
a whole) are also ethnicised. All communities are interested in developing and 
constructing networks favouring their communities (this is characteristic for 
all societies across the world) where the limited set of resources prevents the 
fulfilment of all needs. But in the case of Bosnia the struggle for resources, due 
to the overethnicisation immediately turns into an ethnic-based struggle. The 
ethnicity-based spatial units granted in the DPA underpin this, since the spa-
tial control of territory (which may seem atavistic but in BiH is an everyday 
practice) is unimaginable without an efficient transportation and communica-
tion network. Therefore all territorial units within the state try to plan, con-
struct and develop structures which increase their own stability, efficiency 
and spatial development. Due to various reasons this is more spectacular in 
the case of RS but is also present in FBiH. These plans, as we pointed out above, 
are in many cases antagonistic or at least compete for the same set of limited 
resources.
The well-developed, ‘entity- and ethnicity-free’ transportation network as 
well as an ‘entity-free’ regional development agency/authority could be an 
important pillar of a stable Bosnia and Herzegovina. This latter, professional 
and with international experts if needed, could develop general regional and 
sectoral development plans for BiH regardless of the entities, focusing on the 
interests of BiH as a whole. We are well aware that the implementation of the 
plans is in the hand of politicians. More robust EU funds on prioritised Bosnian 
projects (in which the Vc corridor should be put in first place) and denial of 
funding particular interests may be a step towards a solution. However, non-
EU funding (China, Russia) cannot be banned.
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RASTISLAV BáCHORA, SIMONA MéSZáROSOVá
InTeRnal SeCuRITy  
In BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna 
Although nearly twenty years have been passed since the end of the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the country has not been stabilised to the level 
that a peaceful development would be possible without international engage-
ment. In addition, international military and law enforcement forces are still 
needed in order to oversee the political situation and potential tensions be-
tween the ethnic groups. The international community and especially the EU 
have to take responsibility for development in the country by tackling a broad 
spectrum of different security risks that do not primarily have an ethnic back-
ground. The main internal security challenges in BiH are posed by bad socio-
economic conditions as the basis for corruption, organised crime and extrem-
ism, especially radical Islamism. Therefore the aim of this article is to describe 
these security challenges and to quantify them by using the research methods 
of the social sciences. 
1. Meaning of the socio-economic aspects 
Security issues were primarily discussed in the context of Theories of Interna-
tional Relations (IR) where external security factors of state centric concepts 
were the most relevant indicators for identifying threats to regional and in-
ternational security. In this context, understanding the transnational threats 
posed by low internal security standards is only relevant when failed states as 
international actors are affecting the regional stability or national interests 
of other countries. Although the social economic conditions in a country have 
much to do with the stability of a country and therefore with its security, social 
aspects were not traditionally recognised as relevant factors when security is-
sues were questioned within IR theories. That is why socio-economic issues 
have not for a long time been the focus either of security studies or of discours-
es regarding various security communities in a transatlantic framework. But 
since 9/11, the failure to ensure stability in Afghanistan and Iraq after the mili-
tary intervention during the era of the former US president George W. Bush 
alongside the consequences of the Arab Spring 2011, the significance of social 
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affairs for security issues has increased but they were still not discussed on the 
highest political level. Through the spread of the so called Islamic State (ISIS) 
and the war in Syria that caused the migration crisis, scholars and politicians 
have realised that traditional peace making and peace enforcement measures 
are not enough for a long term stabilisation of post-war countries. In this con-
text BiH can be used as a case study for other regions, especially as a negative 
example of social-economic recovery after the war and a source of threats. 
1.1. Social-economic situation in BiH
A comparison of the socio-economic data of the Western Balkan countries 
clearly expresses the bad situation of BiH. One of the most important criteria 
for the assessment of the wealth of a country is the unemployment rate and 
in this regard, BiH has the worst numerical values of all the Western Balkan 
countries. 
table 1. Unemployment rate in Western Balkan countries 94 95 96 97 98 99
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina94 Kosovo
95 Macedonia
(fyROM)96 Serbia
97 albania98 Montenegro99
43.15% 35,3% 26.84% 17.9% 17.3% 15.68%
Source: Table is based on data from Tradingeconomics.com 
Besides the unemployment rate, a further additional indicator with enormous 
relevance for the security situation is the employment rate of young people un-
der 25. According to this, BiH does not only have the most young people not 
94 Trading economics: Bosnian and Herzegovina, numerical values from August 2015, http://
de.tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/unemployment-rate
95 Trading economics: Kosovo, numerical values from January 2014, http://de.tradingeconomics.
com/kosovo/unemployment-rate
96 Trading economics: Former Republic of Yugoslavia Macedonia, numerical values from July 
2015, http://de.tradingeconomics.com/macedonia/unemployment-rate
97 Trading economics: Serbia, numerical values from February 2015, http://de.tradingeconomics.
com/serbia/unemployment-rate
98 Trading economics: Albania, numerical values from July 2015, http://de.tradingeconomics.
com/albania/unemployment-rate
99 Trading economics: Montenegro, numerical values from October 2015, http://
de.tradingeconomics.com/montenegro/unemployment-rate
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integrated into the labour market in the Balkan region, it also has one of the 
highest youth unemployment rates worldwide. 
table 2. Youth unemployment of people under 25 in Western Balkan countries 100
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Kosovo
100 Macedonia 
(fyROM) Serbia Montenegro albania
60.4% 60.2% 52.2% 48.9% 41.3% 28.9%
Source: Author, table is based on World Bank101 data except for Kosovo
The data in the two tables enables only a vague inside view into the miserable 
living conditions of the majority of Bosnia’s citizens. However, young people in 
particular are suffering under the bad socio-economic circumstances. Accord-
ing to international experts, BiH is very much affected by the phenomenon of 
the so called ‘brain drain’; it is estimated that more than 150,000 young people 
have left BiH since 1995.102 Those who remain have to face an uncertain future 
with a wide spectrum of security risks. 
1.2. Social situation and internal security
The fragility of the internal security in BiH is evident since the violent protests 
against ‘unemployment and the perceived inability of politicians to improve 
the situation’ broke out in February 2014.103 The protests began with demon-
stration over the closure and sale of factories in Tuzla, where most of the local 
population was employed. These protests quickly developed into country-wide 
violent social and anti-government unrest with hundreds of people injured. 
Although there were also demonstrations in Republika Srpska, the ‘hot spots’ 
of the unrest were in Sarajevo and Tuzla as well in other cities of FBiH with 
a Muslim majority. 
In the context of the unrest in 2014 it is important to stress that the bad socio-
economic situation has a negative impact on all ethnic groups. Young Catholic 
100 UNDP: Kosovo, http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/countryinfo.html
101 World Bank: Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force age 15-24), http://data.world-
bank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS 
102 E. M. Jukic, Youth Emigration Causing Balkan ‘Brain Drain’, http://www.balkaninsight.com/
en/article/young-people-leave-serbia-bosnia-the-most 
103 Bosnia-Hercegovina protests break out in violence, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-eu-
rope-26086857 
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Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosnians find organised crime groups, 
nationalist movements or religious extremists equally attractive. Due to the 
fact that the radicalisation of young people is ‘becoming one of the most impor-
tant threats of international terrorism’, young Bosnian Muslims are of greater 
international interest.104 The worries of the estimated population of 950,000 
between the ages of 15 and 29 must be taken seriously by the international com-
munity and special labour market measures have to be implemented. Conse-
quently, hundreds of thousands of young people without any prospects pose 
a huge potential for destabilising the fragile post-war stability. 
2. Main security challenges
The Western Balkan counties are facing more or less the same internal secu-
rity challenges but there are differences in the dimension and the scale of the 
certain types of threats. The common threats for all the Western Balkan coun-
tries are:
•	 weak state structures influenced by corruption and overall uncertainty;
•	 security threatening the socio-economic situation;
•	 divisions and distrust between the ethnic groups;
•	 political radicalisation and growing Islamic extremism;
•	 organised crime networks in the country and region;
•	  availability of explosives, weapons and ammunition which may be poten-
tially misused by certain groups.105
The threats can be grouped into three clusters since the internal security 
will focus on corruption, organised crime and political/religious extrem-
ism. Both corruption and organised crime are closely linked to the weak state 
structure and they significantly endanger the state administration. In these 
104 M. Bizina, D.H. Gray, Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism 
Policy, Global Security Studies, Winter 2014, Volume 5, Issue 1, p. 72. 
105 N. M. Duka, New security threats impose Western Balkan countries a new way of doing in-
telligence, Albanian Institute of Intelligence and Security Studies, http://www.aliiss.org/
aliiss/?p=362 
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circumstances extremist groups can easily spread their activities and became 
an international threat. 
2.1. Corruption 
From a scientific point of view, quantifying the perceptions of the threat of cor-
ruption remains vague but in real life it has a huge impact on society, the econ-
omy, public institutions and politics. In other words, corruption is relevant for 
the whole internal security situation, particularly of a country like BiH.
One cause of the social and anti-government unrest in February 2014 was the 
expression of the public’s disappointment and dissatisfaction with the poor 
and corrupted state administration and reluctance of political elites to fight 
this problem. How this corruption is experienced in BiH and how it can be per-
ceived as a threat will be shown by using the data published in the UNODC 
Report 2011.106 Since the date were generated by UNODC experts, the situation 
in the country has not improved. In 2013, the level of corruption in the country 
assessed and compared by Transparency International by its Corruption Per-
ceptions Index, ranked BiH number 72 out of 177 countries but in 2014 it slid 
down to 80th place.107 This runs contrary to the expected development in line 
with the EU accession conditions and EU enlargement process which keeps the 
fight against corruption high on the agenda. 
The UNODC stated that at least 20 % of citizens experienced corruption in the 
last 12 months in person or through a household member.108 It means in abso-
lute numbers that approximately 740,000 citizens of BiH directly experienced 
corruption.109 The trend shows that bribery prevailed with 25.5% more in the 
decentralised FBiH (making up approx. 600,000 citizens)110 than in the entity 
of Republika Srpska with 10.5% (approx. 140,000 citizens).111 The UNODC states 
that the average amount of each bribe was around 112 euros and most of these 
106 Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bribery as Experienced by the Population, UNODC 
2011, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Bosnia_
corruption_report_web.pdf 
107 F. Bosso, Bosnia and Herzegovina, an Overview of Political Corruption, Transparency Inter-
national, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/bosnia_and_herzegovina_
overview_of_political_corruption 
108 Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, op. cit., p. 7.
109 Calculation by authors based on UNODC data.
110 Calculation by authors based on UNODC data.
111 Calculation by authors based on UNODC data.
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bribes were given in cash (80%), however other forms can also include food and 
drink.112 The fact that 52% of the bribes were given to the police is dramatic.113 
Statistically 33 million euros were illegally taken from citizens by corrupt po-
lice officers.114 
The level of corruption in the country is influenced both by political and eco-
nomic factors. The legacy of war in 1990s in the form of Dayton Peace Agreement 
created a complex and opaque institutional settings with many horizontal and 
vertical administrative layers. This offers many opportunities for bribery in 
society. The advanced decentralisation of political and economic power results 
in the involvement and influence of corrupt officials. Local governments are 
responsible for fiscal and economic policies to such an extent that it under-
mines the state’s ability to set up strategies.115 Another obstacle that contrib-
utes to the complicated situation with unemployment and corruption in the 
country is the incomplete transition from the planned economy in Communist 
Yugoslav to a neo-liberal market economy, labour market liberalisation, rapid 
privatisation and post-war aid dependence.116 
In addition, deep-rooted ethnic tensions and distrust in politics, as well as 
a lack of transparency, cultivates the environment in which it is difficult to 
effectively implement any kind of anti-corruption laws, even the recent ones 
adopted under pressure from the European Union. Moreover, the division 
along the ethnic lines in the political parties and in public is so striking and 
strong that it even runs through private businesses, companies and industries 
accordingly, starting from energy suppliers to telecommunications service 
providers and many more. In line with this, in order to get certain types of jobs 
young people are often directly or indirectly forced to take sides. 
According to the European Commission’s Progress Report 2014 the fight against 
widespread corruption that bears an impact on so many areas is very slow 
and ineffective, particularly as some implicated high-level figures manage 
112 Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, op. cit., p. 7.
113 Ibidem, p. 4.
114 Calculation by authors based on UNODC data.
115 B. Divjak, M. Pugh The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Interna-
tional Peacekeeping, Special Issue: Post-conflict Peacebuilding and Corruption, Volume 15, 
Issue 3, 2008, http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/the-political-economy-of-corrup-
tion-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/ 
116 Ibidem.
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to successfully avoid prosecution and are reluctant to tackle this problem.117 
The most acutely affected sectors in society include public administration on 
higher and lower levels, law enforcement, the judiciary and public procure-
ment and also healthcare, access to employment and the educational system. 
Not even foreign financial aid is excluded.118 The international actors and the 
highest but disputed executive authority, the Office of the High Representative, 
are unable to prevent the corruption in the disbursal of grants and loans and to 
ensure transparency. In addition, their presence and influence in the country 
only contributes to the continuation of dependency syndrome and slows the 
process of local ownership development.119 
Another factor affecting corruption is the seeming impunity, the low penalties 
for corruption and the slow and ineffective prosecutions of cases. This gives 
the public the wrong perception of the act as being something natural and 
common and increases the impression that being caught or prosecuted is un-
likely. Moreover, the willingness of society to report corruption in the country 
also remains very low.120 
Corruption affects the stability of the political and economic system and the 
already low confidence and dissatisfaction with politics, public administration 
services and other key areas. According to the Transparency International 
Global Corruption Barometer 2013, respondents in BiH consider politicians to 
be the most corrupt institutional actors. It also creates unfavourable condi-
tions for business development, and drives away new investors and thus hin-
ders job creation as one of the few ways to tackle high unemployment and the 
frustration stemming from this, especially among young people in the coun-
try. Moreover, it deepens the inequality and the gap between the poor and 
rich. This view is largely supported also by more than 60% of respondents in 
a public survey carried out by the World Bank. The vast majority (approx. 98% 
of respondents) stated that rising inequality, high level of crimes, endangered 
117 European Commission Progress Report 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_
documents/2014/20141008-bosnia-and-herzegovina-progress-report_en.pdf, p. 15.
118 M. Chêne, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), U4 Anti-Cor-
ruption Research Centre, http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-anti-corruption-
in-bosnia-and-herzegovina-bih/#sthash.KHn57CT9.dpuf, p. 2.
119 B. Divjak, M. Michael, op. cit.
120 N. Garoupa, D.M. Klerman, Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History, 
Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010, http://law.usc.edu/assets/docs/Klerman_Cor-
ruption.pdf, p. 88.
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state security and moral decline in society were among the main crucial con-
sequences of corruption.121
2.2. Organised Crime in BiH
Corruption is very closely connected with organised crime. However, while 
corruption is mostly an internal state problem, organised crime has a wide 
regional impact and influence. Little has been achieved in fighting organised 
crime in the country during the 20 year period following the war. There is 
a tendency to overlook the fact that organised crime is not a product of the 
war of 1992-1995 – it was present in BiH even earlier; war only provided fertile 
ground and the opportunity for it to spread as in all post-war countries. After 
the war these activities continued and developed as the fight against organised 
crime was not among the priorities at that time unlike the prosecution of war 
criminals or peace-keeping.122 Also local elites and law enforcement agencies 
were corrupt and unable or unwilling to deal with these issues or they even 
became part of the criminal networks.
The full picture of organised crime in the country is limited due to the lack 
of reliable data in this field, insufficient data exchange, and the frequent in-
volvement of high-up political and business figures in the organised crime 
structures and thus obstruction in data collection. All ethnicities in BiH are 
involved in organised crime networks. The structures and groups are believed 
to be loose with some transnational element and based on ethnicity. Tradition-
al ‘mafia-like’ strictly structured criminal groups active in the country and 
abroad are rather rare in BiH.123
The main areas in which criminal networks in BiH are involved are: drugs and 
weapons trafficking and human trafficking and smuggling. As regards human 
smuggling, BiH is both a country of origin and transit but also a destination 
country for victims of labour exploitation, sexual exploitation and begging.124 
121 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption, World Bank, p. 10, http://www1.
worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf 
122 S. Brady, Organised Crime in Bosnia Herzegovina – A silent war fought by an ambush of 
toothless tigers or a war not yet fought?, https://www.occrp.org/documents/OC_in_BH_
ENG.pdf, p. 10.
123 V. Stojarová, Organized Crime in the Western Balkans, HUMSEC Journal, Issue 1, http://www.
Humsec.eu/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Journal/Stojarova_Organized_Crime_in_
the_Western_Balkans.pdf, p. 96. 
124 European Commission Progress Report 2014, op. cit., p. 16.
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The recent migration wave that Europe is experiencing at the moment and the 
so called re-discovered Balkan route are causing the human trafficking indus-
try to flourish. The production of illegal drugs in BiH is on a low level; BiH re-
mains rather a country of transit and storage of hard drugs on the way mostly 
to Western European countries.125 
The illicit arms trade is closely connected to BiH’s post-war situation. The wide 
availability of small arms and light weapons together with a poor institutional 
background and rule of law system in the country has brought about a situation 
in which black market arms were spread using the traditional drug trafficking 
routes to other conflict zones, such as Iraq. This was allegedly even supported 
and coordinated also by private companies.126 There is still a high availability 
of cheap and easily accessible weapons in BiH that can be trafficked via the 
black market abroad as foreign demands are higher than those found locally. 
The reason is that many citizens keep their own weapons as a matter of safety 
and due to having low confidence towards the state as a provider of security 
and also because of their distrust of the other ethnicities. Furthermore, the 
punishments for illegally possessing weapons are low and so many citizens opt 
for the benefits of feeling safe over the fear of punishment.127
Together with these traditional organised crime activities which are still 
present, also vehicle theft, organised robberies, money-laundering, cigarette 
smuggling and organised petty theft groups are active. The true extent of all 
these is very difficult to assess. Another worrisome area closely connected to 
corruption in BiH is non-traditional organised crime linked to privatisation, 
public procurement and tender fraud.128 This tends to have a much further and 
broader impact on the society of BiH. Despite everything mentioned above, the 
extent of organised crime in BiH in comparison with other Western Balkan 
countries does not seem to be significantly different. 
Among the most recent successful arrests leading to conviction is the case of 
Zijad Turković, the leader of an organised crime group responsible for mur-
ders, robberies and drug trafficking. In April 2015 he received a sentence of 40 
125 Country Overview: Bosnian and Herzegovina, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/
country-overviews/ba 
126 S. Brady, op. cit., p. 16.
127 Ibidem, p. 34.
128 Ibidem, p. 36.
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years of imprisonment and his accomplice, Milenko Lakić, received 35 years.129 
Although there were several successful joint police operations, including with 
transnational cooperation, European Commission’s Progress Report 2014 states 
that the strategic approach of law enforcement, the judiciary and prosecution 
to fight corruption is lacking and needs to be developed and strengthened. 
The fight against corruption is hindered by the infiltration of criminal groups 
within the highest political, legal and economic structures and businesses.130 
Furthermore, the existence of double police and law enforcement services in 
Republika Srpska on one side and in the FBiH on the other further retards the 
progress in fighting organised crime and corruption due to the absence of co-
operation. Little progress has been made overall, nor are the prospects opti-
mistic, taking into consideration the lack of transparency, the involvement of 
elites, the reluctance to act and the ubiquitous corruption. Finally, Věra Sto-
jarová summarised the prevalent meaning of organised crime for both society 
and state as follows: 
Organised crime negatively impacts official financial streams, the market environ-
ment and relations with the countries of Western and Central Europe, and presents 
a threat at the regional as well as global levels. Organised crime threatens the sta-
bility of every state. The structures of weak states encourage the threat of criminal 
activities and the high level of infiltration by organised crime into state structures 
threatens democracy, democratic institutions and public confidence. Corruption en-
ables the infiltration of organised crime into society because corrupted political elites 
do not effectively fight organised crime – very often because of mutual interest.131 
2.3. Islamism and Terrorism
The current threat of terrorism and radical Islam spreading in Europe is be-
coming more glaring with every new attack, especially after the recent Paris 
attacks on 13 November 2015 and it has not skipped BiH either. The frustrating 
socio-economic situation in BiH and most of all unemployment, the lack of ef-
fective law enforcement, weak democracy and the overall stagnation that the 
129 A. Džonlić, Zijad Turković ide u izolaciju i strogo čuvani Četvrti paviljon!, http://www.avaz.
ba/clanak/174235/zijad-turkovic-ide-u-izolaciju-i-strogo-cuvani-cetvrti-paviljon?url-
=clanak/174235/zijad-turkovic-ide-u-izolaciju-i-strogo-cuvani-cetvrti-paviljon#sthash.n7e-
Ocuyp.dpuf 
130 European Commission Progress Report 2014, op. cit., p. 57.
131 V. Stojarová, op. cit., p. 92.
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country faces, forms fertile ground for growing nationalism, radicalisation, 
extremism and potential violence. 
The origins of the growing Islamic fundamentalism in BiH can be traced back 
to the former president of BiH, Alija Izetbegović and the movement Mladi Mus-
limani (Young Muslims) that he joined during World War II. For centuries the 
moderate open-minded Hanafi tradition of Islam prevailed in BiH.132 However, 
Izetbegović’s ideas of a ‘Great Muslim State’, the Islamic declaration he wrote 
in the 1970s, and later the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990s, as well as the 
beginning of the war in BiH in 1992 have all borne further impact on the cur-
rent situation of radical Islam in BiH. 
During the war in 1992 in some areas under the command of Bosnian Serbs 
or Bosnian Croats and the Muslim population decreased to almost zero due 
to incidents of ethnic cleansing. However, those areas controlled by the army 
of BiH were open to almost any kind of Islamic religious activities and this 
meant that many militant Islamists from Afghanistan and other countries 
in the region that came to fight on the side of their ‘Muslim brothers’ as mu-
jahideen, or ‘holy warriors’ could preach and spread their ideas about Islam 
among the Muslims of BiH who had until then been liberal and moderate.133 
After the war many jihadists received BiH citizenship and remained in the 
country to spread the ideas of radical Islam and in time became a real in-
ternational threat. Among those who supported Bosnia during the war were 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, known as the ‘mastermind of the 9/11 attacks’134 
and Abu Hamza al-Masri. While Mohammed was in Pakistan captured al-
ready in 2003 and after that detained in Guantanamo, Abu Hamza al-Masri 
was sentenced to life by a US court in January 2015 for 11 terror and kidnap-
ping charges.135 Although Abu Hamza al-Masri is in prison, he managed to in-
fluence the current generation of terrorists during his active time in London. 
132 G. N. Bardos, Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation, September/October 2014, http://
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/jihad-balkans-next-generation 
133 J.C. Antúnez, Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Part One, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/
news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2468 
134 B. Kanzleiter, Wahhabi Rules: Islamic Extremism Comes to Bosnia, http://www.worldpoli-
ticsreview.com/articles/747/wahhabi-rules-islamic-extremism-comes-to-bosnia 
135 H. Alexander, Who is Abu Hamza?, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qae-
da/10813352/Who-is-Abu-Hamza.html, Radical cleric Abu Hamza jailed for life by US court, 
BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30754959, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Fast 
Facts, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/03/world/meast/khalid-sheikh-mohammed-fast-
facts/index.html 
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As a former British intelligence informant said, the Charlie Hebdo terrorist 
attack in Paris, in which 12 people were killed by two brothers of Algerian 
origin in January 2015, was linked to an Abu Hamza lieutenant based at the 
Finsbury Park Mosque.136  
This was how Wahhabi ideas first appeared in BiH, alongside financial sup-
port from Arab countries not only to religious movements but also local 
NGOs helping during the war, meaning that they flourished in a socially and 
economically underdeveloped BiH. The biggest financially support came 
from the Saudi King Fahd, who gave US$103 million to Bosnia in the period 
1992–96.137 In addition, among the returnees after the war there were also 
many adherents of Wahhabism and their return to areas with a majority of 
Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats caused and continues to cause tension and 
distrust. The traditional local moderate type of Islam is also endangered by 
various activities, such as: sending students to madrasas or universities in 
Arab countries to study theology; foreign investment from Arabic countries; 
new types of mosques and religious activities not based on the traditional lo-
cal Islam. Unquestionably, the uncertainty in the society is growing and the 
increasing influence from Arabic countries especially from Saudi Arabia is 
more and more seen critically by western oriented Bosnian Muslims, Croats 
and Serbs. Representatives from Western countries are also concerned about 
the close connections between Saudi Arabia and the Bosnian leading party 
SDA (Party of Democratic Action).138 SDA was founded by the former presi-
dent is chaired by his son Bakir Izetbegović, who is since 2010 the Bosniak 
member of the tripartite presidency of BiH. 
Wahhabi adherents are committed to enforcing Sharia law in the country and 
believe in the purification of Islam as the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab ordered. They are very strict in their religious practices 
and belief and consider the pleasures of everyday life such as music, films and 
so on as a symbol of ‘decay’.139 The most unexpected incident that caused the 
136 D. Barrett, G. Rayner; Charlie Hebdo suspect ‘mentored’ by Abu Hamza disciple, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11333776/Charlie-Hebdo-suspect-men-
tored-by-Abu-Hamza-disciple.html 
137 M. J. Petersen, Trajectories of transnational Muslim NGOs, Development in Practice, Vol. 22, 
No. 5 – 6, 2000, p. 770, http://www.academia.edu/4368432/Trajectories_of_Transnational_
Muslim_NGOs 
138 A. Wölfl, Angst vor islamistischem Terror in Bosnien, http://derstandard.at/2000015382397/
Angst-vor-islamistischem-Terror-in-Bosnien 
139 Ibidem.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
97
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
16
public to start worrying about the spread of radical Islam was the attendance 
of 3,000 radical Islamists at the funeral of their leader Jusuf Barcić, who died in 
2007 in a car accident. Several journalists were attacked during the funeral.140
The problem with radicalisation in BiH is largely connected to the economic 
and social conditions in the country and the interethnic issues. Radical Is-
lamists tend to use this situation and the frustration of young people espe-
cially in the rural and least developed areas adding to the memory of the 
past persecution and ethnic cleansings of Muslim during the war. Under 
such conditions and given the poor educational system in BiH, recruiters 
offer support and help to young people, taking care of them and later on 
recruiting them. This practice of bonding by organising trips, camps or 
other activities, isolating the youth from the family by indoctrination and 
propaganda as well as becoming a sort of mentor providing a spiritual lead 
and guidance is a common habit of various radical Islamic groups. Another 
common practice is targeting vulnerable individuals such as drug addicts, 
alcoholics or people involved in crime and offering them help in exchange 
for indoctrination.141
At present around 3,000 radical Islamists are known to be present in BiH. 
Among them there are many followers of ISIS but also of al-Qaeda and al-Nus-
ra. They are present in higher concentrations in isolated villages such as Gorn-
ja Maoča, Osve or Donja Bočinja. These are the centres of radical Islamists from 
BiH but also those from abroad creating ‘extra-territorial Sharia-run enclaves’ 
separate from the BiH public authorities and police, which are recruiting sta-
tions as well as safe havens for jihadists from BiH and countries such as Af-
ghanistan, Yemen or Chechnya.142 BiH’s most famous Wahhabi authority, Nus-
ret Imamović, who left to Syria to join the war, was resident in Gornja Maoča. 
After Imamović went to Syria, Husein Bosnić aka Bilal took over his place as 
the publicly most prominent Islamist in BiH. The biggest difference between 
them is that Imamović supports al-Nusra actively in Syria, while Bosnić calls 
for fighting alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq. 
Husein Bosnić was arrested in September 2014 based on verifiable evidence that 
he supports terroristic activities. He was charged with financing, organising 
140 Ibidem.
141 J. C. Antúnez, op. cit. 
142 G. N. Bardos, op. cit. 
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and recruiting Bosnian citizens to join terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq.143 Al-
together 17 persons were arrested with the same charges in 2014 and 12 per-
sons directly involved in fighting within ISIS to March 2015. ISIS is believed to 
have recruited approx. 330 citizens of BiH by spring 2015 for fighting in Syria 
and Iraq.144 Although it is currently unclear whether al-Nusra or ISIS is receiv-
ing more sympathy from the Islamists in BiH, there are some reliable indica-
tors that ISIS is becoming more popular among young people. However, both 
al-Nusra and ISIS have strong networks and their Bosnian followers pose an 
equally enormous challenge for internal security.
Radical Islamist-caused violence is also a security threat within BiH which has 
led to several attacks in over the last five years. In June 2010 the radical Is-
lamist Haris Čaušević blew a police station in the mostly by Bosnian Muslims 
populated town Bugojno and killed one police officer and injured six. The rea-
son for the terroristic act was that Čaušević wanted to take revenge against the 
police, because one of his Islamist friends Rijada Rustempašić was arrested for 
terroristic activities.145 In the second verdict Čaušević was sentenced to prison 
for 35 years for committing a terroristic act.146 The ethnical or religious back-
ground did not play a role in this attack, because the policeman who was killed 
as well as most of the injured officers were Bosniaks and therefore Muslims. 
Moreover, the brother of the police officer who was killed was decorated with 
highest military medal of the Bosniak armed forces during the war.147 
One year after the Bugojno bombing Mevlid Jasarević a Serbian citizen from 
the Muslim populated region Sandžak fired in October 2011 more than 100 
bullets at the building of the US embassy in Sarajevo and wounded a police-
man. Jasarević belonged to the Wahhabi circles of extreme Islamist in Gornja 
143 Islamic state flag displayed in Bosnian village, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.
php?yyyy=2015&mm=02&dd=05&nav_id=93091 
144 G. Lanktree, Isis in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Why are Islamic State extremists buying up 
land in Osve village?, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-bosnia-herzegovina-why-are-islamic-
state-extremists-buying-land-osve-village-1511731 
145 Radio Sarajevo: Razlog terorističkog napada u Bugojnu hapšenje Rijada Rustempašića, 1 July 
2010, http://radiosarajevo.ba/novost/29043/razlog-teroristickog-napada-u-bugojnu-hapsen-
je-rijada-rustempasica 
146 Al Jazeera: Haris Čaušević osuđen na 35 godina zatvora, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijes-
ti/haris-causevic-osuden-na-35-godina-zatvora 
147 Dan žalosti – u Bugojnu će biti ukopan ubijeni policajac Tarik Ljubuškić, http://vijesti.ba/
clanak/15327/dan-zalosti-u-bugojnu-ce-biti-ukopan-ubijeni-policajac-tarik-ljubuskic 
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Maoča.148 After the first verdict was revoked, he was found guilty of terrorism 
and sentenced to 15 years in prison in November 2013. During the trial Jasarević 
apologized for what he now calls his ‘stupid act,’ saying he had been manipu-
lated and then abandoned by his radical Islamist mentors.149
In April 2015 one policeman was killed and two were badly injured in Zvornik 
in Republika Srpska by Nerdin Ibrić, a 24 year old Muslim resident who died 
in shooting shoot out with the police. Because Nerdin’s father was killed dur-
ing the war by Serbs who were policemen at that time in Zvornik, there were 
doubts, whereas as to whether personal revenge was the reason for the killing 
or if it was linked to religious extremism.150 Only one day after this incident, on 
28 April, an emergency sitting of the Council of Ministers on the national level 
took place and politicians from all ethnical groups condemned this as a ter-
roristic act.151 After the attack three men with an extremist background were 
arrested. One of them was a foreign fighter in Syria and was in contact with 
Nerdin Ibrić.152 An Al Jazeera reporter discovered that Ibrić had been radical-
ised only within the previous several months and was evidently influenced by 
a veteran from Syria.153 Based on evidence, Bosnian experts count the Zvornik 
attack as being executed by a Wahhabi adherent.154 Since then new terroristic 
acts are expected by intelligence and law enforcement sources in BiH and this 
has caused mistrust also between the entities.155 In such a tense situation Enes 
Omeragić in the aftermath of the terroristic attacks in Paris killed two sol-
diers and injured three people in Sarajevo-Rajlovac on 19 November 2015 before 
148 BBC: Sarajevo gunman fires at US embassy in Bosnia capital, 28 October 2011, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-15499143 
149 RFE/RL’s Balkan Service: Bosnian U.S. Embassy Attacker Gets 15 Years In Jail, 20 November 
2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/bosnia-us-embassy-attack/25174652.html 
150 Teroristički napad ili lična osveta? šta je govorio Nerdin Ibrić?, Radio Sarajevo, 28 April 2015, 
http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/187183/teroristicki-napad-ili-licna-osveta-sta-je-go-
vorio-nerdin-ibric – 
151 Nakon terorističkog napada u Zvorniku: Danas vanredne sjednice Predsjedništva, Vijeća 
ministara, http://www.bhrt.ba/vijesti/bih/hitne-vanredne-sjednice-predsjednistva-bih-i-
vijeca-ministara/ 
152 Dan žalosti zbog napada u Zvorniku, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/dan-zalosti-zbog-
napada-u-zvorniku 
153 Dvoje privedenih zbog napada u Zvorniku, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/dvoje-prive-
denih-zbog-napada-u-zvorniku 
154 D. Dzidic, Bosnia’s Wartime Legacy Fuels Radical Islam, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/
article/bosnia-s-wartime-legacy-fuels-radical-islam 
155 A. Wölfl, op. cit. 
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committing suicide by detonating a bomb.156 The state prosecution started im-
mediately investigations on this ‘act as terrorism’157 and the OSCE in Sarajevo 
also officially granted the killing as ‘terrorisms’.158 
Omeragić was 34 year old, born in France, had been arrested for some time 
in Zenica and due to media he was ‘associated with members of the Wahhabi 
movement and prone to narcotics’.159 Due to media information it is not clear, 
if Omeragić was a ‘lone wolf ’160 or if he was integrated into extremist group. 
Investigations enclosed that he had an increased contact to persons with Ara-
bic background before the killing and more over his brother in law had been 
personally fighting in Syria.161 
Generally, the latest cases of terrorist acts committed by Ibrić and Omeragić 
are examples how individual motivation or social disintegration can be mis-
used for radicalization that finally leads to terrorism. Bosnian intelligence 
services warned that especially the 200 veterans from war in Syria pose a di-
rect threat to security and new attacks are expected.162 BiH has changed its 
importance for Islamists, it is not only a retreat territory for international 
terrorist but Bosnia’s Muslim population is pool for generating new extrem-
ists and more over it is transit country for Islamists from Western Europe to 
Syria and Iraq.
156 ‘Islamist’ gunman kills two Bosnian soldiers in Sarajevo, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-34866890 
157 BBC: ‘Islamist’ gunman kills two Bosnian soldiers in Sarajevo, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-34866890 
158 OSCE Press Release: OSCE Mission to BiH expresses its condolences to families of BiH Armed 
Forces soldiers killed in terrorist attack in Rajlovac, http://www.oscebih.org/News.
aspx?newsid=2093&lang=EN 
159 This is Enes Omeragic, Sarajevo terrorists who killed two soldiers, http://www.bosniatoday.
ba/this-is-enes-omeragic-sarajevo-terrorists-who-killed-two-soldiers/ 
160 Definition of “Lone Wolfe Terrorism” (LWT) is: The deliberate creation and exploitation of 
fear through violence or threat of violence committed by a single actor who pursues politi-
cal change linked to a formulated ideology, whether his own or that of a larger organization, 
and who does not receive orders, direction, or material support from outside sources. Re-
port: Lone Wolf Terrorism, Prepared by Security Study Program ‘National Security Critical 
Issue Task Force’ (NSCITF). The report was published by a writer’s collective conducted by 
professors Jeffrey Conner and Carol Rolie Flynn, Georgetown University, 27 June 2015, p. 9, 
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Pa-
per.pdf , p. 9.
161 Zločin u kladionici “po uzoru” na kambodžanski restoran u Parizu, http://www.vecernji.ba/
zlocin-u-kladionici-po-uzoru-na-kambodzanski-restoran-u-parizu-1038663 
162 A. Wölfl, op. cit.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
101
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
16
2.4. Digression: Austro-Bosnian-Jihad-Connection 
After the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 transnational Islamist 
connections are a matter of concern for security communities in all EU member 
states. In this context Austria has a particular interest in the relations between 
Islamists in Austria and BiH. The case of the extremist group in Gornja Maoča 
shows how interconnected Islamists between these two countries are.163 For 
several decades Austria was a popular destination for migrants from Bosnia. 
This is why more than 206,000 people with a Bosnian background are living 
in Austrian cities like Vienna, Linz and Graz.164 Consequently, Islamists from 
the Western Balkans with close relations to BiH are active in Austria. Already 
in 2007 Mustafa Cerić, the official representative of the Muslim community in 
BiH, complained that centres for Bosnian Islamists had been established in Vi-
enna.165 This became more evident when in November 2014 Mirad Omerović aka 
Ebu Tejma, a Muslim from the Serbian Sandžak region, was arrested in Vienna 
along with 13 other potential extremists. In this the biggest anti-Islamist op-
eration in Austria a total of 900 police officers were involved.166 Omerović is 33 
years old, the father of six children and a radical preacher who was receiving 
support from the Austrian social system.167 He is the suspected leader of a trans-
national Islamist network with well-functioning relations to Nusret Imamović 
and other extremists in Gornja Maoča but also to directly to al-Nusra and ISIS 
in Syria.168 According to Austrian law enforcement sources Omerović’s ‘Balkan 
network’ established a very successful logistic structure that was able to recruit 
and transport young radicalised Muslims from Austria through the Western 
Balkans to Syria.169 He is accused of the recruitment of 64 young Muslims be-
tween the ages of 15 to 30.170 The case of Austria shows how interconnected the 
163 Bergdorf der Radikalen, http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/4792323/Berg-
dorf-der-Radikalen 
164 Über 206.000 Menschen mit bosnischem Migrationshintergrund, http://medienservices-
telle.at/migration_bewegt/2014/02/11/ueber-206-000-menschen-mit-bosnischem-migra-
tionshintergrund/ 
165 E. Kocina, R. Nowak, Die Wiener Islamisten-Zelle, Die Presse, http://diepresse.com/home/
politik/terror/330169/Die-Wiener-IslamistenZelle 
166 A. Wetz, Bosnien-Connection: Al-Qaidas Netzwerk in Österreich, http://diepresse.com/home/
politik/aussenpolitik/4607236/BosnienConnection_AlQaidas-Netzwerk-in-Osterreich 
167 Austro-Jihadisten kassierten Sozialhilfe, http://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/chronik/Austro-
Jihadisten-kassierten-Sozialhilfe/167065672 
168 “Ebu Tejma”: Schieß – und Kampftraining, http://wien.orf.at/news/stories/2683920/ 
169 A. Wetz, op. cit.
170 “Ebu Tejma“: Schieß – und Kampftraining, op. cit. 
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internal security from Central European countries with those in BiH is, and 
how important international counter-terrorist measures are.
Conclusions 
The nations of the Western Balkans have in the past proven their vulnerability 
towards intolerance and they have maintained this feature. In addition, there 
are the poor political and economic situation in the countries and the stagna-
tion especially in the case of BiH with very little focus on fighting corruption, 
organised crime and radicalisation and these pose a significant danger to the 
wider region including Central and Eastern Europe. Without the improvement 
of socio-economic conditions in post war countries such as BiH, the perspec-
tives for peace and stability will be low and the frustration among people will 
be high and these are the sources of various internal and transnational secu-
rity threats. 
The internal security of BiH is mainly challenged by corruption, organised 
crime and the different types of extremism especially radical Islamism and 
terrorism. There are several reasons why BiH is prone to further radicalisation 
and the growth of extremism. The first is the already mentioned bad socio-eco-
nomic situation and subsequent unemployment especially among vulnerable 
youth that see no perspectives in the country. Another reason is believed to be 
the close links which extremists have with organised crime to finance their 
activities and infiltrate higher politics. However, it has also been shown that 
Bosnian law enforcement agencies can point to some success and this gives 
hope for the future. Finally, the EU and it member states – especially those in 
Central Europe – should more effectively support internal security in BiH. In 
the long run it will be a valuable contribution to its own security. 
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TOMáš DOPITA
leSSOnS fROM THe aRMy anD POlICe RefORMS
How could the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the members of 
the Visegrad Group (V4), help in the process of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Euro-
pean integration? In this paper I would like to discuss this contemporary issue 
via reflection upon the history of the post-Dayton institutional development in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In particular, I would like to draw some lessons 
from the past, when international actors have made to reform the army and 
police sectors in this country. Therefore the historical events and processes 
linked with the army and police sector reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
be presented and then the lessons we have learned from this will be applied to 
current integration initiatives. 
1. The Success of the Reform of the army
In the first years after the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) entered into force 
there formally existed two armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one in each en-
tity – the Federation of BiH (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). However, the 
Army of the FBiH was composed of two elements based on the war-time Army 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council 
(HVO). From the side of the international actors the divisions between the dif-
ferent military elements were increasingly represented as an obstacle that had 
to be overcome to unblock the socio-economic and political development of the 
country.171 In July 2001 NATO formally offered Bosnia and Herzegovina to par-
ticipate in the Partnership for Peace programme, but this made conditional on 
the creation of an army that is with democratic oversight and administered at 
the state level.172 
171 See e.g. H.Vetschera, M. Damian, Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The 
Role of the International Community. International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 29; See also 
US boost for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s joint military committee, Bosnian Institute 2001, http://
www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news/070800_1.cfm
172 Statements by the Right Honourable Lord George Robertson – NATO; Ambassador Wolfgang 
Petritsch – OHR and Lieutenant General Michael Dodson – Commander SFOR, Transcript: 
Joint Press Conference 13 July 2001, http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/2001/t010713a.htm 
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Since the end of 2001 the Office of the High Representative (OHR), NATO’s Sta-
bilisation Force (SFOR) and the OSCE engaged with local political actors and 
tried to get them on board for this reform. From the beginning this project had 
been supported by representatives of Bosniak and Croat political parties. Rep-
resentatives of the Serb parties based in Republika Srpska had also been in-
volved, but at the beginning they rejected the proposed changes as unconstitu-
tional.173 However, they subsequently changed their attitude on this question. 
This change is commonly interpreted as a consequence of the ORAO affair,174 in 
which the military and political establishment from RS was caught red-handed 
directly violating the UN embargo on selling arms to Iraq.175 It was also seen to 
be a consequence of the illegal wiretapping scandal which uncovered the fact 
that representatives of the RS army had been wiretapping many representa-
tives of the public, civilian and an international sector.176 Following these scan-
dals a member of the BiH Presidency elected from RS, Mirko šarović, resigned 
and the overall position of the representatives of Republika Srpska weakened 
substantially. 
After the basic political agreement was secured the international representa-
tives continued with the engagement on the issue of the common army and 
defence. Based on the work of the Defence Reform Commission the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of BiH adopted the Defence Law of BiH on 1 December 2003. The 
outcome was that supreme authority over two different armed forces was en-
trusted to the BiH Presidency, where decisions are adopted by consensus, and 
within the administrative chain of command the entities still retained their 
own defence ministries for primarily administrative purposes (manning, 
training and equipping). At this stage of the reform Bosnia and Herzegovina 
received a third Defence Ministry on the state level and its armed forces re-
mained divided into two armies and three ethno-national components. 
By the end of 2004 it had become clear that attempts to exercise authority 
and coordination at the state level were meeting considerable institutional 
173 H.Vetschera, M. Damian, op. cit., p. 32.
174 The Orao Aviation Institute in the Bosnian Serb entity Republika Srpska, RS, was found to 
have collaborated with the Yugoslav state company Yugoimport to supply the Iraqi regime 
with parts for its MiG-21 aircraft in defiance of a UN embargo; G.Katana, Bosnia: Ashdown 
Warning Over Orao Affair, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/bosnia-ashdown-warning-over-
orao-affair 
175 H.Vetschera, M. Damian, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
176 From Peacekeeping to Partnership – Part II: Reforming the Military, http://www.natolib-
guides.info/balkans/videos
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resistance177 and that the goal of attaining effective compatibility and interop-
erability with NATO forces was still far from being realised.178 However, seen 
from the perspective of NATO, the major problem turned out to be the issue 
of non-cooperation with the International Crime Tribunal for former Yugosla-
via (ICTY) and the Mladić affair. Against this backdrop on 31 December 2004 
the High Representative Paddy Ashdown established a new Defence Reform 
Commission which was mandated to propose changes to consolidate the two 
chains of command under full state-level control, to transfer remaining entity 
defence competencies to the state, and to close entity defence institutions. This 
initiative encountered considerable resistance from the representatives of Re-
publika Srpska, who represented it as contradicting the constitutional order.179 
However, in the end the Defence Reform Commission, including representa-
tives of all three constituent peoples, on 20 July 2005 endorsed far reaching 
changes, which led to the BiH Parliamentary Assembly adopting a new defence 
law in October 2005. The result was a complete merger of entity armies and 
ministries into a single professional military force and Ministry of Defence ef-
fective since 1 January 2006. 
The institutional form of the integration of the defence sector is of some interest 
to the purpose of this paper. The main bulk of the army was reorganised in three 
multi-ethnic infantry brigades. Each of these brigades consists of three mono-
ethnic battalions, one Bosniak, one Serb, and one Croat. The brigade headquar-
ters were set to be in Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Mostar/Čapljina, which can be un-
derstood as belonging to the homelands of three different constitutive nations of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also the representative and decision-making positions 
are occupied by the representatives of the three constituent peoples, so that, 
for example, the positions at the Ministry of Defence are accorded to a certain 
group in advance. At the operational level the constituent peoples and others 
are represented in the army based on a specific pre-agreed proportional ratio. 
The outcome of this is that the defence sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
now one whole operating as a state level army. This nevertheless consists of 
three main nationally defined elements whose cooperation at the state level is 
heavily regulated. This formula of three nations in one army, however, did not 
177 AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century. Defence Reform Commission 2005 Re-
port, Sarajevo 2005, p. 2.
178 Ibidem, p. 14.
179 Reforma odbrane u BiH, izazvala negativne reakcije u Republici Srpskoj, http://ba.voanews.
com/content/a-29-a-2005-01-05-10-1-85910767/669971.html
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stop this army developing compatibility and interoperability with the NATO. 
Soldiers from the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully par-
ticipated in the international peace support operations, for example in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Georgia. 
2. The failure of the Police Reform
The DPA created conditions for a policing system with no policing competency 
anchored institutionally at the state level, except for ‘international and inter-
entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol’. The main 
thrust of responsibility for policing was left in the hands of the entities and, 
in the case of the FBiH, in the hands of its 10 cantons. In 1999 it was acknowl-
edged in arbitration that Brčko District should have a special status that gave 
it entity-like policing competences. This raised the number of relevant levels 
of policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 14. After pursuing the reforms of the 
internal organisation in the entity, canton, and district police agencies, and af-
ter establishing specialised policing institutions at the state level (such as the 
State Border Service and the State Information and Protection Agency – SIPA), 
representatives of the International Community began drawing attention to 
the ‘structural’ weaknesses of the police system in BiH. 
In early 2003 the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) began to examine 
possible police restructuring initiatives and in 2004 a Financial, Organisa-
tional and Administrative Assessment of the BiH police forces (FOAA) was 
published.180 The document was politically supervised by a steering committee 
composed of the Minister of Security at the state level, representatives of all 12 
Ministries of Interior, the Mayor of Brčko and representatives of the interna-
tional community, and it outlined three different organisational models of the 
future organisational framework in BiH and analysed their implications. The 
suggested possible models were:
•	 The creation of one single national police force with 5 to 7 regions.
•	 The creation of a two entity police system with 5 regions in FBiH and 2-3 
regions in RS (including the Brčko District), with the SIPA and SBP plus 
several additional competencies at the state level.
180 Financial, organisational and administrative assessment of the BiH police forces and the 
state border service: Final Assessment Report, CMPD and TC Team Consult, Sarajevo 2004. 
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•	 The integration of the existing policing structures through the stimulation 
of collaboration among its components and the development of some essen-
tial common support and coordination competences at the state level.181 
The assessment devoted most attention to the third option and it made explicit 
arguments concerning its functional compatibility with the wider organisa-
tional, administrative, and political environment in BiH. 
Shortly after the publication of the FOAA, on 2 July 2004 the OHR issued a for-
mal decision to set up the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) with a man-
date to propose ‘a single structure of policing for Bosnia and Herzegovina’.182 
At the first three meetings the work of the PRC focused mainly on the merits 
of the FOAA study, which the PRC associates also discussed with Dr Bernhard 
Prestel, one of the authors of the study.183 At the fourth meeting on 13 October 
2004 the Chairman, Wilfried Martens presented the Concept Paper on the BiH 
police restructuring based on a single structure model of policing. Since this 
meeting of the PRC this model has met with continuous opposition from repre-
sentatives of RS sitting in the PRC. On the 31 December 2004 the Chairman of 
the PRC submitted the Final Report on the work of the PRC adhering closely to 
the mandate given by the HR. The Chair noted that political restrictions placed 
by the Republika Srpska National Assembly on PRC participants from Republika Srp-
ska prevented the full endorsement of the main recommendations. […] Therefore, 
I am submitting the Final Report in my role as Chair.184
The PRC report proposed a single structure model of policing with central-state 
and regional administrative levels. At the regional level the police would oper-
ate in regions that would be determined by technical criteria and that would 
cut across the existing borders of the entities and cantons. The political and 
administrative structures of the entities and cantons were completely avoided. 
The response of the representatives of RS to the PRC report was unanimously 
dismissive. They presented the weakening of the entities as unacceptable and 
accused Ashdown of autocratic behaviour and of attempting to abolish RS. The 
181 Ibidem, pp. 118-121.
182 Decision Establishing the Police Restructuring Commission, Office of the High Representa-
tive, Sarajevo, 5 July 2004.
183 Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/doc/final-prc-report-7feb05.pdf., pp. 234-237. 
184 Ibidem, p. iv.
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defiance of the representatives of Republika Srpska received strong support 
not only from all Serb political parties and the RS National Assembly, but also 
from the the Serbia and Montenegro, the Orthodox Church, and Russia. This 
started off a long – drawn-out confrontation between the international repre-
sentatives, including the representatives of the European Commission, and the 
representatives of Republika Srpska. 
Even though the introduction of the police reform was a condition of signing 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between BiH and the Eu-
ropean Union, the confrontation lasted till April 2008, when the Parliament of 
BiH adopted the Laws on the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies as 
well as on Agencies for the support of the police structure of BiH. From the side 
of international representatives this outcome was a face-saving compromise 
that did not lead to the creation of a single structure of policing and policing 
regions based on technical criteria, but only towards establishment of some 
new specialized institutions at the state level. This limited achievement was 
considered by the European Union as sufficient to meet the conditions set for 
the initiation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. 
It is important to note here that it seems that the principal reason for the failure 
of the police reform was that the international representatives failed to integrate 
the salient political and social forces into the reform, but instead attempted to 
avoid them and re-establish the boundaries of policing, and thereby power, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina anew. This led to fierce resistance from the representa-
tives of RS, who were successful in representing such a reform to their voters as 
a covert way to abolish RS. This led to the formation of a strong, radical and (in 
2006) democratically mandated opposition in Republika Srpska. 
3. lessons for the Current Integration Initiatives
Whether or not the reform process, and the new institutional design involved 
in it, succeeded in meaningfully involving and integrating the different salient 
political and social elements and forces existing in the area under considera-
tion into one functional whole were the decisive factor for the success of the 
reform of the army and for the failure of the police reform. The two cases de-
veloped above are indicative of this. When the local social and political forces, 
that have vested interests in the area of government under consideration, are 
not meaningfully involved in the reform process, they are able to spoil and 
block the reform-integration process, as happened with the reform of the po-
lice sector. In this perspective a basic practical question needs to be asked and 
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addressed if we are to think seriously about new institutional arrangements 
in BiH: who or what are the salient functional-political-social units that need 
to be integrated in the new institutional arrangement in question? The answer 
to this question is of utmost importance, especially with respect to the issue of 
the common EU coordination mechanism that seems to be the next hurdle BiH 
needs to take on.
Currently, European integration is a highly publicised and politicised issue in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The little the EU has done since the double elections in 
2014, which took place in May in the EU and in October in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, has brought important results that generate important questions and also 
responsibility for the actors located inside the EU. The November 2014 British-
German initiative led to the EU Foreign Affairs Council December 2014 Conclu-
sions that invoked the overall objective to establish functionality and efficiency at 
all levels of government and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare itself for future 
EU membership and invited HR Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn to continue en-
gaging with the BiH leadership to secure at the earliest its irrevocable written commit-
ment to undertake reforms in the framework of the EU accession process.185 
The written commitment was set as a condition for the EU to unblock the SAA 
between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the council was very specific 
and demanded that the written commitment should contain a commitment to 
work out in consultation with the EU an initial agenda for reforms, in line with the 
EU acquis [and asserted that] [t]his agenda should include first and foremost reforms 
under the Copenhagen criteria (socio-economic reforms including the ‘Compact for 
Growth and Jobs’, rule of law, good governance) and also agreed functionality issues 
(including the EU coordination mechanism). Finally, the council also concluded 
that [w]hen requesting the Commission’s Opinion on the membership application, the 
Council will ask the Commission to pay particular attention to the implementation of 
the Sejdic-Finci ruling.186
The palpable effect of this European move is that the BiH tripartite Presidency 
adopted the Written Commitment on 29 January 2015, which was then signed 
by the leaders of the major political parties and then endorsed by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of BiH on 23 February 2015. In response, the EU Council 
185 Council conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 
15 December 2014, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/
foraff/146293.pdf 
186 Ibidem.
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decided to activate the SAA which entered into force on 1 June 2015. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at the end of July, in turn, the political representatives adopt-
ed the Reform Agenda for BiH for the period 2015-2018. The Reform Agenda 
addressed the areas of: public finance, taxation, and fiscal sustainability; the 
business environment and competitiveness; the labour market; social benefits 
and pensions; the rule of law and good governance; and public administration. 
The Reform Agenda did not, however, address the EU coordination mecha-
nism, even though the council demanded it in its conclusions. The main reason 
for this is the fact that the areas that were included in the Reform Agenda could 
be plausibly dealt with through the institutional arrangements established in 
the different units of government while in this case the EU coordination mech-
anism would have to establish a new institutional arrangement that would be 
likely to influence and alter the power-relations between the different units. 
If we view the Written Commitment and the Reform Agenda187 as two crucial 
documents formulating the new common position of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
on the issue of European integration then we can see that in these documents 
the voice of BiH is composed of a total of 14 elements of government: the state, 
two entities, ten cantons, and the Brčko District. Thus, in answer to the ques-
tion on who or what are the salient functional-political-social units that need 
to be integrated in the new institutional arrangement, it seems that in the case 
of the EU coordination mechanism it is all the 14 elements of government that 
are signed under the Written Commitment and the Reform Agenda that are the 
salient units that would need to be integrated into one whole. The main pur-
pose of this ‘whole’ would be to communicate with the EU institutions on the 
everyday matters of European integration. 
In BiH there is presently an intense discussion on how the EU coordination 
mechanism should be designed. The representative of RS in the BiH Presi-
dency and currently Chair of the BiH Presidency, Mladen Ivanić suggested in 
August 2015 that the mechanism should be simplified so that one canton could 
not hamper decision-making concerning BiH as a whole. Ivanić suggested that 
where there is no consensus the final decision should be taken by the Chair of 
the BiH Council of Ministers alongside the two co-chairs from the other con-
stitutive nations, or it should be taken by the Presidency of BiH. This proposal 
was rejected both by the other representatives of the RS, Željka Cvijanović and 
Milorad Dodik from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), 
187 Reformska agenda za Bosnu i Hercegovinu za period 2015-2018. godina, http://www.fbihv-
lada.gov.ba/pdf/Reformska%20agenda%20.pdf 
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which holds power in RS, and also by Dragan Čović, the Croat member of the 
BiH Presidency from the HDZ BiH party. The representatives from SNSD ar-
gued that the institutions of the state could not be the last arbiter, and Čović 
argued that all levels of government need to be included in the mechanism.188 
But whereas the political debate in BiH seems to centre around the questions 
of decision-making, the last arbiter, and the position of cantons, then the other 
question is also how practical activities, for example the gathering of informa-
tion from the different and highly autonomous levels of government, will be 
dealt with on a daily basis. 
This short reflection upon the current political situation in Bosnia and Herze-
govina suggests that the Reform Agenda is, for some time, the most the local 
politicians could meaningfully agree on and try to implement in this elector-
al term. The opportunity for reaching new institutional arrangements could 
possibly occur in autumn 2018, when the next general elections are scheduled. 
This, however, does not mean that the external actors, such as the EU institu-
tions or V4, could not meaningfully intervene to facilitate European integra-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
First of all the focus should be put on the development of the long-term policy 
for BiH’s European integration, which should be based on a realistic evaluation 
of the current political situation in the country, meaning that the Reform Agen-
da constitutes the basic horizon of our possible activities in the medium-term 
perspective. The Reform Agenda should also be utilised to expand the scope 
of EU-V4-Bosnia and Herzegovina relations. Intergovernmental activities and 
development assistance should be subordinated to the priority areas identified 
in the Reform Agenda: public finance, taxation, and fiscal sustainability, the 
business environment and competitiveness, the labour market, social benefits 
and pensions, the rule of law and good governance and public administration. 
This would enhance the drive for reform in this area and help local authorities 
to implement them. 
188 Ivanić bošnjačkim strankama preko mehanizma koordinacije otplaćuje dug , http://dnevnik.
ba/vijesti/bih/ivani%C4%87-bo%C5%A1nja%C4%8Dkim-strankama-preko-mehanizma-
koordinacije-otpla%C4%87uje-dug.

PART II  
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MARTA SZPALA
BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna  
In a WIDeR neIGHBOuRHOOD  
– MORe PlayeRS In THe GaMe 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) found itself in the spotlight in 2014, when mas-
sive protests against the governing elite erupted across the country underlin-
ing the popular discontent with the socio-economic situation. Additionally, 
the tension over Ukraine between the West and Russia led to the latter becom-
ing more actively engaged of in BiH, supporting the separatist tendencies in 
the country. This means the EU must be more actively engaged there, but it is 
weighed down with its internal problems and has paid little attention to BiH 
steeped in a prolonged conflict of political elites focused on fanning the flames 
of ethnic tensions. Finally in December 2015 European politicians announced 
a new approach, which is aimed at accelerating reform in the country and the 
process of BiH’s EU integration. Its chances of success are rather limited not 
only due to vague content of the initiative. In the meantime the EU has lost its 
appeal and influence in BiH and the more active engagement of regional actors 
like Serbia, Croatia and Turkey and global powers (Russia, China), which have 
objectives contradictory to the EU’s make the stabilisation and transformation 
of Bosnia more difficult. 
1. How the eu lost a decade 
Since at least the year 2000 with the USA gradually withdrawing from the re-
gion, the EU and its members have attempted to use the leverage of the EU's 
enlargement policy toolbox to induce Bosnia’s political elites to implement re-
forms. At the beginning of 2006 BiH seemed to be on the right track for sta-
bilisation and EU membership. Negotiations on the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreement (SAA) with the EU had just started and progressed more 
quickly than anyone had expected. However, since the autumn of 2003 EU 
negotiators and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) were pushing for 
the unification of police structures in BiH. Since no progress in this area had 
been achieved in 2005 the EU set three mandatory principles of the police re-
form and compliance was made the main prerequisite for the signature of the 
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SAA.189 This approach significantly influenced the process of Bosnia’s EU ac-
cession. Only in April 2008, when the EU almost completely withdrew from its 
initial requirements, did the local elite agree to two minor reform laws190 but 
the EU’s main objective of – the creation of an integrated police – has still not 
been fulfilled; the SAA was signed regardless. 
The history of police reform is important in many dimensions. By focusing 
on this condition first of all, the conditions set by the EU started to be seen 
as arbitrary. Each EU member structures its police force differently and this 
requirement was not based on acquis communautaire. The process of intro-
ducing rules and norms of EU became chaotic since there were no other pri-
orities. Secondly, due to linking the centralisation of the Bosnian police and 
European integration, the Serb political elite started to perceive the EU in-
tegration process as a tool for strengthening the central institutions of the 
state, which they strongly oppose. Thirdly, abandoning the condition when 
the local elites were unable to reach a compromise showed that the EU is not 
solid in its position191 and a wait-and-see strategy combined with playing on 
intra-EU differences is more beneficial than concession and compromise. 
Fourthly, it showed that the reforms demanded by the EU have no influence 
on ordinary people’s lives and so social support and pressure for fulfilling 
the condition was minimal despite the fact that over 70% of citizens support 
EU membership. The process itself was opaque, so society has no tools to as-
sess which politicians were responsible for the failures and successes. Fur-
thermore, informal negotiation with political party leaders instead of formal 
state institutions undermined the credibility of the very institution the EU 
wanted to strengthen. 
These trends have been reinforced during the debate about constitutional re-
form and introducing the Sejdić – Finci ruling of the European Court of Human 
Rights,192 which was ongoing from 2010 to 2014 and brought no effect despite 
hundreds of meetings in various formats with German Chancellor Angela Mer-
189 W. Stanisławski, M.Szpala, Bosnia’s chaos, Warszawa 2008, p. 105.
190 B. Marijan, D.Guzina, The Politics of the “Unfinished Business”: Bosnian Police Reform, 
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/politics-of-unfinished-business-bosnian-police-
reform, p. 6. 
191 Partly because the EU and its members lack a common vision of what they want to achieve 
by setting their condition.
192 In 2009 the ECHR decided that BiH’s constitution and electoral law violates the EU human 
rights law since it prohibits minorities or individuals who do not identify themselves as Bos-
niak, Croat or Serb from running for the country’s presidency and other offices. 
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kel and EU Enlargement Commissioner štefan Füle193 among others. Although 
the implementation of the judgment of the ECHR was the requirement for the 
SAA to enter into force194 in 2014 via the introduction of a new initiative to-
wards Bosnia and Herzegovina, this condition was also abandoned.195 As in the 
case of police reform, the EU decided to devote a whole mandate of parliament 
to pushing for the reform which, if implemented, would not bring significant 
improvement for Bosnian society.196 
So with no significant achievements in the reform process since 2006, the 
situation in BiH has deteriorated. In the meantime Russia, Turkey and China 
have used the EU’s inaction to strengthen its position in Bosnia. Also BiH’s 
immediate neighbours – Serbia and Croatia – encouraged by Western politi-
cians started to lead more active policies towards Bosnia. Some EU countries 
hoped that they could help to stabilise the country197 by influencing the Croat 
and Serb leaders and that due to these two countries EU aspirations, their poli-
cies towards BiH would be more constructive. But although starting from 2000 
both countries have significantly changed their policy,198 they still focus on the 
protection of the interest of their respective minorities at the expense of the 
functionality of the country. 
2. focus on the Croat question 
Croatia likes to present itself as a neutral mediator regarding BiH, but is 
rather a strong supporter of the point of view of BiH’s Croats on the internal 
situation in the country. Croatia’s politicians are vocal supporters of Bosnia 
193 A detailed chronology of the negotiation can be found here: Not for lack of trying. Chronol-
ogy of efforts to solve the Sejdic-Finci conundrum, www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20Se-
jdic%20Finci%20chronology%20-%20Not%20for%20lack%20of%20trying.pdf 
194 Bosnia-Herzegovina – EU: Deep disappointment on Sejdić-Finci implementation, http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-117_en.htm 
195 E. M. Jukic, UK, Germany Launch Joint Initiative on Bosnia, http://www.balkaninsight.com/
en/article/uk-germany-propose-bosnia-s-renewed-eu-perspective 
196 See at F. Bieber, Why constitutional reform will not solve the Bosnian blockade, http://flo-
rianbieber.org/2014/07/28/why-constitutional-reform-will-not-solve-the-bosnian-block-
ade/, Lost in the Bosnian labyrinth. Why the Sejdic-Finci case should not block an EU appli-
cation, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=143 
197 K. Bassuener, B. Weber, Croatian and Serbian policy in Bosnia – Herzegovina. Help or hin-
drance?, democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/pdf/dpc_neighbors_study_final.pdf, p. I.
198 In the 90s the authoritarian regimes of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman had active-
ly supported the separatist aspiration of Serbs and Croats in BiH through financial, political 
and military means. W. Stanisławski, M.Szpala, op. cit., p. 143. 
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territorial integrity, its membership in the EU and the reform of the consti-
tutional system of BiH and critics of the ethnopolitical game of the country’s 
elites. They also are aware that the stability of Bosnia is in the vital interest 
of Zagreb due to their long common border.199 On the other hand, though, 
Zagreb still perceive the non-representation of Croats’ interests as the main 
problem in BiH and in consequence continue to push for the creation of 
a third entity as a best solution to the permanent crisis in the country even if 
it brings no change to the functionality of the state or makes it even worse.200 
Moreover, after becoming an EU member in 2013, Croatia also started to use 
its position as an EU member to impose its own solutions to bilateral prob-
lems with Bosnia. 
The importance of BiH in Croatia has diminished in the past years. Croatia’s 
society is less interested in the situation in BiH and the influence of Bosnia’s 
Croats on Croatian politics decreased due to changes in the electoral law in 
2010.201 Both Croatia presidents – Stipe Mesić and Ivo Josipović took signifi-
cant steps towards reconciliation between both nations.202 But these pro-
cesses have not changed the objectives policy which the main parties have 
towards BiH. Both right-wing HDZ and left-wing SDP promote the idea of 
a third entity and in case of some tension in BiH they have conducted unoffi-
cial consultation with the Croats’ leader to strengthen their position, bypass-
ing state authorities in Sarajevo. When an SDP-led coalition took the power in 
2011 the first initiative towards BiH of the new Foreign Minister Vesna Pusić 
was federalisation of the country. Bosnia was to be divided into five entities 
and the Croats would get one.203 Wide support for the Croat entity is espe-
cially seen in the European Parliament, where all the Croatian MPs from dif-
ferent political backgrounds support the idea. What is most important, other 
problems of BiH are ignored. 
199 Over 1000 kilometres. 
200 It was perfectly seen in the speeches of the representatives of Croatia at a conference organ-
ised by the European Parliament in Brussels „European future of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
– 20 years after Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement” in December 2015 https://youtu.be/eE3L-
1BXfpXs 
201 The Amendments to the Croatian Parliamentary election reduced the number of polling sta-
tion in BiH and the Parliamentary representation of the diaspora to three members. 
202 See at M.Szpala, Croatian president has initiated new policy towards Balkans, http://www.
euractiv.com/enlargement/president-croatia-has-initiated-new-policy-towards-balkans-
analysis-494054 
203 Vesna Pusić’s next initiative in April 2014 was aimed at unblocking the country’s EU inte-
gration process, but failed to garner enough support. It did, though, become the basis of the 
German – British initiative for BiH introduced in December 2014. 
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Relations between BiH and Croatia are also overshadowed by bilateral prob-
lems, which are a legacy of a common state like the demarcation of the common 
border and the division of Yugoslav property. Due to Croatia’s EU membership, 
new disputes were added regarding connection between the Dubrovnik pene-
enclaves and the Croatia mainland, which are separated by the Bosnian part of 
the coast (Neum corridor) and renegotiations of the SAA between EU and BiH. 
To solve the first problem Croatia wants to build a so called Pelješac bridge, 
which BiH opposes, claiming that it prevents the flow into Bosnia’s only har-
bour in Neum. As for the latter Zagreb wants to update the SAA between the 
EU and Bosnia in order to export all products to BiH without tariffs. The cur-
rent agreement guarantees Bosnia protection for 15 products, which, due to ag-
ricultural subsidies in the EU, cannot compete with those from the EU.204 Since 
no compromise was reached in this case, in January 2016 the EU suspended 
trade preferences for BiH. This action is not only especially harmful for Bos-
nia’s fragile economy. It is undermining the policy of the EU in BiH. The EU just 
unblocked the SAA to convince Bosnian political elites to carry out the reform. 
It is also highly probable that in the future Croatia to force BiH to make conces-
sions on contentious issues would block its EU accession. 
3. We respect Bosnia but love Republika Srpska 
The two main problems in relations between Serbia and BiH are the legacy of 
war in Bosnia (especially the responsibility of Belgrade for the outbreak of the 
conflict) and Serbia’s special relationship with Republika Srpska, which is in-
habited mainly by Serbs.
Serbia takes the view that the war in BiH was an internal conflict205 in which 
Belgrade took no part by encouraging the local elites to use force and provid-
ing logistical and financial support. In consequence Serbia refutes claims it is 
responsible for the war crimes committed by Serbian forces. Belgrade focuses 
on the commemoration of the Serb victims during the war in BiH, which is 
an attempt to justify and regenerate the crimes committed by Serbian side.206 
Serbia is also pursuing individuals perceived in Bosnia as war heroes, such as 
204 B. Weber, K. Bassuener, Stuck in Transition? Croatia’s Policy Toward Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, p. 13.
205 Politička kultura protiv evropeizacije, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/izvestaj2014.
pdf, Beograd 2015, p. 451.
206 Srebrenica: neželjeno ogledalo Srbije, Helsinški bilten, No 117/2015, www.helsinki.org.rs/ser-
bian/doc/HB-Br117.pdf 
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Jovan Divjak or Ejup Ganić – defenders of Sarajevo, who were arrested in Eu-
ropean countries on arrest warrants issued by Belgrade. This is being done to 
prove that other sides of the conflict were also perpetrating crimes. Although 
the previous president Boris Tadić twice visited Srebrenica and in 2010 the par-
liament adopted a resolution about the crimes committed there these symbolic 
gesture were not followed by any action for the prosecution of those responsi-
ble for them, who are seen in Serbia as heroes and protected as such. Nor have 
there been any changes in the official narratives about the war. Belgrade’s poli-
cy strengthens the reluctance felt towards the process of reconciliation among 
the Serbs in Bosnia. Without accountability for war crimes, cooperation of all 
nations in a common state will be very difficult. 
Under pressure from the EU Serbia ceased to openly support Republika Srp-
ska’s separatist ambitions but maintains the special relationship with Banja 
Luka.207 The policy of the current president of RS – Milorad Dodik and his par-
ty, the Alliance of the Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), who is constantly 
testing stability of the state and the unity of the international community in 
efforts to protect its integrity have never been openly criticised by the govern-
ments in Belgrade. 
Serbia’s elite also uses Bosnia in their own political agenda. Vojislav Kostuni-
ca’s governments (2004-2008) used the Bosnian issue in the negotiation con-
cerning the final status of Kosovo, threatening that the proclamation of inde-
pendence of the latter will lead to a revision of the borders in Bosnia.208 The 
next government led by Democratic Party (2008-2012), whose leader was the 
president Boris Tadić also practised linking the Kosovo issue with the territo-
rial integrity of Bosnia. Additionally for Democratic Party and president Tadić, 
the close relationship with Milorad Dodik served as a counterbalance to theirs 
pro-European stance to gain support of the more conservative voters. When 
the Serbian Progress Party (SNS) elite took power in 2012, relations between 
Banja Luka and Belgrade, due to friendly relation with its political opponents 
were cold at the beginning, but quickly got back on the right track. 
After preliminary election in Serbia in 2014 Aleksandar Vučić, leader of SNS, 
as the new prime minister inaugurated a new policy towards BiH by choosing 
207 The special relationship between Serbia and RS is based on the Agreement from 2006 and 
includes a joint annual government meeting. Citizen of RS especially in area of education 
and health care are treated like Serbia citizens. 
208 W. Stanisławski, M. Szpala, op. cit., p. 146. 
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Sarajevo as the destination of his first official visit and all three members of the 
Presidency of BiH have visited Belgrade for the first time.209 The first joint ses-
sion of Serbia’s and BiH’s governments took place in November 2015. The prime 
minister also visited Srebrenica twice. The rhetoric was positively changed and 
the diplomatic cooperation between Sarajevo and Belgrade was quite intensive. 
However the RS elite during the same time have been taking decisive action to 
undermine the federal institution by calling for the referendum challenging the 
authority of the state-level judiciary, which is seen as a test before the referen-
dum on the independence of RS. Moreover Dodik at that time participated in all 
major – state and governing party – events in Serbia, what was seen as a support 
for its actions. The symbol of Serbia’s unconditional approval for Dodik was the 
celebration of RS Day in Banja Luka in January 2016, which was attended by al-
most the entire government headed by Prime Minister Vučić.210 This was despite 
the fact that the Constitutional Court decided that the date of the RS’s holiday is 
unconstitutional and Dodik recently once again openly questioned the compe-
tence of the state court. The another example of a double policy towards BiH of 
the current SNS government is the case of Vučić taking part in a commemora-
tion ceremony in Srebrenica in 2015. It was important gesture but was preceded 
by the arrest of Naser Orić – who commanded forces in Srebrenica – on a Serbian 
warrant and the fierce fighting of Serbia’s political elite against the UN resolu-
tion on Srebrenica, which called it genocide. President Nikolić even wrote an 
open letter to Queen Elizabeth II condemning the resolution. This made Vučić’s 
visit highly ambiguous. Furthermore, President Tomislav Nikolić, coming from 
the same party as Vučić, despite four years in office and several invitations, is 
yet to pay an official visit to Sarajevo, although he visited Banja Luka as early as 
2012.211 He was also publicly questioning the future of BiH as a common state.212 
Dodik’s repeated actions and Vučić’s interventions, which led to the with-
drawal of RS elites on the action taken may just be a political game, which ena-
bles Milorad Dodik to strengthen his image of defender of Serbs’ interests and 
Aleksandar Vučić to present himself to his Western partners as a politician 
who is stabilising the political situation in the region and who can control the 
209 Predsedništvo BiH u Beogradu: Tamburaši i šah na Kalemegdanu, http://rs.n1info.com/
a79092/Vesti/Vucic-i-clanovi-Predsednistva-BiH-u-setnji-Beogradom.html 
210 RS slavi Dan republike: Premijer Srbije Aleksandar Vučić u Banjoj Luci, http://mojabanjalu-
ka.info/infograda/article/8397 
211 Tomislav Nikolić u Banjaluci: Doći ću u Sarajevo kada me pozovu, http://doznajemo.
com/2012/12/26/tomislav-nikolic-u-banjaluci-doci-cu-u-sarajevo-kada-me-pozovu/
212 Nikolić: Sve više očigledno da BiH ne može da opstane, http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/
bih/Nikolic-Sve-vise-ocigledno-da-BiH-ne-moze-da-opstane/244046 
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unpredictable leader of RS. This kind of game weaken the stability of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and diverts attention from the implementation of reforms. 
Moreover the current government in Serbia also frequently underlines its role 
as a guarantor of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the territorial integrity of 
RS. This means the rejection of any constitutional changes or reforms which 
will diminish the position of the RS government in the BiH system. 
4. With a little help from our friend 
In the case of Russia, its activity in BiH appeared to be a proxy conflict with the 
West in an area which was peripheral from the point of view of both players. But 
since the Ukrainian crisis the relationship between the two has significantly 
changed Russia became visibly more active in questioning the Euro-Atlantic 
perspective of Bosnia-Herzegovina213 and more vocally supporting the policy 
of Republika Srpska’s separatist tendencies and actions undermining the state 
institution. Moscow is also strongly rejecting changes in the country’s struc-
ture set up in the Dayton.214 From the Russian perspective an unstable Bosnia, 
which ties up the EU and USA is in its interests. It is also possible that Russia 
could use its ability to push Bosnia into conflict to exert pressure not only on its 
Western partners, but also on Serbia. In case of this scenario Belgrade would 
have to defend Banja Luka, which will rule out its chances for EU membership. 
The Russian engagement was welcomed by Serbian politician in BiH. Milo-
rad Dodik was particularly keen to developed a close relationship with Rus-
sia, bypassing the mediation of Belgrade. Direct relations with Moscow also 
strengthen Dodik vis-à-vis Belgrade. The crisis in Ukraine was also used by the 
elites of RS to justify their separatist rhetoric, which stated that the Crimea 
case is the example RS should follow.215 
Russia has become increasingly vocal in the PIC SB in its support for Milorad 
Dodik and his entity government in weakening the central government and 
213 The Russian delegation requested a sentence mentioning „the Euro-Atlantic perspective of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina” be omitted in the UN resolution about Bosnia, http://www.rferl.org/
content/bosnia-russia-croatia-eu/26697396.html. The explanation of the Russia stance 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-05/bosnia_herzegovina.php 
214 Intervju Ambasadora Rusije u BiH Aleksandra Bocan-Harčenka, Glasu Srpske, http://www.
sarajevo.mid.ru/speeches_lj_10.html
215 Dodik: Dešavanja na Krimu primjer za nezavisnost Srpske, http://www.nezavisne.com/nov-
osti/bih/Dodik-Desavanja-na-Krimu-primjer-za-nezavisnost-Srpske/254423 
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functionality of the state.216 The previous Russian Ambassador in BiH Alek-
sandar Botsan-Kharchenko tended to defend Dodik by putting the blame for 
the crisis in BiH on the status of Croats and underlining the fact that the West 
uses double standards by always accusing Dodik for the crisis in BiH.217 Bot-
san-Kharchenko also defended the right of RS to call for a referendum on the 
BiH’s Court and Prosecutor’s Office,218 which was strongly rejected by West. 
The same stance was repeated by Moscow in the PIC Communiqué adopted in 
December 2015 when Russia rejected the opinion about the illegality of the RS 
referendum.219 Moreover in 2014 Moscow representative for the first time did 
not vote for the extension of the EUFOR peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the 
new Russian ambassador suggested that the international supervision of BiH 
should end.220 The strong Russian support for RS definitely strengthens the po-
sition of the Serbian elite and makes the reform of the country less possible. 
Whether the Russia position in RS is strong enough to force the local politi-
cal elite to take a decision which will destabilise the country remains an open 
question. Certainly it has been reinforced in recent years due to intensified 
diplomatic and propaganda activities221 and investment in the oil industry.222 
Russia is now the fourth biggest investor in Bosnia and Herzegovina with to-
tal investment to 2014 reaching 518 million euros. The aim of this investment 
was not only to enhance the presence of Russian companies in the region but 
also to strengthen the political power of Republika Srpska in dealings with the 
central government in Banja Luka and with the international community due 
216 B. Weber, K. Bassuener, The Western Balkans and the Ukraine crisis – a changed game for 
EU and US policies?, http://democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/DPC%20Policy%20Paper%20
Western%20Balkans%20&%20Ukraine%20crisis.pdf, p. 5.
217 Bocan-Harčenko: Problem BiH je položaj Hrvata, a ne Dodik, http://www.bljesak.info/ru-
brika/vijesti/clanak/bocanharcenko-problem-bih-je-polozaj-hrvata-a-ne-dodik/84052 
218 Ambassador: Russia against sanctions for RS, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.
php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=06&nav_id=74188 
219 V. Perry, Highlights and Lowlights: Take your PIC, http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/
highlights-and-lowlights--take-your-pic-take-your-pic 
220 S. Latal, Russia Sparks Row over International Role in Bosnia, http://www.balkaninsight.
com/en/article/bosnian-official-rebuffs-russian-ambassador-s-proposal-08-10-2015 
221 B. Weber, K. Bassuener, op. cit.
222 NeftegazInKor, an alleged subsidiary of the Russian state-owned Zarubezhneft bought 79.9% 
of shares in BiH’s only refinery, Bosanski Brod, 75.6% in the lubricant producer Modrica and 
70% of fuel retail chain Banja Luka Petrol (78 filling stations) for 121 mln euros. This invest-
ment was financed by the Russian state owned bank VTB Bank. In addition to Zarubezhneft’s 
investment, in 2012 NIS, a company from neighbouring Serbia – owned by Russian Gazprom-
neft, bought a chain of 28 filling station from Austria’s OMV which have a market share of 8%. 
Russia’s bank Sberbank also has an interest in Bosnia and Hercegovina’s banking sector (7.4%). 
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to revenues from this transaction.223 Moreover, this investment gave Russian 
companies a dominant position on the local oil market and led to a rapid in-
crease in imports of Russian oil to BiH.224 
For Turkey, having a presence in BiH225 was a part of the strategy of building 
a new image of Turkey as an important and active player in the wider region. 
When Ahmet Davutoğlu took office in 2009 he initiated a new active engage-
ment in BiH underlining the need to cooperate with all ethnic groups.226 An-
kara tried to play the role of a neutral player and conduct policy, which would 
support the country as a whole. Turkey endeavours to foster dialogue and co-
operation in the Balkan region via the framework of the South-East European 
Cooperation Process (SEECP) and trilateral meetings in the format Serbia-BiH-
Turkey and Croatia-BiH-Turkey to solve the bilateral problems between those 
countries. However, Ankara failed in its aim to gain the same level of influence 
as the USA and EU in the region. This was mainly due to dynamic changes in 
Turkey’s neighbourhood (the Arab Spring); the ideology behind this engage-
ment and the patronising style stemming from the Turkish sense of superior-
ity which was seen in diplomatic actions.227 Despite the declaration that inten-
sive cooperation with all the nations and countries in the region is the main 
goal of Ankara, even Ahmet Davutoğlu in his principal work underlined that 
cooperation with Muslim communities in the region is Turkey’s main priori-
ty.228 Moreover Ankara could not change its image among the Croats and the 
Serbs of being an ally of the Bosniaks. The deterioration of relations between 
the EU and Ankara also made Turkey a less desirable partner for Balkan coun-
tries still aspiring to EU membership and it weakened the Turkish position in 
223 A. Pivovarenko, Modern Russia in the Modern Balkans: Soft Power trough Investment, 
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3744#top-content 
224 While in 2005 Russian imports from Bosnia totalled US$ 71 million, in 2009 they increased 
to US$ 582.9 million and then almost doubled in two years to US$ 1,101 million. 
225 Since 1990 Turkey has been actively engaged in providing humanitarian assistance, rebuild-
ing and the renovation of Ottoman heritage after the war, and cultural cooperation. The four 
main institutions conducting such activities in Bosnia are TIKA, Diyanet, Yunus Emre Cul-
tural Centre and the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Kin Communities. For more: A. Vračić, 
A Political romance: the relations between Bosnia and Turkey, http://www.populari.org/fi-
les/docs/427.pdf
226 Ibidem, p. 23. 
227 S. Ananicz, Alone in virtue. The “New Turkish” ideology in Turkey’s foreign policy, Warsaw 
2015, p. 26; For example, the trilateral meeting Turkey – Serbia – BiH in 2012 was cancelled 
when the prime minister of Turkey during his visit in Kosovo said that Kosovo is Turkey and 
Turkey is Kosovo.
228 A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, Istanbul 2004, p. 315.
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the Balkans. Additionally, Turkey has ceased to be a good example of demo-
cratic transformation.
Considering the constant problems in its southern neighbourhood, Turkey is 
now mainly focusing on close cooperation with the Bosniak political elites, 
which are primarily base on the personal friendship between the president of 
Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Bosniak member of the presidency and 
the leader of the biggest Bosniak party (SDA) – Bakir Izetbegović. Erdoğan is 
also admirer of Bakir’s father – Alija Izetbegović229 – the first president of BiH. 
Support for Bosniaks also helps Erdoğan to gain popularity among people of 
Bosnian origin. It is worth stressing that, in contrast to Russia, Turkey sup-
ports the Euro-Atlantic ambitions in the region and the stability of the cur-
rent borders and does not undermine the EU’s and the USA’s policy objectives 
in the region. 
The presence of China in the region and BiH is essentially economically focused 
on energy and transportation. The biggest Chinese investment in Bosnia is the 
Stanari coal-fired power plant (300 MW), which is being built by Dongfang 
Electric Corporation and the euros 350 million investment is financed by a loan 
from China Development Bank. Negotiations on two consecutive power plants 
(Tuzla, Gacko) are under way. So far the economic impact has not translated 
into a political one and China is not interfering in the process of stabilising 
BiH. Nevertheless, as in other regions, the access to the cheap Chinese loans, 
unburdened with additional conditions concerning democratic and market re-
form, may make the Bosnian elites less susceptible to the influence and pres-
sure of Brussels in the longer term. 
Perspectives 
The local elite in Bosnia and Hercegovina are rather focused on maintaining 
the status quo (which protects their interests) than in EU integration, (which 
may challenge them). Society has also gradually lost hope that pressure from 
Brussels can significantly change the country – during the protest in February 
2014 there were no flags of the European Union or calls for European engage-
ment. At the same time as soon as protests broke out the leaders of Croatia, 
229 Erdogan: Alija Izetbegović bio je jedan od najvećih državnika prošlog veka, http://www.blic.
rs/vesti/svet/erdogan-alija-izetbegovic-bio-je-jedan-od-najvecih-drzavnika-proslog-
veka/67jqb5p
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Serbia and Turkey reacted to support ‘their side’. Aleksandar Vučić immedi-
ately met with Milorad Dodik and the leader of the Serbian opposition, Mladen 
Bosić. Zoran Milanović, Croatia’s prime minister, travelled to Mostar, the in-
formal capital of Croats in BiH. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Foreign Minister 
met with the BiH’s Presidency, BiH’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Head 
of the Islamic Community in Sarajevo. This pattern repeats with every crisis in 
BiH and foreign engagement usually strengthens the position of all three sides 
and makes a compromise harder to achieve. 
Twenty years after Dayton, Bosnia is not only facing the inability of the West 
to react on the protracted crisis in this country, but also increasing activity 
from Russia and China, who are pushing their agendas, most often contrary 
to the EU’s policy aims. Moreover when in the end Germany and the United 
Kingdom, introduced the new policy for BiH in 2014 they had not even tried 
to get support for this initiative from countries like Croatia, Serbia or Turkey, 
which at least declare that they favour the policy of the EU in BiH. In the cur-
rent circumstances all three states are conducting policy, which makes the in-
troduction of reform in BiH harder. In the case of Croatia there is also a risk 
that the Macedonian scenario may be repeated, where the policy of the EU as 
a whole clashes with a completely different policy of one of its members. In 
other words, Zagreb can block the process of Bosnia’s integration with the EU 
because of its bilateral conflict with Sarajevo. This would jeopardise the EU’s 
efforts to use the enlargement process to force local elites to introduce the re-
form. In the case of Serbia and Turkey the EU should take advantage of the pro-
cess of the European integration of both countries to persuade them to pursue 
a policy in BiH in line with EU strategy. However, is it hard to imagine that the 
EU (which was unable to reform BiH in more favourable circumstances) will be 
successful in this new, more complicated environment. 
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JAROSłAW WIśNIEWSKI
‘THIS TIMe IS DIffeRenT’  
eu POlICy TOWaRDS BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna: 
a faIluRe Of THe neW aPPROaCH?
So that’s the package: we, Britain and Germany, will work with Bosnia and Herzegovina on 
a plan to deliver reform. And once that plan is delivered, we will advocate for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with our EU colleagues to ensure Bosnia and Herzegovina’s candidacy gets 
back on track (…) it is about taking a pragmatic and flexible approach to the sequencing 
of reforms, aligning priorities more closely with the most urgent needs of the country, and 
being prepared to reward progress where we see it being made. At the same time, we will be 
prepared to be tougher should political leaders once again allow themselves to get stuck in 
the mud of ethnic bickering.230 
Philip Hammond, UK Foreign Secretary
‘A new strategic approach’ was both the title of the speech and the message 
sent by Philip Hammond, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, to Bosnian politicians. 
At that time they were already involved in debates about sharing the spoils of 
power after the October 2014 elections. More importantly, however, Hammond 
and his German counterpart Frank-Walter Steinmeier were sending a signal 
that the EU is willing break the deadlock and turn a new page in its relation-
ship with Bosnia and Herzegovina. A common UK-German letter outlining the 
‘new strategic approach’ proposed a new narrative showing the need to focus 
on the economy before other reforms with the keyword being ‘pragmatism’. An 
additional push for this initiative was created by the Russian grab of Crimea, 
which has led many to ‘re-discover’ the Balkans as a potential area of Russian-
Western rivalry.231
A joint letter, co-written by Hammond and Steinmeier, called on the Bosnian 
political leaders to sign up to a package (at that time undefined) of economic 
230 P. Hammond, Bosnia and Herzegovina – a new strategic approach, https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/speeches/bosnia-herzegovina-a-new-strategic-approach 
231 D. Bechev, Russia in the Balkans: Perceptions and Realities, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
lsee/2015/03/19/russia-in-the-balkans-perceptions-and-realities/ 
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reforms linked with the Compact for Growth and Jobs.232 In turn, both Ham-
mond and Steinmeier promised to ‘bring the long-delayed Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement into force so that BiH can benefit from the much need-
ed financial investment that comes with it.’ The Anglo-German initiative was 
adopted as an EU approach in December 2014. The third crucial part of this 
‘new approach’ was the ‘Reform Agenda 2015-18,’ an official document outlin-
ing a roadmap of key reforms requested from BiH, de facto becoming the pack-
age of reforms mentioned by Hammond. The combination of the Compact for 
Growth and Jobs, the Hammond-Steinmeier initiative and the Reform Agenda 
were together supposed to break the Bosnian stalemate. Initially it all seemed 
to work well. Following a written commitment by BiH politicians, in April 2015, 
the EU’s foreign and European affairs ministers recommended unfreezing the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). 
Only two months later Christian Schwarz-Schilling proclaimed this ‘new stra-
tegic approach’ to be effectively dead.233 This was preceded by the fall of the 
government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and resistance 
from Republika Srpska’s (RS) president Milorad Dodik. It seemed that the ini-
tiative fell victim to domestic Bosnian political dynamics. For the EU however, 
the initiative remained alive.234 
To borrow the popular phrase, one might conclude that ‘this time it was sup-
posed to be different.’ This phrase captures and summarises every single fi-
nancial crisis in the past eight centuries. But, as Carmen M. Reinhart and Ken-
neth S. Rogoff conclude – it almost never is.235 A very similar observation can be 
applied to the history of EU-BiH relations with déjà vu being the most common 
feeling among many Balkan watchers. With the Anglo-German initiative ex-
periencing a reality check when confronted with Bosnian political dynamics, 
there is hope that a truly ‘new strategic approach’ to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
can be achieved through the Berlin process.
232 For more information see at http://europa.ba/?page_id=547 
233 Njemačko-britanska inicjativa za BiH je propala, http://www.dw.com/bs/njema%C4%8Dko-
britanska-inicijativa-za-bih-je-propala/a-18511957 
234 Statement of EUD/EUSR on the development of an initial Reform Agenda, http://europa.
ba/?p=32294 
235 C.M. Reinhart, K.S. Rogoff, This time is different, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. XXXV.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
129
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
16
1. The failure (?) of the anglo-German initiative
The initial Anglo-German agenda appeared to have a very pragmatic dimen-
sion. Instead of pushing for constitutional reforms blocking Bosnia’s path to 
Europe for over 5 years (primarily the Sejdić and Finci case and the 2009 ruling 
of the European Court of Human Rights), it sought to address the most pressing 
issue for Bosnian society – the need for economic reform. 
The initial letter co-authored by Hammond and Steinmeier was sufficiently 
vague to be accepted by Bosnian politicians (as they eventually did in February 
2015).236 Its basis was the Compact for Growth and Jobs, which later translated into 
a more specific ‘Reform Agenda 2015-18’. And this proved to be more problematic.
The Compact for Growth and Jobs was originally published in July 2014. It was 
a product of the Forum for Prosperity and Jobs held in Sarajevo in May 2014 
and of subsequent consultations. It has received support from the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, and the EU and the US Administration.237 The Compact iden-
tified six priority reforms: (1) changes in the existing taxes on jobs, (2) opening 
up the labour market by removing the existing barriers, (3) improving the busi-
ness climate (BiH was ranked 131st on the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking), 
(4) strengthening the private sector by restructuring large state-owned enter-
prises, (5) dealing with corruption (stronger adherence to the rule of law and public 
administration reform), and (6) increasing social protection for the citizens of BiH. 
Initially the compact was endorsed by the political elites, but when it came to 
implementation (the Reform Agenda), obstacles started to appear. The biggest 
one has not changed since the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) itself – the do-
mestic political dynamics in BiH and the inseparability of the economy from 
politics strengthened by the 2014 elections.
The October 2014 elections have further cemented the political bases of three 
major nationalist parties: the Party of Democratic action – SDA (Bosniak), the 
Croatian Democratic Union of BiH – HDZ BiH (Croat) and the Alliance of Inde-
pendent Social-Democrats – SNSD (Serb). The coalition talks on all levels, from 
236 E. M. Jukić, Bosnian lawmakers unblock path towards EU, http://www.balkaninsight.com/
en/article/bosnian-leaders-unblock-country-s-eu-path 
237 Compact for Growth and Jobs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Delegation of the European Union 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://europa.ba/?p=17720 
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the federal government to the governments in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska have yet again exposed the loopholes in the 
Dayton agreement. Again it turned out that no one is really in the opposition, 
which was most vividly seen in the case of RS – the dominant SNSD controls 
the local parliament and local government, but is in opposition on the federal 
level, where the Serbian Democratic Party – SDS and the Party of Democratic 
Progress – PDP (themselves in opposition in RS) are parts of the coalition. The 
elections and their outcomes have only confirmed what Paddy Ashdown called 
the permanent dysfunctionality of Bosnian institutions.238
The new ‘strategic approach’ was met by the ‘old politics’. The focus on eco-
nomic reforms, although approved in February 2015, was met with fundamen-
tal systemic resistance – a system of patronage and business relations based on 
political power. EU-promoted economic reforms posed a threat to the function-
ing of BiH’s system of patronage in both FBiH and RS.
1.1. Resistance in FBiH
The ‘breath of fresh air’ in FBiH was supposed to come with the electoral success 
of the Democratic Front – DF, a new political party formed by Željko Komšić, 
a former member of Bosnia’s state presidency. One of its key electoral promises 
was to address corruption and promote transparency. The post-election arith-
metic in FBiH meant that the only realistic governing coalition was SDA (the 
biggest winner of the election), HDZ BiH and DF. This agreement fell apart rela-
tively quickly (spring 2015) over DF’s insistence on public transparency.239 This 
was something neither SDA (in opposition in the past 4 years, eager to regain 
its influence and access to public funds), nor HDZ BiH (not interested in losing 
control over various companies) was willing to agree on. 
1.2. Defiance in RS
A much bigger (and more direct) blow came from Republika Srpska, where its 
president – Milorad Dodik refused to accept the ‘Reform Agenda 2015-2018’.240 
238 Bosnia and Herzegovina – new international thinking (workshop report), South East Euro-
pean Studies at Oxford, March 2015, p. 17.
239 DF traži policijsku istragu javnih preduzeća, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/df-trazi-
policijsku-istragu-javnih-preduzeca 
240 Reformska agenda za Bosnu i Herzegovinu za period 2015-2018. godina, http://www.fbihv-
lada.gov.ba/pdf/Reformska%20agenda%20.pdf 
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The agenda was ‘intended to respond to the call of the Foreign Affairs Council 
of December 2014 to develop an initial agenda for reforms in line with EU ac-
quis’ and it mirrored the priorities set by the Compact for Growth and Jobs, giv-
ing them a more specific shape. The document was adopted by the government 
of FBiH and by the Council of Ministers (Bosnia’s state government) but re-
jected by the government in RS, as it was expected that public companies in the 
energy sector would be privatised.241 This was something that would directly 
hit the SNDS system of patronage and the financial (mis)management of state 
assets. This decision has led to the last minute cancellation of the visit to Sa-
rajevo by Johannes Hahn, the EU’s enlargement commissioner. Eventually the 
RS government approved the agenda in late July 2015, a decision welcomed by 
Philip Hammond,242 Frank-Walter Steinmeier243 and the EU. Rather unsurpris-
ingly, the privatisation of the energy sector in FBiH or in RS was not directly 
mentioned in the final document.244 
The crisis has temporarily been averted; the ‘new strategic approach’ is (theo-
retically) still in place; at least until another part of the agenda is questioned 
by Banja Luka. Nevertheless, the ‘new strategic approach’ has suffered its 
first loss with the politico-economical Bosnian system of power. This episode 
clearly illustrated the inseparability of the political and economic systems in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both remain strongly interconnected. Political power 
gives access to state funds and state enterprises, which in turn provides em-
ployment opportunities. Taking into consideration the fact that in a country 
of 3.28 million, 7,748 people have put their names on electoral lists, which as 
Jesse Hronesova calculated, means that ‘almost every second family in Bosnia 
is somehow linked to a political subject through one of its family members’.245 
This not only shows why certain parties do not lose their popularity but also 
that the political and the economical are in fact intrinsically linked in BiH. 
241 Reformska agenda pred NS RS? http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Reformska-agen-
da-pred-NS-RS/310345 
242 Foreign Secretary welcomes BiH adoption of Reform Agenda, https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/news/foreign-secretary-welcomes-bih-adoption-of-reform-agenda 
243 Foreign Minister Steinmeier welcomes adoption of reform agenda in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2015/150728_
BosnienHerzegowina.html?nn=479796 
244 Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015-2018, working translation, Delegation of 
the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://europa.ba/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/09/Reform-Agenda-BiH.pdf
245 J. Hronesova, Bosnia – Voting for the devil you know, Balkan Insight, http://www.balkan-
insight.com/en/blog/bosnia-voting-for-the-devil-you-know-1
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
132
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
02
/2
01
6
Nevertheless, the challenges faced by Bosnia and Herzegovina reach beyond 
domestic politics.
2. europe – repeating the same old mistakes
One of the bigger obstacles to BiH’s progress on the European level is the EU’s 
belief that ‘this time is different’. The October 2014 elections and their after-
math, including the process of negotiations over the ‘Reform Agenda 2015-2018’ 
has shown that everything is still the same. A new Anglo-German ‘strategic ap-
proach’ quickly started to lose ground to Bosnian political dynamics. There is 
a trap that the EU will continue with the same approach as in the 1990s, trying 
to find solutions for the politicians themselves rather than, as a recent SEESOX 
report suggested,246 empowering the institutions themselves, thus providing 
them with the necessary legitimisation. This problem was epitomised by the 
spat over the call for a referendum by Milorad Dodik in the summer of 2015, 
which was redolent of 2011. Back then the problem was resolved by the inter-
vention of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy Catherine Ashton. In 2015 Brussels was again addressing the problem, 
thus undermining BiH’s sovereignty and the independence of its institutions, 
instead of empowering them. As Adis Merdzanovic has pointed out, discus-
sions over internal Bosnian matters, such as the threat of a referendum in Re-
publika Srpska, were again being sponsored by the West and held abroad.247 
This gives Bosnian politicians a great excuse not to take responsibility for any 
difficult decisions. It also undermines the EU’s ambition to strengthen the rule 
of law in BiH. In previous years the Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
played the role of the scapegoat. Now Brussels has started to wear the same 
hat. This only strengthens the perception that the EU’s priority is to stabilise 
no to reform the Western Balkans, which is why the EU might seem eager to 
prioritise the status quo. As Dimitar Bechev has argued: ‘the message Western 
Balkans politicians hear in Brussels, Berlin or Paris is: sort out your internal 
mess, demonstrate you are ready, and then come and talk to us’.248 And if there 
are delays or complications, the EU always refrains from naming and shaming, 
as the history of the EU’s relationship with a number of Balkan officials have 
246 Bosnia and Herzegovina – new international thinking…, op. cit. 
247 A. Merdzanovic, Structured Dialogue in Brussels: the return of 1990s international strate-
gy?, https://adismerdzanovic.wordpress.com/2015/09/12/structured-dialogue-in-brussels-
the-return-of-1990s-international-strategy/ 
248 D. Bechev, The Periphery of the Periphery: The Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis, ECFR 
Policy Brief, p. 7.
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shown, e.g. Nikola Gruevski and the snooping scandal, or Hashim Thaçi and 
the accusations of corruption and human trafficking. And the vicious circle 
continues.
3. Keys to BiH – managing regional dynamics
The most important keys to Bosnia-Herzegovina lie in Belgrade and in Zagreb. 
The ethnic, national and historical links are with Croatia and with Serbia, 
which means Bosnia’s progress (or regress) is dependent on the political dy-
namics in both neighbouring countries. FBiH is directly exposed to an extend-
ed election campaign in Croatia, which started from the presidential race in 
2014-15, and finished with the November 2015 parliamentary election. This was 
already seen in the recent ban on exports of Bosnian dairy products to Croatia 
(late August 2015) which was criticised by the European Commission’s Stand-
ing Committee on Food and Animal Health.249 But Croatian President Kolinda 
Grabar-Kitarović (herself an ex-HDZ politician) has provided a more visible 
example. During her trip to Sarajevo in September 2015, she stated that she 
would continue to insist on the equality of all the constituent peoples in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.250 This sent a clear signal of support for HDZ BiH in their 
pursuit of a third, Croat-dominated, entity within BiH (a key electoral prom-
ise of its leader and now member of the Bosnian presidency, Dragan Čović). It 
clearly undermined the DPA and the current constitutional arrangements in 
BiH. The relationship between HDZ in Croatia and in BiH is not one of equals, 
even though a large part of Grabar-Kitarović’s electoral success stemmed from 
Croatian votes in BiH (up to 90% of the Croatian diaspora, primarily living in 
FBiH, voted for her).251 Still, Zagreb remains the more influential actor.
A similar game is being played between Banja Luka and Belgrade. It seemed 
that the close relationship between Milorad Dodik and Boris Tadić, the former 
Serbian president, would negatively affect the former’s contacts with Tadić’s 
successor, Tomislav Nikolić, and with Aleksandar Vučić, the prime minister 
of Serbia. This however, according to Banja Luka-based experts Ivan šijaković 
249 Jakovina zahtjeva od EK da riješi problem trgovine Hrvatske i BiH, http://www.jutarnji.hr/
jakovina-zahtjeva-od-ek-da-rijesi-problem-trgovine-hrvatske-i-bih--ne-mogu-se-traziti-
nova-prava-i-nova-privilegije-u-odnosu-s-trzistem-eu--a-s-druge-strane-odbijati-ob-
veze-/1413774/ 
250 E. M. Jukić, Bosnian academics honour Croatian president, http://www.balkaninsight.com/
en/article/bosnian-academics-honor-croatian-president-in-sarajevo-09-11-2015 
251 D. Bechev, 6 key observations after Croatia’s presidential elections, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
lsee/2015/01/13/6-key-observations-after-croatias-presidential-election/ 
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and Mladen Mirosavljević has not happened. In an interview for Radio Free 
Europe,252 they both agreed that the relationship between Dodik and Vučić is 
indeed very close, though one should not underestimate Mladen Ivanić, a Ser-
bian member of the state’s presidency and a politician of Party of Democratic 
Progress (PDP), an opposition force at the entity level in RS. Nevertheless, Milo-
rad Dodik is very well aware that his political survival, significantly weakened 
by his own slim victory over Ognjen Tadić in last year’s presidential elections in 
RS, is dependent on his cooperation with Belgrade. But even weakened, he still 
remains a very pragmatic politician. RS’s economy is less dependent on Bel-
grade than before, and the biggest investor in RS, the energy company Comsar, 
is Russian, not Serbian. Aleksandar Vučić, on the other hand, may wish to be 
seen as less partisan (also, reportedly, he is influenced by Germany253), hence 
his contacts with Mladen Ivanić. In the end, as Ivan šijaković concludes,254 no 
politician in RS could achieve success by criticising the Serbian government. 
Just as in the case of the relationship between HDZ in Croatia and HDZ in 
BiH, the relationship between Serbia and RS is not one of equals. Both Zagreb 
and Belgrade are the more influential partners. And their role in BiH’s future 
should be neither forgotten nor underestimated.
The biggest potential for improvements in BiH lies in regional cooperation. 
This is where the Berlin process has a chance to inject new hope and a more 
sustainable strategic approach.
4. Berlin process – focus on regional cooperation
In an interview posted on her website in June 2014255 Angela Merkel praised the 
Belgrade-Pristina dialogue facilitated by the EU, but also reminded everyone 
of European support for future EU enlargement in South East Europe, under-
lining three key aspects which have to be tackled there: the rule of law, the 
development of civil society, and the development of economic transparency. 
The most important element of her initiative was the recognition of the most 
important game-changer: regional cooperation.
252 Da li će Dodik poslušati Vučića i odustati od referenduma, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/
content/da-li-ce-dodik-poslusati-vcica-i-odustati-od-referenduma/27215978.html 
253 Angela Merkel će tražiti od Vučića da se distancira od Dodika, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/
bih/angela-merkel-ce-traziti-od-vucica-da-se-distancira-od-dodika/140827051 
254 Da li će Dodik poslušati Vučića i odustati od referenduma, op. cit.
255 Klare EU-Perspektive fur Balkanstaaten, http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/
Podcast/2014/2014-06-07-Video-Podcast/links/download-PDF.pdf;jsessionid=00631809DE5
BAF5A1E35DA7A401D08BA.s3t2?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 
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The conference in Berlin which followed in August 2014 was seen in the Balkans 
primarily through the economic prisms; as an opportunity to attract German 
investment and to obtain support for cross-border infrastructure projects.256 
Berlin made sure that the conference had a European dimension – José Manuel 
Barroso, the president of the European Commission, accompanied Merkel in 
all of the meetings with the heads of states of all involved parties – Albania, 
Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The 
ministers for the economy met with the German minister for the economy Sig-
mar Gabriel, who was accompanied by Günther Oettinger, commissioner for 
energy. All foreign ministers met Frank–Walter Steinmeier, minister of for-
eign affairs and štefan Füle, the enlargement commissioner. 
The meeting in Berlin, built on the success of the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, provid-
ed a more comprehensive approach to the Western Balkans, by focusing on the 
most pressing issue – the economy – but also by trying to keep momentum and 
to facilitate dialogue in other areas, primarily between heads of states. It has also 
demonstrated that Germany clearly understands that neither the enlargement 
process nor any country-specific initiative can be detached from a wider region-
al approach. It was also a much-needed shot in the arm for the Western Balkan 
states, which received257 the announcement by Jean-Claude Juncker not to expect 
further EU enlargement by 2020 as a blow. The conference’s aim was to give fresh 
impetus to the process of reform by creating a narrative (though not a commit-
ment) that future EU enlargement might be possible after 2020. The conference 
has led to a number of regional activities. Some of them were initiated prior to the 
conference itself, e.g. joint infrastructure projects between Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and Serbia,258 or modernisation of the Belgrade-Bar railway.259 Others were 
initiated already in Berlin, with the most salient one being renewed Belgrade-
Tirana dialogue. The meetings between Albania and Serbia’s prime ministers in 
the following months caught the eye of almost all of the European media (not only 
because of the context of the brawl during a Serbia-Albania football match).260 
The conference has also initiated what was later dubbed the ‘Berlin process’ 
256 F. Franze, D. Tomovic, Balkan leaders have high hopes of Berlin Summit, http://www.balka-
ninsight.com/en/article/berlin-hosts-top-tier-western-balkans-conference 
257 M. Poznatov, Serbia grudingly accepts Juncker’s enlargement pause, http://www.euractiv.
com/sections/enlargement/serbia-grudgingly-accepts-junckers-enlargement-pause-308481 
258 Serbia, Bosnia to have joint projects in Berlin, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.
php?yyyy=2014&mm=08&dd=20&nav_id=91354 
259 PM travels to Berlin to attend conference, B92, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.
php?yyyy=2014&mm=08&dd=27&nav_id=91417 
260 N. Ames, S. Ibrulj, Serbia v Albania abandoned after players and fans brawl on pitch, http://
www.theguardian.com/football/2014/oct/14/serbia-albania-euro-2016-flag-halted 
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– annual meetings between EU and Western Balkan politicians. A second sum-
mit took place in August 2015 in Vienna, and a third and fourth are scheduled 
to take place in France and Italy. The second conference led to the announce-
ment of more specific projects: a possible motorway linking Niš (Serbia) with 
Dürres (Albania) passing through Pristina (Kosovo); the announcement that 
the Belgrade-Sarajevo railway line would be co-funded by the EU. Overall, ac-
cording to the Austrian Vice Chancellor Reinhold Mitterlehner, 24 different 
infrastructure projects, worth about 7 billion euros, were confirmed during 
the conference. There are projections that they could stimulate the 1% of GDP 
growth in each country, and could possibly lead to the creation of 200,000 new 
jobs.261 The Vienna conference has also shown that these summits can facilitate 
not only economic reforms, but also be a platform for discussions of the most 
salient topics, such as the refugee crisis in the Balkans. 
The Berlin process created a new atmosphere, where regional cooperation was 
to be promoted. It looked at the overall picture, and any gaps were supposed to 
be filled by supplementary, specific nation-tailored initiatives (the Hammond 
– Steinmeier initiative, the Reform Agenda, etc.). 
5. new hope? – lessons for the future
However naïve it may sound, the Berlin process may well be the biggest hope 
for genuine change in the Western Balkans. This may be the only way out of 
the situation where the EU countries ‘pretend that they still want the Western 
Balkans to join, and that the elites in the region pretend that they are seriously 
tackling their multiple and chronic economic and political problems’,262 even 
despite the hiccups experienced by the Anglo-German initiative. 
The offer of a more pragmatic approach presented by Philip Hammond and 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier seems to be the only viable one. It has to be consistent 
and cannot get lost in the existing mechanisms of the EU’s approach towards 
BiH. The mechanism of the European Commission providing tutelage in Brus-
sels whenever there is an internal dispute should be abandoned. If the rule of 
261 I. Jovanovic, Merkel: summit has shown EU commitment to Balkans, http://www.balkaninsight.
com/en/article/western-balkans-to-have-clear-european-future-merkel-says-08-27-2015 
262 P. van Ham, Gridlock, Corruption and crime in the Western Balkans. Why the EU must ac-
knowledge its limits, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Gridlock%20Corrup-
tion%20and%20Crime%20in%20the%20Western%20Balkans.pdf 
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law and the strength of state institutions is in the EU’s interest, words should 
be backed up by actions. 
The UK – German proposal had several highly significant elements and these 
should now be consistently pursued. It has shown that the EU can be flexible in 
terms of conditionality, which might work to the advantage of BiH. It has also 
shown it is willing to focus on the most urgent needs (stimulating the economy, 
creating jobs, strengthening the rule of law, reducing bureaucracy), moving 
the controversial ones (e.g. constitutional changes) to a later stage. 
An innovative SEESOX workshop report on new international thinking on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina adds a few relatively inexpensive and potentially 
highly impactful recommendations. The key one involves the international 
community needing to be ready to name and shame those public figures who 
are responsible for any backlogs in BiH’s EU integration process.263 Although 
many might dismiss it as interfering in Bosnian domestic affairs (which West-
ern institutions do regularly anyway), this might be a very practical tool for 
informing Bosnian society about the realities of BiH’s European path. 
European Union support cannot be limited only to providing funds – Bos-
nian politicians may be very eager to accept them, without giving much in re-
turn. The same applies to other countries in the region covered by the Berlin 
process. Ultimately the only way Bosnia’s political system can be changed is 
through public pressure. Bosnia needs a ‘constituency for change’.264 More ef-
ficient investments in civil society (e.g. through the Erasmus Plus programme) 
combined with the pressure for transparency and the naming and shaming 
of all those who create backlogs might be the cheapest and most effective way 
of changing Bosnia’s political culture. The EU has to stop thinking in terms of 
‘this time is different’. It is not and will not be. Twenty years of cementing of 
Bosnia’s political system after the Dayton Peace Agreement has made it highly 
resilient to conventional changes. Supporting institutions, not politicians, and 
strengthening civil society (especially in terms of requesting transparency 
and accountability from their elected representatives) may well be the only 
way to create a ‘constituency for change’. In the end it is the Bosnians them-
selves who should feel the need for change and be willing to join the EU.
263 Bosnia and Herzegovina – new international…, op. cit., p. 14.
264 F. de Borja Lasheras, Can Steinmeier and Hammond reset Bosnia?, http://www.ecfr.eu/ar-
ticle/commentary_can_steinmeier_and_hammond_reset_bosnia371 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be ‘fixed’ without ‘fixing’ the whole Western 
Balkans. The Berlin process creates a specific context of regional cooperation, 
supported by the EU. Belgrade and Zagreb may be only too eager to explore and 
exploit their influence in BiH (as could be vividly seen in the Croatian presi-
dential and parliamentary campaigns), which makes the EU’s role even more 
important. Getting Belgrade and Zagreb on the same page with Brussels would 
be bring added value, and this is something the Berlin process should be able to 
facilitate. The biggest advantage of the Berlin process lies in its flexibility (no 
one in Berlin a year ago would have thought that discussions in Vienna would 
focus on cooperation in the face of a refugee crisis in the Balkans). Ultimately, 
the closer Serbia and the other Western Balkan countries are to the EU, the 
better for BiH’s European path.
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MATEUSZ GNIAZDOWSKI, TOMáš STRáŽAY
VISeGRaD COOPeRaTIOn  
On BOSnIa anD HeRzeGOVIna:  
CHallenGeS anD OPPORTunITIeS
Whenever the crises and internal problems of the EU diverted attention away 
from enlargement policy, the Visegrad Group (V4) countries have stressed that 
this EU policy is the most efficient and effective tool for the transformation 
of the EU's southern and eastern neighbourhood. The progress in the Balkan 
countries’ EU accession and the support of their European aspirations was 
among the priorities of the Czech, Hungarian and Polish EU Presidencies. The 
accession negotiations with Croatia were finalised during the Hungarian Pres-
idency and Zagreb signed an Accession Treaty during the Polish Presidency 
(2011). The V4 countries have also recognised that the success of Croatia’s EU 
membership will foster the reform implementation and EU integration of oth-
er countries in the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – for whose stability 
the EU has a special responsibility – counts among them. It may be expected 
that also during the Slovak Presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 
2016 the Western Balkans and EU enlargement will be duly considered.
The programs of the V4 Annual Presidency has included cooperation in sup-
port of the Western Balkans for years. The common goal of the V4 is to sup-
port NATO and the of ‘open doors’ policy of the EU. The V4 countries encour-
age countries in the Western Balkans region to intensify their reform efforts 
and assist them with their experience of the transition period and accession. 
V4 cooperation on BiH is an element of cooperation between Central European 
countries in the whole Western Balkans. This in turn is also the result of the 
role the region plays in the foreign policy of the V4 countries.
To understand the potential of V4 cooperation in the Balkans and particularly 
in BiH, it is worth briefly looking at the determinants of the national policies 
of the V4 countries. Hungary borders the region but Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic also explicitly declare that the area of the Western Balkans is a prior-
ity for their foreign policies. The largest of the V4 countries – Poland – does not 
emphasise the Western Balkan countries on their list of priorities so clearly 
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but is devoting more and more attention to this region, both in the context of 
the broader policy issues in the EU and NATO, and also in the bilateral and 
regional dimension.
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the policies of the V4 countries
The Western Balkans is an important strategic region of the foreign policy of 
Hungary and, due to its proximity, it is usually associated with greater chal-
lenges than is the case with the other V4 countries. Within the region it is not 
BiH which has the most importance, but Serbia and Croatia. The baggage of his-
torical relations and the problems of national minorities resound in the Hungar-
ian policy towards the region. In the XX century Hungary (as part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire or as an independent country, as well as a NATO member) 
were in conflict with the Serbs three times: in World War I, World War II, and 
– indirectly – during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when it became a NATO member 
shortly before NATO bombed in Yugoslavia and it made its airspace available to 
its new allies. Hungary endorsed Slovenia and Croatia when Yugoslavia began 
to collapse, fearing the emergence of a very strong Serbia with nationalist ten-
dencies. During the fighting in 1991-95 Hungary remained neutral and accepted 
many refugees from the former Yugoslavia, including Hungarians from Vojvo-
dina. Hungary’s contribution to the peacekeeping operation in BiH also included 
providing the military base and airport in Taszár for US armed forces.
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not share a border with Hungary and there is no 
significant Hungarian community there. Budapest has thus pursued a policy for 
this country similar to that for other Central European countries. Nevertheless, in 
some government documents BiH is named an honorary neighbour to Hungary. 
The Hungarian government is well aware of the fact that long term stability and 
steady economic growth in BiH is a prerequisite of enduring stability and growth 
of whole region. Furthermore, Serbia and Croatia, which are highly involved 
in Bosnian issues, are the most important Western Balkans states for Hungary.
Under pressure from the United States, Hungary joined the Southeast Euro-
pean Cooperative Initiative (SECI) in 1996, being the only V4 country to do 
so. Hungarian soldiers have participated in the IFOR operation and in SFOR 
(mainly engineering troops stationed in Okučani) since 1996 and currently are 
part of the EUFOR Multinational Battalion.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the strategic partner of the Hungarian International 
Development Cooperation. Hungary’s main goals in BiH are: keeping the peace 
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and avoiding armed hostilities (including low scale violence and terrorist ac-
tions), increasing political and social stability, supporting economic develop-
ment, assistance in meeting the criteria of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures, 
and (re)vitalizing bilateral economic, civil and cultural-academic relations. In 
order to achieve these goals, Hungary is focused on: motivating and supporting 
Hungarian exports and direct investment to BiH through Eximbank Hungary; 
providing higher education grants to Bosnian citizens (Stipendium Hungari-
cum, 50 students for 2015); project based capacity building, education and hu-
man resource development in the fields of sustainability, rural development, 
agriculture, flood protection (training programme in the framework of EU 
strategy for Danube Region) etc. and on improving transportation ties.265 
The Western Balkans was declared as one of the post-accession priorities of 
the foreign policy of Slovakia by the then Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda 
in March 2004.266 This may be considered as a natural step, despite the lack 
of common borders, especially due to historical reasons (strong ties between 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, numerous Slovak minorities in Vojvodina and 
Croatia), cultural and linguistic closeness (with the exception of Albanians) 
and economic interest. The Western Balkans has also played a crucial role in 
the EU enlargement policy, which Slovakia supports. 
The importance of the region for Slovakia can be demonstrated by the grow-
ing number of embassies. While in 2004 Slovakia had only two embassies in 
the region – in Belgrade and Zagreb – ten years later they can be found in all 
Western Balkans countries.267 The embassy in Sarajevo was opened already in 
the year 2004, as the third Slovak embassy in the region. 
Both the direct and indirect involvement of Slovak diplomats in the stabilisa-
tion of the region can be considered as further visible proof of Slovakia's in-
terest in the region. Their activities were closely connected with the EU and 
other international organisations. This especially applies to Miroslav Lajčák, 
who currently serves as the minister of foreign and European affairs of the 
Slovak Republic. In 2007 Lajčák was appointed the High Representative and 
265 A promise to continue the M6 motorway – part of the TEN Vc corridor – as a motorway from 
Mohács to the Croatian border, lobbying to restart rail traffic between Budapest and Sarajevo.
266 Appearance of Prime Minister of Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda, [In:] P. Brezáni (ed.), Foreign 
policy of Slovakia after NATO and EU accession. Starting points and strategies, Bratislava 2004.
267 Slovakia does not recognize the declaration of Kosovo s´ independence thus it only has a rep-
resentation office in Pristina. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
142
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
02
/2
01
6
EU Special Representative in BiH. Though he remained in the office only a lit-
tle over one year, he developed a reputation for being a skilled expert on the 
entire region. He was appointed to one of the most important positions in the 
European External Action Service, as an EEAS managing director for Russia, 
the Eastern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. Another Slovak foreign 
minister – Eduard Kukan – was engaged as a special envoy of the UN Secretary 
General for the Balkans in 1999-2001. After having been elected to the Euro-
pean Parliament in 2009, he became a rapporteur for the Western Balkans.268 
In relation to BiH it is worth mentioning that a European Economic and Social 
Committee member, Patrik Zoltvány, was the rapporteur on EU-Bosnia and 
Herzegovina relations. 
The Western Balkan countries have been the recipient of the Slovak Offi-
cial Development Assistance since its establishment in 2003. Though Bosnia 
and Herzegovina – unlike Serbia and Montenegro – has never become a pro-
gramme country of the Slovak ODA after 2004, it has appeared on the list of 
project countries. In 2008, BiH even became the priority project country of 
Slovak official development assistance.269 Other instruments aimed at devel-
oping cooperation with the region include the Centre for Experience Transfer 
in Integration and Reforms (CETIR), which focuses primarily on the training 
of civil servants and twinning projects, aimed at the transfer of know-how and 
experience, especially in sectoral cooperation.
Slovakia continues to support EUFOR in its mandate and objectives, which 
means support capability building of the AFBiH and personnel in key HQ roles, 
such as Chief of the Liaison and Observation Team (LOT) Coordination Cen-
tre (LCC) in Camp Butmir and through three Slovakian LOT Houses based in 
Višegrad, Novo Sarajevo and Foča.270 
268 The participation of both Miroslav Lajčák and František Lipka in the process of the dissolu-
tion of the Serbia-Montenegro Union may be considered as another large contribution of the 
Slovak diplomacy to the stabilisation of the Western Balkans. While Lajčák served as an en-
voy of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy for the whole 
process of the referendum, František Lipka was appointed the chair of the referendum com-
mission. 
269 Uznesenie vlády Slovenskej republiky č. 208 z 2. apríla 2008 k Národnému programu oficiál-
nej rozvojovej pomoci na rok 2008, http://www.mvro.sk/attachments/article/293/NP_
ODA_2008.pdf
270 Chief of Defense – Slovak Republic, General Milan Maxim visits EUFOR, http://www.eufor-
bih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2878:chief-of-defense-slovak-re-
public-lieutenant-general-milan-maxim-visits-eufor&catid=217:latest-news 
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On the other hand, the economic performance of Slovakia in the entire West-
ern Balkan region remains relatively low. Slovakia has become neither a major 
investor nor an important trade partner for the Western Balkan countries. As 
regards BiH, both exports and imports have remained low – in 2014 exports 
reached only €76.5 million, and imports €57.6 million.271 
The Western Balkan countries are also priority areas of the foreign policy of 
the Czech Republic. This translates into the development of cooperation pro-
grammes with BiH, Kosovo, and Serbia, as well as relatively large – when com-
pared to other V4 countries – economic interests; though their balance sheet is 
not the best. Czech companies had larger operations in the Western Balkans, 
such as the škoda Auto construction plant in Vogošća until 2008 and the Mi-
tas tyre production plant in Ruma (Serbia). The Czech electricity production 
and distribution company ČEZ (70% state-owned) began its Western Balkans 
expansion in 2005. In 2006 ČEZ entered into an agreement with Republika 
Srpska (BiH) on the modernisation and expansion of coal-fired power plants 
in Gacko.272 The project was supposed to be for a record €1.4 billion, but was 
unsuccessful and ended in international arbitration. ČEZ’s €102 million invest-
ment in Albania in the only electricity distribution from 2009 turned into a se-
rious bilateral dispute between the countries. This received wide coverage in 
the media, meaning that these markets began to be associated with high risk in 
the Czech business community. Despite these problems, Czech exporters and 
companies are active in the Balkan markets, and the development cooperation 
programmes of the government often serve as outposts of economic coopera-
tion and are correlated with Czech economic interests. 
For the Czechs, cooperation in the security field is also important. Although 
the Czech participation is now significant only in EULEX in Kosovo (32 offic-
ers) and it is rather symbolic in EUFOR-Althea (two officers) and KFOR (eleven 
soldiers), Prague believes that the stability of the Western Balkans has a di-
rect impact on the internal security of the Czech Republic. This belief is fur-
ther strengthened by the migration crisis, which is having a strong influence 
271 Ekonomická informácia o  teritóriu – Bosna a  Hercegovina, https://www.mzv.sk/docu-
ments/745948/783206/120915_EIT_BosnaHercegovina.pdf/d29e549d-69fc-40a6-9285-
63fa7fb81581
272 Internal Information: CEZ has today signed implementation agreement under largest-ever 
foreign investment of Czech firm, http://www.cez.cz/edee/content/file/investors/inside-in-
formation/2007-05/cez-061-2007-en.pdf
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on Czech politics and public opinion. An important role in the Czech BiH ap-
proach is the police cooperation focused on the fight against organised crime.
Although the region does not feature so prominently in the foreign policy 
agenda documents in Poland as it does in the case of its V4 partners, the stabi-
lisation and integration of the Western Balkan countries with the EU has re-
peatedly been the subject of reflection due to its implications for Polish inter-
ests.273 Discussion is usually dominated by the conviction that it will primarily 
affect Poland indirectly – by acting on the political dimension of European in-
tegration and security issues.274 This process, was also considered as one of the 
aspects of regional cooperation pursued by Poland, also in the V4.275 There is 
a conviction in Poland that the possible destabilisation of the Balkans would 
result in disastrous consequences for European and Polish security and for 
NATO and the EU – institutions which Poland considers to be the pillars of its 
security. That is why the international community must remain strongly en-
gaged in BiH, particularly as political, economic and social tensions mount. It is 
often stressed that no amount of international support can substitute the polit-
ical will of Bosnian politicians and if politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
serious about their stated goal of joining the Euro-Atlantic community, they 
must be prepared to revisit their entrenched positions.276 Poland, like the other 
V4 countries, supported the integration ambitions of BiH in the international 
arena, including support for BiH’s candidacy for non-permanent membership 
of the UN Security Council for 2010–2011.277
The Polish military presence in the missions in the region was relatively high 
(and still is in KFOR and EULEX). Although the security situation in BiH has 
273 See at R. Sadowski, J. Muś (ed.), Bałkany Zachodnie a integracja europejska. Perspektywy 
i implikacje, Warszawa 2008, pp. 48-49. 
274 K. Smyk: Konsekwencje polityczne i w obszarze bezpieczeństwa. Bałkany Zachodnie a in-
tegracja europejska, op. cit., p. 80.
275 M. Gniazdowski: Western Balkans: A Matter of Central European Solidarity. The Polish 
Quarterly of International Affairs 2008, no 2, p. 74–78; T. Żornaczuk, Western Balkans in Po-
land’s Foreign Policy. [In:] Panorama of Global Security Environment 2009. Bratislava 2009, 
p. 237-248.
276 The Western Balkans: Securing a Stable Future. Special Report by Witold Waszczykowski. 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 12 October 2013, http://www.nato-pa.int/shortcut.
asp?FILE=3301, p. 5.
277 Poland initially competed in the Eastern European regional group for this position, but lat-
er gave support to BiH. Poparcie dla Bośni i Hercegowiny, http://e-prawnik.pl/artykuly/
prawo-administracyjne-1/poparcie-polski-dla-kandydatury-bosni-i-hercegowiny-na-ni-
estalego-czlonka-rady-bezpieczenstwa-nz.html 
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been stable for a long time, the Polish government recognises the danger that 
social unrest could break out. Poland supported the maintenance of the EUFOR 
Althea operation with an executive mandate278 although before 2014 in the EU 
(and V4) there were divergent opinions on that. Originally, the Polish contin-
gent in BiH was about 660-strong, now it has been reduced to 50 soldiers. In 
practice it is about 35 soldiers, including the Polish Liaison and Observation 
Team (LOT) in Doboj.
Trade and investment cooperation between Poland and BiH remains at a rela-
tively low level.279 The biggest Polish investor in BiH is Organika Group (ap-
prox. €9.4 mln) – one of the leading producers of flexible PU foam, but its 
presence in the Bosnian chemical sector cannot be considered a resounding 
success because of the controversy related to that sector’s privatisation and re-
dundancies. Boiler engineering company Rafako implemented modernisation 
projects in the Tuzla thermal power plant, but failed to win a major contract 
for its expansion280 and to participate in the modernisation of the power plants 
in Ugljevik and Gacko.281 There was also an unsuccessful attempt to relaunch 
the Ursus tractor producer on the Bosnian market.282 In 2010 the Polish govern-
ment gave Republika Srpska tied aid loan (€20 million) for the purchase of 200 
carriages and equipment for RS Railways from Polish companies EKK Wagon 
and RAFAMET. 
In June 2014 the Polish government adopted a special document – Guidelines 
of the Government of the Republic of Poland towards the Western Balkans – 
whose implementation by individual ministries aims to strengthen the repu-
tation of Poland as a valuable partner in the process of integration with the EU 
(including the expansion of the grid cooperation in sharing experience from 
accession negotiations), to strengthen economic exchange, public diplomacy, 
278 See at Operacje i Misje UE, https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bez-
pieczenstwa/operacje_nato_i_ue/operacje_ue/ 
279 In 2014 Polish exports to BiH amounted to EUR 172 million, and imports to €44 million. The 
total value of Polish investments totaled €26.9 million (December 2013), representing 0.5% of 
total FDI in BiH. Bośnia i Hercegowina, http://www.informatorekonomiczny.msz.gov.pl/pl/
europa/bosnia_hercegowina/bosnia_i_hercegowina
280 Rafako już poza przetargiem na blok 450-480 MW w Tuzli, http://budownictwo.wnp.pl/ra-
fako-juz-poza-przetargiem-na-blok-450-480-mw-w-tuzli,207020_1_0_0.html 
281 Poljska kreditira obnovu TE Ugljevik i Gacko, http://swot.ba/wordpress/poljska-kreditira-
obnovu-te-ugljevik-i-gacko/
282 Ursus wychodzi z Bośni i Hercegowiny. Sprzedali Fabrika Traktora za markę, http://
wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100896,16685008,Ursus_wychodzi_z_Bosni_i_Hercegowiny__
Sprzedali_Fabrika.html?disableRedirects=true
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the development of transport links, the implementation of Polish interests in 
the area of energy security and risks related to organised crime, terrorism and 
illegal migration.283 While the Western Balkans does not receive significant 
Polish ODA, in case of emergencies – such as flooding – Polish humanitarian 
aid is provided. There are also new initiatives related to the transfer of the Pol-
ish experience of transformation, such as a series of study visits for Western 
Balkans civil servants – the Enlargement Academy, organised jointly by the 
Polish MFA, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Development.284
2. The Western Balkans, Bosnia & Herzegovina and V4 cooperation 
The V4 activity in the whole Western Balkans can support the region’s integration 
into the EU, its successful transformation, and closer ties with Central Europe. 
This will have a positive effect on BiH and thus the processes occurring in the im-
mediate neighbourhood have key importance for the stability of the country. This 
includes above all progress on Serbia’s road to the EU and the normalisation of its 
relations with Kosovo, and the economic recovery of Croatia. From the point of 
view of geopolitical calculations, Montenegro’s invitation to NATO submitted in 
December 2015 is also important. On the other hand, the situation in BiH is also 
particularly important for the stability of whole region due to the aspirations of 
national minorities. The possible disintegration of BiH would probably escalate 
demands for a correction of borders along ethnic lines or attempts to obtain a very 
high degree of autonomy. This is also why both the EU and the V4 countries see 
BiH as an important element of political stability in the entire Balkan region. 
The element of rivalry for influence with countries outside the EU – mainly Rus-
sia – as well as the necessity to revise the Balkan ‘buffer’ in the context of se-
curity challenges (mainly the fight against terrorism) and uncontrolled migra-
tion via the Western Balkans trail to Western Europe (especially Germany) all 
underline the problem of ‘geopolitical gaps’ on the map of Europe in the region. 
The role of strategic and geopolitical factors due to the involvement of actors out-
side the region and the EU has significantly increased in recent years. With the 
283 Komunikat nr 22/2014 nt. prac Komitetu ds. Europejskich w okresie 2.06 – 6.06.2014 r., https://
www.msz.gov.pl/resource/4047ff09-f318-4c84-97c6-66e34ec7dbb3:JCR; Odpowiedź sekretar-
za stanu w Ministerstwie Spraw Zagranicznych – z upoważnienia ministra – na interpelację 
nr 29291 w sprawie korekty wyzwań dla polskiej polityki europejskiej na lata 2015-2025, http://
sis.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=722B5928
284 The representatives of the Western Balkan countries become the participants of the Enlarge-
ment Academy, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/news/the_representatives_of_the_
western_balkan_countries_become_the_participants_of_the_enlargement_academy
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escalation of tensions between Russia and the West after the invasions of Geor-
gia and Ukraine, the Balkans became an arena of struggle for the influence and 
credibility of Western integration processes. An accelerated integration of the 
Balkans into the EU is an opportunity to confirm the EU’s role as a key (along 
with the US and Russia) actor in this part of the continent and to improve its 
prestige in the international arena. Moreover, if it turns out that the EU cannot 
stabilise a small country in its immediate neighbourhood, it would not be cred-
ible in its ambitions to wield effective influence in more distant surroundings.285 
As Matteo Tacconi noted if the Western Balkans look carefully at V4 involve-
ment, the V4 agenda is much more focused on the Western Balkans than it used 
to be years ago. In Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest, policy makers 
have realised that the Balkans matter.286 The interest of V4 in the Western Bal-
kans is underpinned by a number of factors. The Visegrad countries consider 
their experience of the transition to democracy and a free-market economy 
and EU accession as unique and easily transferable to Western Balkans. An-
other reason is the complementarity of V4 and EU priorities – both consider the 
Western Balkans to be an important foreign policy priority. The Western Bal-
kans has been one of the priority regions of ODA for three V4 countries.287 The 
economic dimension is also worth mentioning – the developing markets of the 
Western Balkans countries and the ongoing processes of privatisation provide 
an opportunity to play a more active role in the region. Furthermore, there is 
an assumption that the Visegrad model of regional cooperation may serve as 
inspiration for the Western Balkans. Last but not least, cultural, historical and 
to a large extent also linguistic proximity makes the V4 a natural advocate of 
the Western Balkans countries aspiring for EU membership.288
285 See more L.Hladký, Dwanaście lat po Dayton – rzeczywistość i iluzje. [In:] M.Gniazdowski 
(ed.): Europejski protektorat? Bośnia i Hercegowina w perspektywie środkowoeuropejskiej, 
Warszawa 2008, p. 30.
286 M. Tacconi, V4 and the Balkans. Visegrad Insight, no 2(8), 2015, p. 77.
287 In this regard Poland is an exception – none of the Western Balkans countries is on the list 
of priority recipients of Polish Development Assistance. Multiannual Development Cooper-
ation Programme 2012 – 2015, https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/download/files/dokumen-
ty_publikacje/PW_EN-po_reas.pdf
288 The ability of the V4 countries (and the Visegrad Group as such) to serve as role models in 
the process of the European integration of the Western Balkans is also disussed in the com-
parative study published by the European Movement in Serbia and four Visegrad think tanks 
(Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM – Prague, CEU Center for Enlargement Studies – 
Budapest, Centre for Eastern Studies – Warsaw and Slovak Foreign Policy Association – Brati-
slava) in May 2015. See J. Minić (ed.), European Integration of the Western Balkans – Can the 
Visegrad Group Countries Serve as Role Models, http://www.emins.org/uploads/userup-
loads/forum-it/02-PA-V4Studija.pdf
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Alongside Kosovo, BiH is the least advanced country in the region as regards 
integration to the EU, but with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) coming into force in June 2015, the country made a significant step on the 
way to the EU membership. Nevertheless, the country’s unstable political cli-
mate and divisions along ethnic lines are still hampering the overall progress 
of accession-related reforms. The European Commission’s Bosnia and Herze-
govina 2015 Report underlines the limited results achieved in complying with 
Bosnia’s EU-reform agenda due to the political stalemate, which is manifested 
through the lack of political dialogue and coordination between the entities.289 
On the other hand, it is worth underlining that all parties in BiH recognise the 
absence of alternatives to EU accession: there is no competing long-term per-
spective but the European one, no consistent ideological approach except the 
market approach, and no feasible model that can bring prosperity to broader 
segments of the population.290 
Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a challenge both for the EU and V4. The 
latter is yet to develop an intensive cooperation with the country, which is con-
sidered as a part of the ‘regional approach’. In order to assess the current status 
quo and prospects for cooperation between the Visegrad Group and the West-
ern Balkans, three levels of cooperation are considered: political, institutional 
and procedural know-how sharing, and the sectoral aspects of cooperation.291 
Political Cooperation. Support for the integration of the Western Balkans is 
embodied in a number of Visegrad Group documents, including the Kroměříž 
and Bratislava Declarations, Presidency programmes and ministerial state-
ments292 and the joint declaration of the V4 and Croatian foreign ministers, 
which was adopted on the occasion of Croatia’s accession to the EU.293 Regular 
summits of the foreign ministers of the Visegrad countries and their counter-
parts from the Western Balkans countries have been taking place in the au-
289 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 Report. November 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2015/20151110_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf
290 Based on Haris Mašinović comments.
291 See also T. Strážay, Visegrad Four and the Western Balkans: A Group Perspective. Polish Quar-
terly of International Affairs, 21, 4 (2012), p. 52-64.
292 For example: The Bratislava Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on the occasion of the 
20th anniversary of the Visegrad Group, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/the-bratislava
293 Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Countries and Croatia on the Oc-
casion of the Croatian Accession to the EU, https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/d5cad1e9-adea-
43ab-85b9-99ae6ad2460b:JCR
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tumn since 2009, when the Hungarian V4 presidency introduced this informal 
procedure. It is also worth mentioning that representatives of the European 
Commission take part in these summits.294 Besides that, the meetings of the 
political directors and heads of analytical departments are also worth high-
lighting. During the Polish Presidency of the V4 in October 2008 there was 
a meeting of the foreign ministry political directors of the V4 countries with 
a representative of the British Foreign Office, the BiH authorities and the High 
Representative/EUSR for BiH Miroslav Lajčák. The meeting aroused interest in 
the experience of V4 and indirectly supported Lajčák in his efforts to stabilise 
and reform BiH. Similar meetings were later repeated. 
Such meetings, in the V4+Western Balkans and V4+BiH format, allow politi-
cal issues to be discussed in a detailed perspective. In addition, although the 
parliamentary dimension of cooperation between the V4 and the Western 
Balkans has not so far been very intensive, the joint meeting of the commit-
tees on public administration and regional policy295 and the European affairs 
committees of the parliaments of the Visegrad countries and Croatia might 
serve as an inspiration.296 V4’s political commitment to BiH has already been 
appreciated by the BiH government, which especially thanked V4 for its con-
tribution to the liberalisation of the visa regime as the most powerful instru-
ment of soft power of the EU, promoting the integration process, especially 
among young people.297
Institutional and Procedural Know-How Sharing. It can be argued that 
the Visegrad cooperation has already become an inspiration for developing 
serious regional projects in the Western Balkans. The extension of Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 2006 in the region proves that 
a model that was born in V4 countries can also be implemented in the Bal-
kans.298 CEFTA enabled the Visegrad countries (and other countries of a ‘wid-
294 See at Visegrad Group Joint Statement on the Western Balkans, 31 October 2014, https://www.
msz.gov.pl/resource/206a981e-08de-4fb6-b0ab-56f911eda333:JCR 
295 Joint Statement from the 5th Meeting of the Committees on Public Administration and Re-
gional Policy of the Parliaments of the Visegrad Group Countries and Croatia, http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/download.php?docID=206 
296 Calendar of Events of the Polish V4 Presidency (July 2012-June 2013), https://www.msz.gov.pl/
resource/ca6d9527-3019-4953-9bf4-d52c9ce42ab1:JCR 
297 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of BiH Ana Trsic-Babic Visited Warsaw, http://ambasa-
dabih.pl/en/10/zamjenica-ministra-inostranih-poslova-bih-ana-trisic-babic-u-varsavi/
298 The signatories of the Agreement CEFTA 2006 are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croa-
tia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and UNMIK (on behalf of Kosovo). The main 
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er’ central Europe – Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) to prepare to enter the 
EU single market, while the region’s countries have exactly the same goal. It 
was also important because the EU considers regional cooperation to be proof 
that the Balkan states are capable of sustaining economic relations with each 
other and with the rest of the Europe.299 CEFTA can therefore be considered 
as perhaps the most efficient example of the export of V4 know-how in the 
Western Balkans.
The V4 countries have a unique and valuable experience for the Balkan states 
associated with the process of transformation, building a free-market econ-
omy, adapting to EU and NATO requirements and membership negotiations 
with the EU. The platform for cooperation is to provide expertise in the frame-
work of twinning projects, support for the use of pre-accession funds, the co-
operation of non-governmental organisations, and scholarships for students. 
In this area the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) plays an important role, 
given that it supports contact between NGOs and public entities between the 
V4 countries and the Western Balkan countries under the programme frame-
work ‘Visegrad+’ and enables the exchange of students between two regions. 
The establishment of the V4 – Western Balkans Expert Network on the Rule of 
Law and Fundamental Rights, which came out of the 2012-2013 Polish V4 Presi-
dency also aimed to strengthen the exchange of ideas and know-how by creat-
ing a pool of experts from both regions.300
Cooperation within the V4 as well as the IVF has also become a model for re-
gional cooperation for the Balkan states. After more than four years of negotia-
tions the establishment of the Western Balkan Fund, based in Tirana, seems 
to be an irreversible project. The idea of establishing such a fund in the West-
ern Balkans was initially developed by the International Centre for Democrat-
ic Transition (ICDT) in Budapest. An international group of experts on civil 
goal of CEFTA has been to expand trade in goods and services, eliminate barriers to trade 
among the countries involved, as well as to foster investment. It also aims to harmonise pro-
visions on modern trade policy issues, such as competition rules and state aid. The signato-
ries the tradition of the original CEFTA, whose founding members are already EU members. 
For more details see http://www.cefta.int; T. Strážay, Grupa Wyszehradzka i Bałkany Za-
chodnie – współpraca czy uprzywilejowane partnerstwo? [In:] M. Gniazdowski, op. cit., p. 148.
299 P. Biernacka, Review of the Economic Development in the Western Balkan States, CES Studies, 
no. 19, Warsaw, 2005, p. 15-16.
300 Report of the Polish Presidency of the Visegrad Group July 2012 – June 2013, http://www.msz.
gov.pl/en/news/report_of_the_polish_presidency_of_the_visegrad_group_sums_up_pol-
ish_achievements_?printMode=true; Partnerstwo V4-Bałkany Zachodnie, https://www.
rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/partnerstwo-v4-ba%C5%82kany-zachodnie 
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society and regional cooperation developed it in the first half of 2011.301 The for-
eign ministers of the V4 and six Balkan states signed an agreement in Prague 
on November 2015.302 Being built on the institutional and procedural know 
how of the International Visegrad Fund, the Western Balkan Fund could be 
an important instrument for enhancing regional cooperation in the Western 
Balkans. Similarly to the IVF, the Western Balkans Fund is expected to be cre-
ated by the governments of interested Western Balkans countries and should 
mainly support people-to-people contacts, cooperation among civil society or-
ganisations, and also cross-border cooperation. The contributors are to be the 
governments of the involved Western Balkans countries, though the feasibility 
study also calls on the V4 governments and other state and non-state actors to 
match the Western Balkans countries’ contributions. 
Sectoral Cooperation. As regards sectoral cooperation, only a few achieve-
ments can be highlighted. Though the V4+ Western Balkans format has been 
used regularly on the political level, the analysis of Presidency Programmes 
and Annual Reports303 provide us with quite a short list of examples of secto-
ral cooperation. Among Western Balkans countries, Croatia was the most fre-
quent partner of V4. 
One of the examples is defence. The meeting of the V4 ministers of defence and 
their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia took place during the Hungarian V4 presidency in October 2009. 
The main purpose of this meeting was to discuss the NATO and EU integra-
tion process of the Western Balkans countries in detail, as well as a possible V4 
contribution.304 
V4 – Western Balkans cooperation was visible in the energy sector. In 2006 the 
extended V4 meeting of energy sector executives included Croatia, and Austria, 
301 Non-paper on the feasibility study on the possible creation of a ‘Western Balkan Fund’ for 
regional cooperation based on the International Visegrad Fund model, http://www.icdt.hu/
documents/events/WB_Fund_nonpaper.pdf 
302 Agreement on the Establishment of Western Balkans Fund in Tirana, 16 November 2015, 
http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/press-office/news/agreement-on-the-establishment-
in-tirana-of-western-balkans-fund 
303 All Presidency Programmes and Annual Reports are available on the official website of the 
Visegrad Group: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/annual-reports
304 The national positions on the new NATO Strategic Concept were also exchanged during the 
meeting. It was also decided that a Strategic Concept working group was to be set up based 
on V4 delegations to NATO. Hungarian Presidency – Annual Report (2009/2010), http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/documents/annual-reports
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Romania and Slovenia. In January 2010 BiH, Croatia and Serbia together with 
the Visegrad countries and Austria, Bulgaria and Romania were co-signatories 
of the Declaration of the V4+ Energy Summit held in Budapest. The summit 
initiated the creation of several working groups, including one on the north-
south interconnection. The extended meeting of this working group plus Croa-
tia was held during the Slovak V4 presidency in September 2010. The Czech 
V4 presidency (2011-2012) succeeded in the preparation of a Memorandum of 
Understanding on North-South Interconnections in Central-Eastern Europe, 
which was signed by the V4 countries, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, 
Romania, Slovenia, and the European Commission.305 The more intensive in-
clusion of Croatia in the meetings on energy security results from its impor-
tance in the north-south interconnection.
Other cooperation initiatives in the V4+ Western Balkans format included the 
justice and home affairs sectors. The issues discussed included the fight against 
corruption306 and judicial training.307 A meeting of V4 justice ministers + Croa-
tia and Slovenia was held during the Czech presidency.308 The Czech presidency 
also managed to organise the 2nd Ministerial Conference of the Prague Process, 
which focused primarily on issues related to asylum and migration.309 The joint 
declaration was signed by ministers from EU countries, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Western Balkans and Turkey. The 2013-2014 Hungarian 
Presidency was able to organise a meeting of experts on IPA funds, with a specific 
focus on IPA II. The Hungarian Presidency also initiated the first V4 Good Govern-
ance Forum, in which the representatives of the Western Balkan countries took 
part. A second one was organised in June 2015 during the Slovak V4 Presidency.310 
305 Memorandum of Understanding on North-South Interconnections in Central-Eastern Europe, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2011_north_south_east_mou.pdf
306 The seminar on the experiences of the fight against corruption among experts of V4 and West-
ern Balkans justice ministries was organised during the Hungarian V4 presidency in 2006. 
307 The meeting of V4+ Croatia justice ministers (plus Slovenia and Germany), at which a mem-
orandum of cooperation regarding judicial training was signed, was organised by the Slo-
vak Presidency (2010-2011). 
308 Among other topics the meeting discussed ways to reduce the prison population, patents 
courts, and the enforcement of execution orders. 
309 The first Ministerial Conference of the Prague Process was held in Prague in April 2009. The 
ministers responsible for migration issues then adopted a Joint Declaration, which set long-
term priorities for cooperation in the field of migration management. See: http://www.
pragueprocess.eu
310 V Bratislave sa konala medzinárodná konferencia V4 Good Governance Forum, http://www.
minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy&sprava=v-bratislava-sa-konala-medzinarodna-konferencia-v4-
good-governance-forum
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In connection to educational, research, culture and mobility projects, it is im-
portant to mention the role of the International Visegrad Fund. The IVF began 
opening up to non-V4 applicants in 2004, after the adoption of the Kroměříž 
Declaration and Guidelines on the Future Areas of Visegrad Cooperation by 
the V4 governments. The Western Balkans soon became one of the long-term 
priority regions, with Serbia, Albania and Macedonia being the major recipi-
ents. Currently, the whole Visegrad+ grant scheme is dedicated to the Western 
Balkan region. 
Certain restrictions of the development of the sectoral cooperation of the V4 
countries with BiH and common projects are caused by the structure of the 
EU’s territorial cooperation. Poland is not directly covered by the EU Strategy 
for the Danube Region (EUSDR), which includes the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary, and BiH. This makes it difficult to build project consortia with 
the participation of Polish stakeholders. BiH is also a partner state of the Inter-
reg Danube Transnational Programme (DTP) – but this also does not include 
Poland. To overcome this gap, the V4 could facilitate for stakeholders from Po-
land to take part in the DTP, using the 20% ERDF flexibility rule (according to 
this rule entities from countries not taking part in the programme area can 
participate in projects as partners). Using the same rule, V4 could try to allow 
operators from BiH to participate in joint consortia applying for funding from 
Central Europe Interreg programmes, which cover all the V4 countries.
3. #V4BiH: future challenges and opportunities
In November 2015, the foreign ministers of the V4 countries wrote a joint ar-
ticle for the major newspapers of the Balkan states (including the Oslobođenje 
daily in BiH), which emphasised the close relationship of the Visegrad Group 
with the countries of the Western Balkans. They support the European aspira-
tions of countries in the region and underline that the crises the EU is facing at 
the moment, the migration and refugee crisis being one of the most challeng-
ing, will not be a cause for hesitation on our side with regard to our support 
for further EU enlargement.311 Similar assurances were heard at a meeting of 
ministers of V4 and the Balkans in Prague. These were important statements 
after a series of disagreements, which highlighted the divisions in Europe on 
refugee issues, manifested also in disputes between Hungary and Croatia and 
Serbia. The V4 emphasising the importance of considering the needs of EU 
311 Joint article by Visegrad Group foreign ministers, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/joint_ar-
ticle_by_visegrad_group_foreign_ministers  
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transit countries and providing an assistance programme for the protection of 
their borders, signals a ‘positive agenda’ to the partners in Western Balkans to 
cope with the problem of massive migration.
On the political level the Visegrad Group has proved to be a committed advo-
cate of the region in the EU and a supporter of the integration ambitions of the 
countries of the Western Balkans. As noted by the Serbian expert Jelica Minić, 
“the V4 can be a bridge for the Western Balkans. Maybe the Visegrad Group 
could not play the role of top driver, but it can better understand problem of 
the Western Balkans and approach them on a more equal footing than other 
big European countries”.312 
The Visegrad Group may affect a number of factors which are important for 
the stabilisation and Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH including by strength-
ening the commitment of the international community – especially the EU – to 
the reform process in BiH, increasing the determination required to impose 
specific legal, political and administrative actions. Using good examples and 
the transfer of know-how, particularly in sectoral areas, V4 can influence BiH’s 
political elite and explain the consequences of their inaction. 
Examples and encouragement from Central Europe, including successful mod-
els of reconciliation and interethnic cooperation, may be useful in shaping the 
attitudes of local communities in BiH, who are predominantly interested in EU 
membership, but also emotionally involved in internal conflicts. The citizens 
of BiH expect reforms, but often do not understand the benefits of the imple-
mentation of the EU’s requirements and without clearly formulated conditions 
in EU agenda, they have a problem with identifying politicians guilty of fail-
ures.
It is in terms of widening public support for reforms that V4 can find its niche 
specialisation, by extending cooperation with local authorities, as well as with 
groups that could be directly affected by integration, such as farmers and small 
entrepreneurs. According to Bosnian expert Haris Mašinović, the bottom-up 
approach has already been tried and is yielding some results, but its present 
form is not sufficient. NGOs generally remain fragmented and typically suf-
fer from the legacy of ‘donor mentality’. Various donor programmes sought to 
work with either the local levels of authority, i.e. municipalities on relevant 
312 Quoted after M. Tacconi, op. cit. See also J. Minić, op. cit.
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reforms, or with low-level actors, such as local business/farmers communities/
associations, generally on capacity building and on some institutional/proce-
dural reform. There are successes, and interest for them to be replicated in 
other municipalities, but the ability of those changes to filter up has so far been 
limited. The municipal elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina scheduled for au-
tumn 2016 should be considered as an opportunity to boost the implementation 
of the Reform Agenda at the level of municipalities.
In the coming years the initiative of strengthening the stability and pro-West-
ern orientation of BiH will arouse the interest of the EU and NATO. This is due 
to growing concern about the whole region, migration pressures, the develop-
ment of the so-called Berlin Process initiated in August 2014 by Chancellor An-
gela Merkel, and also the entry into force of the SAA and the implementation 
of the new EU strategy towards BiH. 
The Czech V4 Presidency in the V4 (2015/2016) also included the Western Bal-
kans in the foreign policy priorities and the presidency is focused intensively 
on the development of the Western Balkan Fund. In sectoral cooperation the 
Czech presidency prioritises the areas of environment and justice.313 New V4 
activities concerning BiH during the Polish Presidency of the V4 (2016/2017) 
could strengthen the position of Poland as a country that does not focus only on 
the eastern flank of the EU and NATO, but as one which is ready to extend part-
nerships also in South-Eastern Europe. Preparations for the Polish Presidency 
of the V4 in the area of  the Western Balkans should also include an attempt 
to strengthen political cooperation in the V4, including the exchange of views 
and to synchronise positions on the EU’s involvement in BiH, including the fu-
ture of EUFOR Althea and international institutions in BiH and how to boost 
reform efforts. In terms of sectoral cooperation the Polish V4 Presidency should 
consider dividing responsibilities among the V4 countries, as was the case with 
Ukraine in 2014. A division of thematic/sectoral priorities would contribute to 
the dynamisation of the EU integration process of BiH and at the same time it 
would increase the reputation of the V4 in terms of know-how transfer. 
Transport and the development of infrastructure connections between BiH 
and the EU seems to be a promising area for V4+BiH cooperation, though 
so far only Croatia has taken part in the extended summit of V4 transport 
313 V4 Trust – Programme for the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group (July 2015–June 2016), 
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/20152016-czech
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ministers.314 BiH remains on the margins of the European transport network, 
which hinders the development of trade and tourism. There is potential for the 
development of the Vc transport corridor, connecting the countries of Central 
Europe and BiH and which is the shortest route to BiH (and – onwards to the 
Dalmatian coast) from the Eastern part of the V4 and Baltic countries. It repre-
sents the continuation of the North-South axis, crucial for V4 cooperation. In 
the years 2011-2015 102 km of motorways were built in BiH (35% of the length of 
the Vc corridor) and further investments are planned.315 
Energy policy is also a potentially important aspect of V4 and BiH cooperation. 
In this area, both BiH and the V4 countries cooperate in the Energy Commu-
nity. The integration of energy infrastructure within the North-South energy 
project corridor would help diversify supply routes and sources of gas to the 
Balkans. The key project of this cooperation is the construction of LNG termi-
nals in Poland and Croatia. 
Poland, alongside its V4 partners provides an example of a relatively successful 
transformation and the benefits of integration (especially for the agricultural 
sector). Meanwhile, the lack of funds for Polish development aid in the West-
ern Balkans significantly reduces the influence of Polish public diplomacy. The 
synergistic action of the V4 countries, even with scant resources, may serve 
to build public support for reforms in BiH and European integration. The BiH 
embassy V4 countries already implementing joint actions: joint celebration of 
national holidays or annual V4 film festival. 
There is an urgent need to develop a new V4 public diplomacy strategy careful-
ly tailored to BiH. Despite its impact, described above, there is a limited aware-
ness among the general population of BiH about the V4 and its activities. It was 
further weakened by the negative image created by the coverage of the refugee 
crisis (Hungary raising a border fence, etc.). This strategy would not have to be 
a grand scheme, it would suffice if it focused on activities at the local level – es-
pecially outside of Sarajevo, and if it centred on young people. One of the great-
est strengths of V4 is cooperation beyond borders, a model acutely applicable 
314 The topic of the meeting was ‘At the beginning of the new financial framework: exchange of 
experience in the implementation of infrastructure projects using EU funds’ so the partici-
pation of Croatia – as a soon-to-be EU member – can be considered a natural step. The other 
participants were: the three Baltic countries, and Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.
315 Modernizace dopravní infrastruktury ve Federaci Bosny a Hercegoviny, http://www.busi-
nessinfo.cz/cs/clanky/modernizace-dopravni-infrastruktury-ve-federaci-bosny-a-herce-
goviny-70964.html
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
157
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
16
to an ethnically and politically divided BiH. This could be the backbone of any 
public diplomacy approach. The implementation of such a strategy would not 
have to involve major financial backing. On the most basic level, elements of V4 
promotion could be done by the diplomatic representatives of V4 countries in 
BiH, who already receive funding for public diplomacy from their respective 
ministries. Here V4 could address young people by e.g. promoting university 
opportunities in each of the four Visegrad countries (which in any case falls 
under the responsibilities of diplomats) or by the promotion of cultural events 
which are organised (anyway) by all four embassies in Sarajevo (and culture 
tends to be the main barrier-breaking area in the Balkans). A strategy of this 
kind should also have its social media component. It would not have to be sig-
nificant.316 With unemployment being arguably the biggest challenge for young 
people in BiH, development of common initiatives (organised by all four em-
bassies) outside of Sarajevo addressing various aspects of entrepreneurship, 
linked with the advertisement of available funds (from the IVF) could poten-
tially have an observable impact. The biggest potential challenge is in identify-
ing local partners, as these initiatives should go beyond cooperation with local 
governments and civil society institutions, with educational institutions pos-
sibly the best partners to reach young people directly. Should there be the will 
to develop a grander pan-V4 public diplomacy strategy for BiH, moving beyond 
the day-to-day cooperation of embassies, this impact could be even bigger. 
316 For example, the establishment of a common hashtag, like #V4BiH, for all social media would 
help in maintaining a very basic virtual database listing all initiatives/ideas/endeavours de-
veloped under the common umbrella of V4. Special thanks to Jarosław Wiśniewski for the 
comments about public diplomacy.
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On 15 February 2016 Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for membership 
of the European Union. This was the result of the new policy strategy which 
the EU introduced in 2014, aimed at unblocking BiH’s integration process 
and encouraging local elites to accelerate the reform process. Despite 
a formal application to the EU, the main internal problems of BiH remain the 
same – local politicians focus more on the power struggle and enhancing 
ethnic division than on reform and this is hampering the economic 
development of one of the poorest countries in Europe. For these reasons 
this report is devoted to analysing the internal challenges to the stability, 
coherence and unity of the country. Special attention was also placed 
on examining the interest and strategies of the various international actors 
since they can hinder or support the reform process.
The Western Balkans, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, is playing 
a prominent role in the framework of V4 cooperation. The stability of this 
region and its integration with the EU is of vital interest to the V4 countries. 
It was for this reason that the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), alongside 
partner institutions from the V4 countries – the Research Centre of the 
Slovak Foreign Policy Association (RC SFPA), the Institute of International 
Relations (IIR) from the Czech Republic, and GEO Research from Hungary 
– and supported by the International Visegrad Fund, decided to develop 
a joint research project focused on BiH.
